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ALL AROUND THE WORLD SAME SONG:
BLACKNESS, RACISM, AND POPULAR
CULTURE IN CHINA
ROBIN R. MEANS COLEMAN1
This autoethnographic account of the author’s trip across mainland China explores
the role popular culture plays in informing racial understandings and intercultural
exchanges between two families, one African American and one White American,
as well as between Chinese encountered along the journey. Specifically, this
autoethnography works to expose moments when popular culture—music, music
videos, dance, style, travel brochures, advertisements, film, and broadcast media
— prompts cultural misunderstandings and fuels racial stereotypes. This study
seeks to complicate extant scholarship on racial representations by considering
how such popular culture forms translate in transnational contexts. It is argued
here that the global circulation of raced discourses (re)produce complex,
hierarchical notions of power and cultural worth. 
Keywords: autoethnography, blackness, China, whiteness
“There is no racism in China because there are no Black people.” —A Chengdu
University Student quoted in the Shanghai Star, April 17, 2003
Mainland China, February 2007
My husband, RC, and I enter a crowded food and sundries market on the rural outskirts
of Xi’an. We are entranced by what to us, as urban-dwelling African Americans, is the
unfamiliar spectacle of the place—from an elderly man with a small, razor-sharp knife
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quickly and methodically cutting the throats of live chickens to sell them under his blood-
splattered, blue plastic tarp, to a female adolescent hawking herbal remedies infused with
ground “dragon bones.” However, on this day, it is neither the conditions under which
chickens are slaughtered, nor the purported remnants of flying dragons that are on
exhibition; today, as it has been for much of our stay in China, it is we who are on display.
Our entrance into the market is greeted with shouting, pointing, and staring. “What are they
saying?” I ask our guide Ting. She hesitates, self-censoring her response. Ting opts to plead
ignorance, even as several dozen people begin to press in around us very clearly yelling
something, something that is not in my Chinese-English dictionary or part of my limited
Mandarin vocabulary. 
A few dozen women walk behind me, and then reach around to my face to run their
fingers quickly across my cheek or to give a quick pull of the tips of my long dredloc’d hair.
After this first, daring wave of curious women examine my Black body, more, and more, and
more women rush up, reaching out in the hopes of doing the same—touching and pulling.
Absolutely no one touches RC. For whatever reason RC is spared (gender discrimination
perhaps?) from this moment of objectification, I feel as though he is the lucky one. Ready
to bolt from this claustrophobic place, RC and I look for a way out of the market’s labyrinth.
Finally, Ting shoos the women off, putting a stop to the drama. She explains to us that the
women are not sure our skin is really our skin. Ting has given up on feigning
incomprehension, and she now seems willing to talk about what we are experiencing. But
I am unclear as to what she is trying to convey, so I tread carefully: “Do they think I’m
dirty?” To this, Ting responds emphatically, “No, no! They think it is like a powder, for
girls’ faces. They are seeing…checking the color underneath.” I am still confused about
what, exactly, Ting is telling me they are checking for. “Where do they see people with
powdered makeup covering their skin?” I ask. And now I have confused Ting with my
question. She seeks her own clarification, “Where?” So I try to rephrase, working to bridge
our language gap: “Would they have seen someone around here with make-up on her face,
but that make-up is covering…covering up what?” Ting’s face moves from confusion to a
smile evidencing understanding. She explains, “Yes, covering a different color skin. But not
here [gesturing around the market]. But, all around, on TV.”
All around, indeed. With Ting barring any other opportunities for such close encounters
by the curious, RC and I are able to take in our own unfettered look about the market.
Directly before us, there is fodder for cultural misunderstanding in the form of Black Man
(formerly, “Darkie”) toothpaste being sold in a stall. The brand name of Hong Kong’s Hazel
& Hawley Chemical Company’s “Darkie” toothpaste was only changed after the company
was acquired by Colgate in 1985. The Darkie brand’s Al Jolson-inspired logo, a grinning
caricature in blackface and wearing a top hat, was as offensive as its name. After buying the
company, Colgate [slightly] altered the logo and changed the product’s name to “Darlie,”
but only after U.S. civil rights groups protested. However, the Cantonese name - Haak Yahn
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Figure 1
Figure 2
Nga Gou or “Black Man Toothpaste” remains for Asian
marketing (Kolpakov, V., 2006).  [See Figure 1].1
In other cities such as Shanghai and Chongqing, RC and I
spot posters adorning the storefronts of hip music and video
stores, hailing the arrival of The Bubble Sisters’ third CD, “Vol.
3-Dramatic Episode” which was released in China on February
9, 2007. The Korean quartet’s stage act, writes the Korea Herald,
includes painting themselves black, donning afros, sticking their lips
out in caricature and dancing in pajamas [.…] The girls jump
around, pulling faces and wearing grotesquely distorted “rubber-
lips” makeup that harks back to the White Minstrel comedy acts
dominant in 1830’s America, bringing up unsavory issues like slavery, exploitation, racism -
issues the West has spent a century trying to bury. To make matters worse, the girls sing about
being ugly and not satisfying their true love, creating an unfortunate juxtaposition (Hodges, M.,
2003). [See Figure 2].
Ting and I are now close to fully understanding each other, “So, you see people with
make-up on to change their skin color on TV? Do you mean on CCTV?” “Yes,” Ting
explains, “our people put on make-up to look like you. On singing contests for prizes.” 
As RC and I make our way across mainland China—Shanghai, Wuhan, Yishang, along
the Yangtze River, Wushan, Fengdu, Chongqing, Xi’an, and Beijing, questions emerge for
me about cross-cultural, racial understandings. What meanings do the Chinese bring to, and
take away from, their encounters with African Americans? What are the sources of cultural
(mis)understanding between the Chinese and African Americans? What role does the
transnationalization of popular culture forms such as television, advertising, music and
music videos, Internet-circulated discourse, and film play in these understandings? Is cross-
cultural (mis)understanding between the Chinese and African Americans markedly different
from White Americans’ understanding of African Americans? And, in what ways do African
Americans (mis)understand Chinese and White Americans?
Here, I draw upon instances of close cross-cultural encounters
to highlight the role popular culture plays in interpersonal
interactions in China between RC and I, as African
Americans, and a family of White Americans, and between
some Chinese we meet. To be sure, none of us represent ideal
types. Nonetheless, our interactions work as examples to
assist in an interrogation of our responses to each other.
Unlike recent scholarship that has focused on concerns of the
appropriation of (Black) Western culture by some central
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Asians (e.g., de Kloet, 2005; Wang, 2007: 35-68), this article explores the meanings
assigned to Black, White, American, Chinese, and Asian cultures, in the context of central
Asia, by attending to the circulation of popular culture. The goal here is to reveal how
popular culture informs how we take, as Crang (1997: 360) posits, “part in the world” rather
than popular culture simply “reflecting it.” 
I choose to pursue these queries through the methodological lens of autoethnography.
Autoethnography, write Ellis and Bochner (2000: 745), is “an autobiographical genre of
writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal
to the cultural. Back and forth autoethnographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-
angle lens, focusing outward on social and cultural aspects of their personal experience;
then, they look inward, exposing a vulnerable self […]” (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 746). In
autoethnography, with the researcher as subject, it is the researcher’s activities that are
under investigation. That researcher as subject “ask[s] their readers to feel the truth of their
stories and to become coparticipants, engaging the storyline morally, emotionally,
aesthetically, and intellectually” (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 746). Thus, autoethnography
describes a writing practice that is emotional, self-conscious, and first person. In
autoethnographies, the personal-cultural-social is brought to bear for reflexive interrogation.
It “confronts dominant forms of representation and power in an attempt to reclaim, through
self-reflective response, representational spaces that have marginalized those of us at the
borders” (Tierney, 1998: 66). 
To begin to answer my questions, I keep a field log of my and RC’s experiences and
interactions with some of China’s citizens, as well as with the other foreign travelers, we
meet up with during our travels. The field log includes detailed observational and analytical
notes, as well as photographs, and other documents. These data reveal a complex array of
racial decodings that relate to cross-cultural (mis)understanding which work to either
facilitate and/or impede race relations. For example, data evidence themes of ethnocentrism,
in which the Chinese are viewed as excessively raced. There are themes of racial symbolic
annihilation, in which African Americans represent a cultural lack with their usefulness
residing only in their potential to entertain. And, there are themes of what I would call an
“embodied Other” where the raced body is seen as an object that houses stereotypes and
myths. 
ETHNOCENTRISM FROM IOWA TO CHINA
During the tourist “low season” — December through March when the weather ranges
across China from cool to brutally frigid—the country’s approximately 22 million annual
international visitors  diminishes to a trickle. Massive chartered buses are replaced with2
Toyota minivans or mid-sized Buick sedans to transport the few foreign tourists to China’s
many cultural highlights. Challenges arise, however, if a low season trip (such as ours)
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coincides with the Chinese New Year/Spring Festival, a two-week celebration that sees
China’s major urban areas emptied of its populace as millions of migrant workers return
home, often to remote farming villages several days by train away from the cities. With
these two February events conspiring, the low season and the arrival of the New Year (the
year of the pig), an ostensibly unusual turn of events for logistical expediency by our
excursion coordinators put RC and I in the company of the Benson family for parts of our
trip. The three Bensons—Brian, Delores, and Paul—hail from Iowa, are White, and all are
in their late 60s. Somehow, the Beijing landmark tours RC and I pre-arranged through our
travel agency become their itinerary too. As best we can tell, their travel agent worked with
a Chinese tour brokerage firm—one that our agency used as well. Their agent likely said,
“Don’t worry, we’ll see that you have a good time,” while failing to ask the Bensons about
their tastes or for their input into the design of their own travel plan. This is but one of many
things that make the Bensons very unhappy in China.
Introducing the Bensons3
Brian and Delores are husband and wife, with four adult children at home in Iowa. The
Benson family represents several generations of grain and cattle farmers. Today, the Benson
clan primarily produce corn to be converted into ethanol fuel. According to 2000 U.S.
census data, Iowa farmers earn an average income of $41,000. The Benson family farm is
not the largest in their area – those would be owned by corporations – but Brian confides
that they continue to “do all right. Not the best. But not nearly as bad as some.” He should
know their competition well, as their specific community is a small farming village with a
population of approximately 230 people representing around 60 families, with some of those
60 interrelated through marriage. According to Delores, their town was 100% White;
however, that distinction changed recently with the arrival of a pair of Latino men who are
employed as cooks in a local restaurant. On seeing their numbers reduced to 99.13% White
with less than 1%, approximately .87%, reporting as non-Black Hispanic,  Delores divulges4
to us over dinner one evening, “They are starting to move in; even where we live” and that
“It has become a big issue.”
Brian and Delores confide to RC and I that they would not even be in China were it not
for Brian’s brother Paul, who has financed the entire trip for the trio—“Who’s gonna turn
down a free trip!” Brian chuckles. Paul is the self-described “cosmopolitan” of the family.
He attended a regional university in Iowa where he completed training as a dentist. Over the
years, Paul has accumulated thousands of frequent flyer miles, which, as a widower and not
wanting to travel alone, he uses to treat himself and his brother and sister-in-law to trips.
Paul crowed about the three days he spent in Macau, or “the Orient” as he called it, three
years ago. Paul chose a return visit to China on his travel agent’s recommendation since she
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had convinced him he had “not really seen China” during his earlier 72 hour trip to a Macau
casino. 
Indeed, by comparison, Paul does seem more “cosmopolitan” than Brian and Delores.
Paul is embarrassed when his brother and sister-in-law unabashedly proclaim their profound
dislike of museums while, too, complaining loudly about how are forced to suffer through
lectures by docents. Likewise, this Benson family conversation at a museum gift shop leaves
Paul noticeably mortified:
Brian calling out to Delores and Paul: “Hey, you guys should buy from that little
oriental gal over here. You can “Jew” her down.”
Delores: “That little oriental gal there?” [To Paul]: “I picked up four of those Terra
Cotta soldiers for the kids, I didn’t think to ‘Jew’ them.”
Paul [shooting a furtive glance in my and RC’s direction]: “Shhhh! You’re talking a
little loud.”
All three Bensons insist on being presented with the English names of our various tour
guides. Jia, our Tiananmen Square and Forbidden City lecturer, bristles at this demand —
to provide an English name, because his Chinese name is easy to pronounce. Barely
containing his contempt for the Bensons, who refuse to even say his name, Jia growls at all
of us, “Some disregard Mao today, but he was a great man who fought the Western
imperialists!” Jia then seethes to our group, “Just call me Mark!” And the Benson’s do. RC
and I are especially hurt that Jia has lumped us in with the Benson’s bad behaviors. When
they act out or insult, in our judgment, they soil us too. As a result, at times, we as a tour
group appear comically ridiculous as each of us refuses to yield on our ideological
entrenchments:
Robin: “Jia, what is that over there?”
Paul: “I’m sorry Mark, we didn’t hear you back here. What did you say that was?”
While this incident could have easily allowed RC and I to position ourselves as self-
righteously enlightened, it worked to do the opposite. We came away feeling burdened. We
took it upon ourselves to act as an intermediary between the Bensons and Jia, perhaps with
the goal of evidencing to them both the “goodness” of African Americans. In Jia’s presence,
we felt the double-consciousness of being both Black, but also of being potentially viewed
as the “ugly American.” As such, we took the approach of trying to earn his favor, and to
recast Blackness as positive, by behaving as a sensitive cultural brokers.
By contrast, what the Bensons are making plain through their rhetoric and behavior is
not only an ethnocentrism—evaluating Chinese cultures as deficient in comparison to their
own, and based upon a very limited experiential base—but they are also making obvious
their judgment of the Chinese by reacting to what Prashad (2001: 127)  calls a myth of an5
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“excess of culture.” Discussing their experiences in Iowa, the Bensons present a form of
American Whiteness that views Latinos as fraudulent citizens who are lacking because they
seemingly have little to contribute to the Benson’s tight-knit community. The Latino men
are seen as “takers”—moving in and taking over, thereby consuming without offering
anything useful in return. By contrast, where Latinos represent lack to the Bensons, the
Chinese represent excess. They are too “little” and too markedly “oriental,” and their
language too difficult. Later the Bensons would deem Asian food too “different” to even try
to consume, and the Chinese customs too peculiar. For example, Brian refuses to eat when
he is supplied with chopsticks; instead he turns boisterous, demanding from restaurant food
servers a “U.S. of A., fork”. That the Bensons are on the Chineses’ turf is irrelevant, making
their reaction to Chinese culture little different than Whites’ first encounters with Asians in
18  century America. According to Prashad, Whites during this time had a view ofth
themselves as virtuous, but “when the first Asians arrived in the Americas, the White
patriarchs found their presence foul […] they came to be seen as fundamentally alien [and]
as oozing cultural sloth mainly through their language, food, and hair” (Prashad, 2001: 127).
This view of Asianness means that it can never shed its “Other”. In the Bensons’ view, the
Chinese have to find ways to adapt their culture to Western ideals, such as adopting
Westernized names and cutlery; but the Chinese, even in China, should not expect
accommodations in the reverse.
BET: Black Entertainment Tourists
In 2005, CBC News reported how then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s race was
ridiculed by some of China’s educated elite on the Chinese website Sine.com. Some wrote
that Rice was, “a black devil,” “a black pig,” “a black whore” and “a black female dog.”
While others offered: “You’re not even as good as a black devil, a real waste of a life,” “her
brain is blacker than her skin,” “the ugliest woman in the world,” and “she looks like an
orangutan, and talks rubbish; send us a beautiful woman next time” (Chao, S.Y., 2005).
In spite of these select racist opinions, I hold out hope for signs of personal syncretism
between us and some Chinese. Literature and popular imagery embed in my imagination a
connection with the Chinese built around political solidarity. I recite to myself a line from
W.E.B. DuBois’ poem “I Sing China: ‘Hail, dark brethren of mine’” (Mullen B. & Watson
C., 2005: vii). I allow myself to adopt a naïve, uncomplicated view of a Black and Yellow
diaspora formed out of our variously Othered existences; as DuBois described, “we are
all—we the Despised and Oppressed—the “niggers” of England and America” (Prashad, V.,
2000: 173). Likewise, I recall Richard Wright, who at the 1955 Bandung Conference noted
calls for an Asian-African/Yellow-Black alliance with guarded optimism, but did not dispute
our common opponent: 
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Who had thought of organizing such a meeting? And what had these nations in common?
Nothing, it seemed to me, but what their past relationship to the Western world had made
them feel. This meeting of the rejected was in itself a kind of judgment upon the Western
world! (Wright, R., 1995: 12).
Indeed, I suspend my disbelief about racial disharmony in ways I would never do so at
home in the States. Discriminatory moments in China get a “pass” from me in large part
because the presence of the Bensons serve as a distraction. Theirs is what RC and I call
undifferentiated, “one size fits all” bigotry. In short, I come to conclude that the enemy of
my enemy is my friend. I engage China with the belief that it can offer me whatever it is I
believe I am lacking on the racial solidarity front at home. There is some legitimate reason
to believe that China can provide such solidarity. Vice Foreign Minister of the People’s
Republic of China, Wang Guangya’s remarks at the 2001 World Conference Against Racism
leaves me optimistic about our same-mindedness: 
Colonialism, foreign invasion, slave trade and Apartheid are all typical manifestations of
racism, which inflicted untold sufferings on the countries and people across Asia, Africa and
Latin America. In Asia, innocent people were trampled underfoot by colonialists and foreign
invaders. From the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and from South East Asia to Middle East,
none of the cradles of ancient human civilization was spared by the wreckage and
destruction. In Africa, the colonialists treaded on every inch of the land under their iron
heels, and slave trade was the darkest page written in human history with the blood and tears
of countless African sons and daughters. […] Our forefathers left an old maxim with us, “all
men are brothers within the Four Seas.” Though we hail from different parts of the world and
vary in race and color, we have similar genomes, and our ideal in pursuit of equality,
happiness and peace is the same. (Guangya, W., 2001) 
Though we are all “brothers within the Four Seas,” in China RC is regarded as a
“brotha” as defined by and seen in media. RC came to understand that popular culture had,
in the a priori, tainted for some in China understandings of Black masculinity and its worth.
Blackness According to “Barbershop”
We are just 72 hours from New Year’s Eve in China: it is the national holiday. RC and
I are excited that we will soon be in Beijing celebrating with over 10 million people. For
now, however, we are in Xi’an with Qin (no Bensons on this leg of the trip), a local guide
who has spent much of the day leading RC and I on tours of neighborhoods. Qin chats RC
up about men’s fashions, about RC’s lack of “bling-bling,” and about the national
excitement around the coming Olympics in Beijing. We all get along so splendidly that,
though his duties as a hired guide for the day are complete, Qin invites us to dinner at his
favorite neighborhood restaurant. Watching Qin and RC hang out and laugh together is the
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embodiment of the equality, happiness, and peace Vice Foreign Minister Guangya talked
about, and which I had hoped we would experience. 
The restaurant Qin has taken us to is really a massive banquet room, and it even has a
large stage for people to climb up on for impromptu karaoke performances and dancing. The
place is packed with city workers being treated to a holiday feast by their companies’
bosses. The employees, lubricated by truly enormous quantities of Chongqing beer, engage
in lots of singing, joking, and loud talk. Our meal finished, Qin, RC, and I wind our way past
tables crowded with festive diners and move toward the elevator. Unfortunately, the elevator
does not come fast enough—not before an inebriated celebrant grabs a digital camera and
leaps from his table. The man rushes over to RC and gleefully snaps the flash directly in his
face. Then the reveler goes much too far. First in Chinese, then slowly, crudely translating
into English, he punctuates each word with hysterical laughter and looks back at his
tablemates to see if they are watching— they are. The man attempts to hand RC a coin while
telling him, “Get my coat.” If there is any doubt that we are mistaken about any part of the
man’s cruelty, Qin’s gasps of horror and his leap into the finally available elevator in an
effort to flee the whole scene reveal otherwise. In a controlled, yet scolding voice, RC says
directly to the drunk, “You should be ashamed of yourself.” It is a purely lucky but brilliant
choice of words. Qin tells us later that “losing of face” is one of the worst situations a
Chinese person might find oneself in. Because RC has kept steady composure, RC “wins”
by being the most respectable. Indeed, in being subjected to RC’s measured admonishment
the man is instantly sobered and immediately embarrassed. He apologizes profusely,
interestingly, not to RC, but to Qin. Later, RC and I would ponder this man’s ability to speak
directly to RC when RC was seen as the Black buffoon stereotype. When RC presented
himself as real, human, and humane, and therefore outside of media’s imagistic constraints,
the man could no longer communicate with RC.
Those who have gathered at the elevator for a closer look at the action now join us for
the ride down. They pepper RC with questions, or rely on Qin to interpret, “Where are you
from? Do you speak Chinese? Are you a sports star? A rapper?” RC is often presumed to
be an athlete or a rapper, even as his age, weight, and style of dress do not prove to be a
signifier for either line of work. Perhaps in some of the Chineses’ minds, Black male wealth
stereotypically comes from two principle sources of what I call the “Black entertainment
economy” —sports or music. Though neither the Bensons’ presence, nor that of other White6
tourists such as those we run into from Australia, raise an eyebrow, we as Black Americans
seem to be judged as out of place. It is often assumed that we are in China for some other
specific job-related purpose, such as to promote a concert tour or in connection with a
sports-marketing event. While walking us back to our hotel, Qin makes sense of our
reception in China. 
Qin: “So, RC, you are not a rapper, huh? Are you a policeman or something?”
RC: “A policeman? Wow, no. What makes you ask that?”
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Qin: “It’s how you handled that man. You were very firm, very calm.”
RC: “Qin, we’ve got to know. Everywhere, we’ve been kinda the center of attention.
People taking our pictures...We are kinda getting more attention than most foreigners. Is
there an understanding of Black...?”
Qin [suddenly interrupting]: “Like Barbershop!“
RC: “What???”
Qin: “Black. Like Ice Cube. Like “Barbershop.” [Plainly] Um hmm. But you were
different with that man in the restaurant. He didn’t expect you to be like that.”
Robin:”Wait! You mean to tell me that what he knows about Black folks is from
movies like “Barbershop!?”
Qin: [Rather matter of fact] “It’s very popular here.”
Robin:”Oh Lord!” [I proceed to rant] “That man in the restaurant …when RC didn’t
act like a servant or grin then people didn’t know what to make of him!”
Qin: “Um, well, yeah.” 
Robin:”Look. You don’t want us foreigners learning about China only through the
movies do you?”
And then Qin offers a measure of confirmation for Park, et. al’s (2006: 160) assertion
that the naturalization of racial differences through comedic stereotyping discourages
critical engagement with racial discourse. Qin puts forth, “Yeah, but Blacks are very good
with, you know, funny comedy.”
Touring Yellow and Black Bodies
RC and I do not want to engage China as tourists in China; rather, we want to be good
travelers. The difference is crucial. Vardalos (2003: 2) writes,
The motivations of the tourist are commonly assumed to be self-gratification, hedonism, and
escape, while the motivations of the traveler are presented as spiritual rejuvenation,
education, and concern about the world and its inhabitants. The tourist’s character is viewed
as cautious, oblivious to inauthenticity, and unmindful of others, but the traveler’s character
is presented as adventurous, intelligent, independent, and conscientious.
RC and I are what McKercher, Wong, and Lau (2006: 650) would call the “Tour-taker.”
A tour-taker, they write, “buys multiple sightseeing, cultural or special interest tours during
the visit. [They] describe themselves as being curious about the local culture and interested
in developing a deeper understanding […] purchasing a tour provides them with an
opportunity to gain a more authentic, back of the house understanding.” Toward this end of
“tour-taker,” we arrange for a series of tours, sometimes several excursions per city, per day.
The Bensons, by Vardalos’ definition, are tourists. 
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The Bensons take photos of that which speaks to their oft-proclaimed theme of “look
how poor they are.” Paul snaps a photo of what the Chinese call “bom bom” men — rural
farmers that come into the cities to make extra money by toting heavy packages, balanced
on a rod of bamboo. On one occasion, Delores kneels down close to the ground to capture
a close-up photo of a severely handicapped, blind woman lying in the street. Delores
chooses not to leave a coin behind in the woman’s donation cup. 
In my view, the Bensons were promised a particular story about China largely through
media—tour brochures, textbooks, movies, and fiction literature, and they worked to capture
that story through their camera lens. John Urry, in his seminal book The Tourist Gaze (2002:
129), explains: 
What is sought for in a holiday is a set of photography images, which have already been seen
in tour company brochures or on TV programmes. While the tourist is away, this then moves
on to a tracking down and capturing of those images for oneself. And it ends up with
travellers demonstrating that they really have been there by showing their version of the
images that they had seen before they set off.
Our own picture taking focuses on objects—the Great Wall; the Terra Cotta soldiers;
mountains, rivers, and boats; a school for the arts in Beijing where actress Gong Li trained;
a music school in Shanghai for children learning stringed instruments; towering statues of
Buddha all across China; and signs marking the last 75 meters the Yangtze River has to rise
before it will completely flood out millions of people to make way for a hydroelectric power
station and dam. The photos that I take are to support my pedagogy in my “China Theme
Year” course I will teach when I return home. In part, I hope the images I bring back will
dispel myths about China as a land of mystical kung-fu fighters and sacrificing geishas. One
main “theme” of mine is the globalization of consumerism and commercialism. Neon
advertisements for Kentucky Fried Chicken, TDK, Wynn, Casio, Nikon, and Nestle intrigue
me. I capture a snapshot of a provocative department store window display for “Tony
Wear,” which juxtaposes Chinese men in “before” poses with White men in “after” poses
under the tag line, “New life style for you.” RC and I fail to notice that we have taken very
few photos of actual people until friends looking at our photos upon our return home point
out this fact. 
With this being the low season, tourist attractions are not being overrun by foreigners.
Rather, many Chinese are using the holiday to visit national landmarks with their families.
At different landmark sites, groups of Chinese gather around our guides, smiling
approvingly when they are able to detect that a fellow countryperson is displaying an
impressive command of the English Language. One of our guides reports the he finds this
phenomenon humorous since many of his admirers do not speak English themselves, and
have no real idea what is being said. After pride is shown toward the guides, RC and I brace
ourselves for what we know is coming next as it happens in location after location:
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hundreds, if not thousands, of personal cameras turn away from China’s most precious
artifacts to capture our image. RC, weary from enduring near constant attention, laments,
“I wonder how much of their vacation stories are going to be devoted to us and not to these
places?” 
By the time we join up with the Bensons, these incidents of being gazed upon are
routine for us. But, as it turns out the Bensons have some of the very same questions about
Blackness that the Chinese have posed. 
They, too, wonder what our proximity to the “Black entertainment economy” is, and are
similarly poised to snap our photos, but only if we are people of some popular entertainment
importance or notoriety. “No, I don’t rap, if that is what you are asking,” I respond, when
questioned if I am “a rapper performer, or some sort.” “But you listen to it,” asks Paul
accusingly. The Bensons’ cameras are lowered. Delores asks what I have done to my hair.
I don’t suffer Black hair questions well. I choose to ignore her. Undeterred, Delores next
questions my age, remarking how my smooth skin in contrast to the grey in my hair belies
any guess. By now I have grown annoyed with Delores. And still, I resist the temptation to
mischievously provide her with a new stereotype for this one: “Black don’t crack.” When,
under heavy questioning, I finally reveal that I am a professor (of media studies), Paul shows
surprise and begins to ponder the information for a moment when, “flash,” he stuns me by
snapping my photo. In his digital camera I appear after pictures of a Terra Cotta solider and
of a Starbucks in the Forbidden City. I’ll never know which he finds more amazing.
I, too, wonder what stories will accompany the images of our Black bodies taken by the
Bensons and the Chinese. This concern of embodiment is what Crang (1997) describes as
looking upon objects (e.g., bodies) as cultural products without knowing or controlling how
that looking will be taken up and used. I also fret over what stories will be attached to the
images of the Yellow bodies taken by the Bensons. As far as I can tell, no one—neither us
nor the Chinese—have shown much of an interest in capturing the Benson’s White bodies.
It may be argued that global media has turned seemingly “exotic” bodies into the
familiar; therefore, today, the “body tourist” can be more purposeful in the images that they
seek. Such body tourists are not seeking out photo opportunities that have been “set up.” For
example, during a trip RC and I once took to Jamaica, we saw a lavishly costumed elderly
man invite tourists to take his photo for $10. Rather, body tourists are now purposefully
striving to capture candid moments of purported authenticity with little recognition of how
their photos may work to supplement (problematic) media representations. As Buzinde et.
al (2006: 708) advance, the images we consume before embarking on a new experience
often offer an interpretation of the culture that reaffirms stereotypes, and ultimately embeds
“myths and expectations that affect how certain groups of people, whether locals or tourists,
are perceived.” As such, when the raced body becomes the voyage the tourist embarks on,
the body becomes the spectacle upon which a particular ideology is inscribed. 
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CONCLUSION
Autoethnography works to situate encounters and events into contexts of deeper
meaning and understanding. It is an endeavor that is “located between the interiority of
autobiography and the exteriority of cultural analysis,” and can, at times seem “heroic” to
some while “ludicrous” to others (Tedlock, 2000: 455). Indeed, revealing the presumptions
and prejudices the three groups displayed during this trip may to some be laudable, and to
others nonsensical. Autoethnography boasts a goal of focusing its readers’ attention upon
the ethnographic encounter while demanding that readers consider “the complex personal
and political dimensions involved in crossing cultural boundaries” (Tedlock, 2000: 466), as
well as writing and reporting about such boundaries. As such, regardless of reception, it is
my hope that this autoethnography works to encourage debate regarding how researchers
can counter criticisms that race has been studied “somewhat blithely” and devoid of
experiential and social context (Morris, 2007: 409). Additionally, readers of this study
should be aware that detailed analyses of individual cultural specificity remains elusive in
research (Hughes and Heuman, 2006: 34). This work also encourages readers to engage with
(and in) comparative cultural research that extends beyond binaries such as African
American and White American encounters. Certainly, cultural crossings do not happen in
a vacuum, rather, as evidenced here and as asserted by Kim, racialization trajectories of
groups are “profoundly interrelated” and “mutually constitutive of one another” (1999: 106).
If this autoethnography is any indication, our world seems woefully ill equipped to make
sense of the complexities of relationships that come with increasing global, cross-cultural
interaction. The Bensons viewed themselves as superior to the Chinese and to African
Americans (and, for that matter, Hispanics and Jews). Theirs was a sense of power based
on myths of white skin privilege. They are not “raced;” the rest of us are. Though they were
visiting the “middle kingdom,” it was the “U.S. of A.” and the English language, which were
thought to be central and dominant. Hence, as Dyer (1988: 44) concludes, “white power
secures its dominance by seeming not to be anything in particular,” that is, except better. By
engaging China only in ways that work to reaffirm their superiority, the Bensons returned
to Iowa without the kinds of alternate visions of their own and others’ culture that come with
travel. In leaving China resolute in their dissatisfaction with “Orientals,” the Bensons seem
guilty of textbook Edward Said’ist orientalism: “[…] The relationship between Occident and
Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of complex hegemony
[…] There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves
reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness” (1979: 2, 5, 7).
More pointedly, the relationships and degrees of hegemony RC and I are trying to sort
through is more complex than Occident vs. Orient. Rather, it is that of a “racial
triangle”—Black, White, and Asian—which, too, displays a varied hierarchy of power and
privilege. In our unique experience in China, one that should not be construed as universal,
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RC and I discovered that we as African Americans possessed no “cultural currency”
(Alexander, 2003: 106). Even if we could lay claim to membership in the Black
entertainment economy (actually, as a Black woman it was viewed as unlikely I was the
entertainer, rather I simply was accompanying RC who was thought to be either a
rapper/athlete), such an identity still worked to mark Blackness—its forms of cultural
practice, knowledge, history, vernaculars, and modes of social interaction—is at best
intriguing, but it does not necessarily increase Blackness’ hierarchical value. The work of
scholars such as Bow (2007) complicates this notion of hierarchy by reminding me of the
role (skin) colorism plays and how it informs identity investments. While I took to China
fantasies of DuBois/Wright/ Guangya-inspired political hybridity, I failed to consider, as
Bow would have me to, that some Asians do not construct themselves as “partly colored,”
rather they see value in being “almost White” (Bow, 2007: 3). Certainly, there were hints
of this phenomenon to be seen in the Tony Wear window display, as well as in
advertisements featuring models and products presenting a White European standard of
beauty.
Finally, in sorting through the trajectories of race in this Black, Chinese, and White
encounter, this autoethnography works to prompt others to interrogate and critique my own
flaws. First, I problematically conflated U.S. Chinese history in America as non-White and
Other (e.g., the Chinese in Mississippi during Reconstruction) with how mainland Chinese
view themselves in China as well as on the global stage. Seeking relationships of solidarity
need not be predicated on a group’s identifying as marginalized or experiencing
marginalization. The coalition seen between activist groups such as the Black Panther Party,
the Red Guard, and the Brown Berets in the 1970s U.S. is as much about location as it is
about their own internally constructed racial situatedness. Second, on an emotional level,
RC and I (perhaps as this study too prominently reveals) often felt that we were Black
objects, placed in a position of being acted upon. We were studied, gazed upon, and
pigeonholed. But as visitors to China, outsiders really, we felt powerless to flex our muscles
too much. This research should encourage readers to theorize strategies for (re)claiming
agency for all parties involved in cross-cultural encounters.
As for my mounting concern regarding what popular culture may be communicating
about American Blackness, sociologist Herman Gray (2005: 187) is troubled by the
preoccupation, by the “investment, overinvestment really, on the part of African American
cultural producers, media activists, and scholars in representation as the productive site of
cultural politics.” Gray is talking directly to me, as I am one of those scholars with
“preoccupations with positive and negative representations” (Gray, 2005: 187). Gray argues,
in part, that such a preoccupation is excessively local and one should not get entirely caught
up with worrying about judging gazes. Touche’ Gray. However, evolving and shifting
configurations of diaspora, nation-state, identity, and power, not to the exclusion of a
globalization of Westernness, Whiteness, and Western White ideologies, are all changing
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as cultural imagery goes global. My charge here is a simple one: there needs to be continued
exploration, at a micro level, into the diasporic racial triangle of Asian, Black, and White.
It would be productive for such an exploration to focus on how these groups view and relate
to one another, as well as how these relationships are predicated on a knowing informed, in
part by, popular culture. As communication and transportation technologies make the world
more intimate, the translocalization of global racisms (embedding local racisms into global
communications) and cultural misunderstandings becomes increasingly problematic. 
In 1999, at the MIT “Media in Transition: An International Conference,” Ingrid
Volkmer offered that, 
[…] growing density and complexity of communication are the sign of a growing “world
community.” To understand the new global sphere, its autonomy, independency and its
“mediation” will support the transition into a world community in the 21st century.
Indeed, understanding the complexity is what we need. However, understanding isn’t
easy. The difficulty of carrying out such cross-cultural communication is revealed through 
our trip. We felt superior to the Bensons given our perception of their bigotry. The Bensons
felt superior to us and to the Chinese based on what they believed was each of our
subordinate racial status. The Chinese felt superior to us and seemingly indifferent to White
tourists. And along the way RC and I encountered much north (Beijing) versus south
(Shanghai) posturing, with southerners saying they were more stylish than northerners, and
northerners saying the southerners were not too bright. What — a — mess! 
As an urban-dwelling Black woman, scholar and “tour-taker,” my unique experiential,
philosophical, and educational positions influenced my readings of the Bensons and the
Chinese with whom I interacted. Somehow, I thought these identities would help me to sort
out impressive solutions to race relations dilemmas. In fact, there is no happy ending. When
we returned home from our trip, all hell had broken loose in the U.S., and my email inbox
was full of messages from friends and colleagues with the subject line “have you heard
about this?” or “Blacks and Chinese.” While RC and I were away, Kenneth Eng, a (now
fired) reporter for Asian Weekly News had penned a column entitled, “Why I Hate Blacks.”
All around the world same song.
ENDNOTES
1. Note: Kolpakov is a local (Michigan) medical researcher-practitioner.
2. Based on China National Tourist 2006 data from www.cnto.org/chinastats.asp, accessed 21
March 2007.
3. “The Bensons” are a pseudonym. In addition to changing this family’s name, all important
identifying facts have been altered to ensure anonymity. 
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4. This data has been drawn from the 2000 U.S. Census. However, the exact location in which
they reside has been altered, and the exact population numbers have been rounded, in an effort to
protect the anonymity of the “Bensons.” 
5. On this point of “excess of culture,” Prashad cites and draws on the work of historian Robert
Lee. See: Lee, R. (1999). Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press. 
6. The concept “entertainment economy” comes from Michael Wolf’s (2003) book, The
Entertainment Economy: How Mega-Media Forces are Transforming our Lives, published by Three
Rivers Press. W olf describes such an economy as one preoccupied with a battle for celebrity and
attention, and as one in which popular entertainment forms are the fastest-growing segments in the
economy. According to Wolf, U.S. produced entertainment forms (e.g., mass media, concerts, sporting
events) and strategies used to commodify these forms is being replicated throughout the world. I
extended Wolf’s concept to Blackness to reveal how entertainment and marketing merge and become
culturally defining since Black economic and social success is often displayed through entertainment
forms. For example, Shaquille O’Neal success is defined through his participation in
entertainment—he is an athlete, a film, reality television, and television commercial star, and a rapper.
Relatedly, the Black entertainment economy works to explain how Blacks get their disposable income.
While in China, no one quested how the Bensons’ could afford such a costly trip. However, many
people wondered where RC and I got the funds for such travel. Award-winning journalist Cora Daniels
in her book, Ghetto Nation (2007: 7), published by Doubleday writes of similar travel experiences
born out of presumption that her husband (note the exclusion of Black women) is part of the Black
entertainment economy: “When my husband and I travel abroad, whether it be to South America,
Europe, or the Caribbean, at some point during the trip he will be asked, nicely, respectfully, and will
no ill intent, if he is a rapper. How else would a young Black man have cash to spend? […] Even in
Morocco they called my husband Puff Daddy and wanted to buy his “hip-hop” sunglasses right off his
face” […].
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THE MEDIA LOGIC OF MEDIA WORK
MARK DEUZE2
Culture creation is quickly becoming the core industrial (and individual) activity
in the globally emerging cultural economy. This process gets amplified through the
increasing conglomeration of media corporations, as well as the widespread
diffusion of information and communication technologies. This paper combines
insights from research on (professional and amateur) media production from
disciplines as varied as institutional sociology, organizational psychology, cultural
economy, management, media studies and economic geography to present a review
of trends, developments and values co-determining media work. The concept of
media logic is used as a mapping tool, articulating contemporary institutional,
technological, organizational, and cultural trends as they co-determine media work.
This hermeneutic analysis identifies principal components of work styles in the
media production industries across disciplines and genres, including journalism,
advertising, film and television, and digital game development.
Keywords: media production, media industries, media work, labor, creative
industries, cultural industries, production of culture
On April 4, 2006 U.S. comic artist Dave Coverly published a cartoon in his widely
distributed “Speed Bump” series on media work. In the image, a concerned parent listens
to a college counsellor, who dispenses the following advice: “Your son is smart and curious
and has no attention span whatsoever … I’d say he had a bright future in the media.” 1
Indeed, what does it take to work in the media production industries? This is not a question
without consequence. Media production as a form of culture creation is quickly becoming
the core industrial (and individual) activity in the globally emerging cultural economy. This
process gets amplified through the increasing conglomeration of media corporations, as well
as the widespread diffusion of information and communication technologies. Furthermore,
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as several observers have noted (see for example Lash & Urry 1994; Sennett 1998; Caves
2000), other industries consider the organization of labor and the management of creativity
in the media a pioneering example and to some extent best-case scenario for things to come.
In this paper I map the field of media production studies with an emphasis on labor and
work, focusing on the blend of work and lifestyle conditions and strategies of professionals
in the media industries: their “workstyles,” where life has become a way of working and a
way of being at work.  The purpose is to build theory on media work that is generalizable2
across professional media production industries, as well as applicable to analyses of
emerging practices throughout the creative industries (Hartley, 2005; Deuze, 2007).
WORKSTYLES IN THE MEDIAPOLIS
Change and insecurity, whether real or perceived, are part of most if not all people’s
workstyles (Gorz 1999). Beck (2000) points at the fundamentally ambivalent prospects of
the “brave new world of work” as marked by uncertainty, paradox and risk. The risk of
finding and keeping a job has become a strictly individual risk, as most governments and
employers in the world today are retreating from collectively negotiated labor and welfare
regulations, instead focusing on keeping a core of experienced employees and outsourcing,
off-shoring or sub-contracting work. Contemporary workstyles in especially the media
industries are best understood in a context where, as Ursell (2000: 805) writes, the size of
permanent staffs quickly diminishes, casualization of the labor force increases, entry to the
labor market is more difficult and less well rewarded or supported, average earnings have
dropped, and working terms and conditions continue to deteriorate. In such a new capitalist
setting letting go of control, history, and tradition are advertized as new necessary survival
skills (Sennett 2006).
The media, in whatever shape or size, amplify and accelerate these trends – even more
so because nowadays people are not just using media in a digital age; we are living in media.
Research on the way people use (new) media is scattered and diverse, yet is unified in its
conclusion: we use more media all the time, spending more if not most of our time immersed
in some kind of media, our exposure to media is concurrent, and an increasing portion of
people’s media diet shifts towards production rather than consumption (Bucy & Newhagen
2003; Livingstone 2003; Jenkins 2006). In overdeveloped wired, always-on societies such
as most European countries, North America, and isolated yet interconnected nodes
elsewhere, the lifeworld of a majority of the population gets expression and meaning almost
exclusively through media. This does not necessarily mean we spend more time every day
with media, as people’s media diet tends to be relatively stable at roughly two-thirds of
people’s waking moments in most developed countries (Papper et al. 2004; Garnham 2005).
It does suggest, however, that these media have not only become digital and networked, but
more importantly so also pervasive and ubiquitous: they cannot be switched off, are
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everywhere, and have become unavoidable. Our contemporary world is what Silverstone
(2007) regards as a “mediapolis”: a completely mediated public space where media underpin
and overarch the experiences of everyday life. In the constant remix of time spent on work,
life, and play in and through media the differences between these spheres of activity get lost.
This paper aims to map the field of media-making that is sensitized to two related
phenomena that are to some extent exemplary of the contemporary human condition in
Silverstone’s mediapolis: first, a notion of media work as a set of behaviors, strategies and
tactics, norms and values that co-determine with technology the outcome of the production
of culture within and across media industries (such as journalism, advertising, television and
film, digital games). Second, an appreciation of media work as a range of activities and
social arrangements that a growing number of people – and the majority of teenagers – enact
in the context of contemporary digital culture (Deuze 2006), that is: using media as media
producers rather than or next to media consumers. This in effect creates a white space for
theorizing the findings and results of media production analyses across all ranges of
people’s interaction with and through media, rather than excluding anyone but the salaried
employees of commercial and public media organizations in society.
MEDIA LOGIC
The average media worker operates in a complex environment, somewhere between the
splendid isolation of one’s individual creative endeavors and a constantly changing
transnational context of ties, relationships, demands, and pressures of colleagues,
consumers, employers, and clients. Such an acknowledgment of the field of media
production industries must be the point of entry to discuss the infrastructure, trends and
developments affecting individual practitioners in (and outside of) media companies. The
creative process of work in the media industries is a fascinating object of study, as the
production of culture is in itself a cultural process. This means that neither the individual,
nor the company completely controls the production of culture – elements of social structure
(the organization of work, the parameters set by time, budget and space, media ownership,
and so on) and the norms, values, and ways of doing things of the professionals involved
mutually influence each other. Indeed, cultural and economic determinants of media work
are not necessarily different, but rather can be seen as what McFall calls “constituent
material practice” (2004, p.18): the combination of specific technical and organizational
arrangements as these influence and are shaped by the generally idiosyncratic habits of
individual media practitioners. An emphasis on the individualistic and idiosyncratic nature
of media workers suggests that contemporary trends such as workforce casualization,
technological and cultural convergence, and flexible productivity not only mean different
things to different people, but are also differently articulated in the context of specific media
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products, genres, and organizations because of the ways in which departments, teams and
individuals work together (Deuze 2007). 
Media work takes place both within and outside of institutions, by both professionals
and amateurs (including so-called “citizen media”), both within and across particular media.
In order to adequately describe and analyze the various ways in which professionals are
affected by and give meaning to such a complex environment of cultural production, one
needs a holistic, integrated perspective on the nature of media work. In this context I use the
concept of “media logic” as introduced by David Altheide and Richard Snow (1979 and
1991), and developed further by Peter Dahlgren, where he refers to media logic as “the
particular institutionally structured features of a medium, the ensemble of technical and
organizational attributes which impact on what gets represented in the medium and how it
gets done. In other words, media logic points to specific forms and processes that organize
the work done within a particular medium. Yet, media logic also indicates the cultural
competence and frames of perception of audiences/users, which in turn reinforces how
production within the medium takes place” (1996, p.63). 
Media logic is an useful tool to overcome what may be the most crucial problem in my
discussion of what it is like to work in the media: the notion, that what a journalist does is
guided by distinctly different ideas and factors of influence than what informs the work of
a game developer, television producer, or advertising creative – and vice versa. One thing
these professions have in common is the fact that journalism, advertising, broadcasting, film,
and game development are all examples of the production of culture. This does not mean
that a news report on CNN and a Nike ad produced for the soccer World Cup are equally
important or valuable in informing and thus sustaining people’s sense of community; it does
mean that I wish to move beyond such normative concerns about the distinctions between
different kinds of media content to focus on what people actually do when they work in the
media, and how they give meaning to their actions and beliefs. In turn I presuppose that this
process of giving and articulating meaning has consequences for the way media are made.
MEDIA PRODUCERS AND WORK
On the one hand, one could argue that the workers in the cultural industries are a distinct
professional group, a social system that contributes to the functional differentiation of
society and can (or should) be studied as such. This would for example mean we look at the
management practices of media firms (Picard 2003), the business models and strategies
particular to cultural industries (Lampel et al. 2005), and the intricacies of managing specific
media companies (Cottle 2003) or the media production system (Louw 2001; Hesmondhalgh
2002 and 2006) as a whole. Most of this exemplary work draws explicit boundaries around
its object of study, often assuming clear-cut distinctions between different media
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professional fields. This may not be particularly helpful if we want to make sense of what
making media in fact means to the individual people involved – and thus of the problems
and solutions people in overdeveloped capitalist democracies increasingly face. The
spillover effect between people’s acts of media consumption and production observed in
contemporary media rituals for example suggests that the various ways in which media
professionals negotiate and make sense of their work on an individual level are increasingly
becoming part of the lives of media users everywhere. 
MEDIA WORK AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY
Media organizations can best be understood as a collection of public service and for-
profit companies (or a combination thereof) dealing with the industrial production and
circulation of culture. In terms of media work, this “culture” refers not only to the
production of spoken and written words, audio, still or moving images, but also (and
increasingly) to providing platforms for people to produce and exchange their own content.
In contemporary definitions of what the work within these industries involves in terms of
how the people involved make sense of what they do, four concepts are crucial: content,
connectivity, creativity, and commerce (Figure I). Media industries produce content, yes,
but also invest in platforms for connectivity – where fans and audiences provide the free
labor necessary for the digital game to clear its bugs and to extend its shelf-life through the
outsourcing of level editing and modification, for the news item to become part of the
conversation a society has with itself through discussion forums and blog posts, for the
advertisement to be endlessly forwarded and its product user-recommended, and for the
television show to create and sustain its own brand community. Media work is culture
creation, yes, but tends to take place within a distinctly commercial context. The constant
interactions and negotiations between creativity, connectivity, content, and commerce can
be considered to be the building blocks of all decisions made that define the workstyles in
media production.
In economic terms, the media serve a dual product market: media are sold as
newspapers, magazines, movies, CDs, and so on to audiences, while at the same time the
attention of that audience – expressed as ratings, circulation figures, unique site visitors, et
cetera - is sold to advertisers. This is a fascinating area of tension within the industry, as the
wants and needs of audiences, creators, and advertisers may not always be the same, and in
the current digital and networked media ecosystem the roles played by advertising creatives,
media producers, and content consumers are increasingly intertwined. Although each field,
genre or discipline in the media has its own peculiarities and distinctiveness, the trends
towards business integration, technological convergence, and the mutually reinforcing
developments of localization and globalization have made working experiences the media
industries increasingly similar. It thus becomes possible to discuss “the” media according
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to a couple of key distinctive trends and features. Hesmondhalgh (2002, p.12) includes as
the core cultural industries: advertising and marketing, radio and television (broadcasting),
film, internet (including Web design, portal providers), music (record labels, press and
promotion, publishing), print and electronic publishing (including books, magazines, and
newspapers), video and computer games. All of these industries interact and interconnect
with each other in complex ways, sometimes as competitors (for audience attention,
investors, and for skilled creative and technical labor), sometimes as albeit temporary
collaborators. 
The cultural geography of the media is organized as a range of informal networks of
collaboration, expertise and influence. “These networks extend in two dimensions,
horizontally, through peer-to-peer relationships with organizations and individuals, and
vertically, through supply chain relationships which contribute to different phases of cultural
production and distribution” (Bilton 2007, p.46). Bilton emphasizes the informal,
collaborative and intangible nature of the creative process. A second crucial contextual
aspect of media work for the negotiation of commerce, connectivity, content and creativity
is the largely project-based nature of production. The organization of work in projects with
a limited lifespan occurs both within certain companies – as in temporary teams assembled
for particular clients in an advertising or integrated marketing communications firm – as
well as between companies, and between companies and individual cultural entrepreneurs
(Grabher 2002). 
INDIVIDUALIZATION OF MEDIA WORK 
For the purposes of the goals outlined for this paper, I consider the theoretical
explanations of media work primarily from the perspective of individual “culture creators”
(Bauman 2005, p.55). The validity of this perspective does not only refer to the growing
numbers of freelancers, part-timers, flexworkers, “atypical” (IFJ 2006), “nonstandard”
(Kalleberg 2000), or otherwise contingent employees in the media – even though this group
of people by all accounts are rapidly becoming a dominant force in the media labor market
(Baines 1999; Ursell 2000; Gall 2000; Baumann 2002; Grabher 2002; Blair, Culkin &
Randle 2003; Cottle 2003; Platman 2005). Even those currently employed fulltime by large
and small media firms alike are affected by the shift towards the individual for the
responsibility and accountability of the organization of work, as they must also balance the
competing demands of creativity versus commerce, of producing content versus exploring
opportunities for connectivity, and of translating the accelerated demands of a competitive,
technology-driven and liquefied work environment into meaningful actions, values and ideas
that combined would constitute one’s professional identity as media worker.
Lazzarato (1997) suggests that creativity and productivity in postindustrial societies
reside in the dialectic between the forms of life and values they produce, and in the activities
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of subjects that constitute them. In doing so, Lazzarato points towards a key consideration
for a nuanced understanding of the role of the individual in today’s media industries: the
crucial importance of agency for individuals facing a vast array of influences, pressures,
pleasures and constraints. Are the attitudes, behaviors and choices of an individual simply
a product of socialization into the existing order of things, or can her goals, ideas and
actions be considered to be more or less independent of the way things work in existing
companies or organizations? To argue, as Giddens (1984) does, that all human social
activities are recursive – simply put: whatever people do in a certain way produces routines,
rules and norms that in turn inspire people to do things in a certain way – seems a fruitful
way out of the binary opposition. Even though socialization research has been conducted
in different media institutions with similar results, it seems to fit rather awkwardly with the
current dogma of flexible production, increasing precariousness of employment
arrangements, a globally emerging digital culture where consumers co-create with
consumers (Jenkins 2006), and an almost complete shift of responsibility and accountability
from employer to individual employee (Beck 2000, p.53ff; Jenkins 2006; Sennett 2006) as
a key asset of contemporary managerial practices in particularly the media industries. 
Du Gay (1996) notes how in the field of cultural production managers and employers
increasingly stress the importance of “enterprise” as an individual rather than organizational
or firm-based attribute. Shifting the notion of enterprise – with its connotations of
efficiency, productivity, empowerment and autonomy – from the company to the individual
employee, it becomes part of the professional identity of each and every worker, however
contingently employed or not. This shift can be seen as a deliberate managerial attempt to
regulate professional identity as a form of organizational control, with the intent “to
reconstitute workers as more adaptable, flexible, and willing to move between activities and
assignments and to take responsibility for their own actions and their successes and failures”
(Storey et al. 2005, p.1036). A shift towards an individualization of labor counters the
historical trend towards socialization and salarization, instead favoring more fluid and
flexible notions of work – ushered in through rapid developments in technologies of
communication, a decentralization of management practices and the fragmentation of
markets. This does not mean that newcomers in the media are not asked anymore to adapt
themselves to existing ways of doing things, nor that professionals are not expecting regular
salaries for their work. It does suggest that socialization today is quite different from the
industrial master-apprentice model, where the aspiring practitioner would dutifully observe
and copy an existing consensual creative process.
Considering the highly individualized, informally networked and contingent context of
media work, we may have to rethink the notion of the “organization” as the operational
framework for analyzing what work and employment are like in the media. In this context
one has to bear in mind Beck’s warning against - and I paraphrase - a “zombie media
sociology”: one that would exclusively locate research questions and interpretations of
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findings within the confines of existing modern social, economical and political institutions
such as the church (or mosque, temple), the family, firms and corporations, the nation-state.
Beck and other social theorists such as Giddens suggest that these have become zombie (or
“shell”) institutions: “living dead categories, which blind the social sciences to the rapidly
changing realities inside the […] containers, and outside as well” (2002, p.24). In recent
years, the emphasis in organization science indeed seems to have gradually shifted from
explaining the behavior of organizations as entities in and of themselves towards
considering organizations as open systems of interdependent activities linking shifting
coalitions of participants in interorganizational networks (Baker & Faulkner 2005). On the
one hand, such an open approach enables us to look at organizations as loosely integrated
units of individuals working together temporarily – which seems to fit the realities of the
contemporary character of media work - while on the other hand it allows for the equally
necessary acknowledgement that still much of the work in the media gets done within the
context of larger social structures such as hierarchical and bureaucratic institutions.
Although much of the work in the media takes place within the walls of media
organizations, using the organization as an operational definition of the context of media
work would miss the lived realities of contemporary work-styles: media work takes place
on an individual level, often within the context of a team, a group or department of a larger
organization – which teams or groups increasingly are not necessarily located in the same
building, city, or country. Considering the contemporary trends of increasing casualization
of work and the globalization of markets for cultural and symbolic goods, a coherent
conceptualization of media work has to look outside of the historical boundaries of the
organization to adequately address the working lives of its professionals.
THE WORKSTYLES OF MEDIA PRODUCERS
Applying media logic as a mapping tool for contemporary media work means I examine
the [1] institutional, [2] technological, [3] organizational and [4] cultural features of what
it is like to work in the media. In doing so, I do not assume that the key issues affecting (and
indeed: explaining) the work of media professionals are particular to any specific industry.
Please note: this does not mean that neither the different media nor the work that media
workers do is becoming similar or the same, as for example Tunstall (2001) has argued. It
does suggest, however, that what generally contextualizes media professions in the digital
age is an increasing complexity and ongoing liquefaction of the boundaries between
different fields, disciplines, practices and categories that used to define what media work
was. Ultimately, this approach may be a useful way to consider the work and employment
of particular individuals or groups of media producers as part of (and tied into) a broader
media ecosystem, as operating in a wider context of social, economical and technological
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forces, as well as a range of professions that have their own ways of dealing with such
influences.
Technologies. Before discussing the different features of the institutional, organizational
and cultural determinants of media work, I would like to single out the omnipresent role of
technologies, as particularly expressed in new media (hardware and software). Throughout
all accounts of the structure, management, and work in the media the prominent role of
technology stands out. The media production industries are among the key accelerators of
the development and innovation of new information and communication technologies. In the
daily work environment and practices in the media, technology plays a crucial part in the
creative process. A significant concern regarding this trend is the standardization of work
practices implied by an omnipresence of technologies. In order to facilitate technological
convergence and the corresponding managerial expectation of a synergy between different
practices and processes, media companies increasingly rely on content management systems
(CMS), which are often Web-based sophisticated software packages including automated
series of tools and code that enable digital content management. Such systems are generally
acquired on the commercial market, further developed using open source applications and
finally customized in-house. As different media formats – audio, moving and still images,
text - become increasingly standardized regarding their translation to the digital, the
exchange and repurposing, windowing, or shoveling of multimedia content becomes more
manageable. Yet this lowering of the threshold for technological convergence can at the
same time considered to be problematic for media practitioners, who like to see themselves
as creative workers, not as ‘slaves’ to the relatively limited range of options offered by
preprogrammed templates, shells, and formats offered by technologies like CMS.
Although different technologies are used in different contexts throughout the different
areas of the creative industries, today media professionals are first and foremost expected
to come to terms with technological convergence in their work. Technological convergence
refers to the coming together of audio, video, telecommunication and data onto a common
platform, enabled by the digitization of all these formerly separate technologies. The crucial
nature of information and communication technologies in the creative process of media
work gets supercharged in a converged environment, where multiple technologies are
integrated. As these technologies are increasingly networked and thus can accessed both
from home and the office, the boundary between those kinds of places begins to lose
significance. Convergence in media work thus relates to two intertwined processes: the
convergence of place – as in the workplace and the home office - and the convergence of
technology – as in the digital, networked hardware and software available to set the
parameters of creative endeavors, and to further the means for managerial control over
media work. Such control takes place through workflow standardization (as in the case of
film and TV with software packages such as “Movie Magic,” or in advertising through
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networked holding firm-wide intranets), workplace surveillance, and decentralization of
work through for example telework, and the outsourcing of specific segments (assets, or
“deliverables”) of a project to external agents. As such, convergence directly affects four
key aspects of mass media industries: the content of communication, the relationships
between media producers and consumers, the structure of firms, and ultimately how
communication professionals do their work. 
The introduction of all kinds of content management systems, company intranets, and
desktop publishing software in newsrooms, advertising agencies, film and television (post-)
production houses tend to mean two different, but important things for the professionals
involved: it speeds up the creative process, and it creates a sense of having to do and learn
more on top of one’s existing competences, skills, and talent. New technologies force people
to learn new skills and unlearn old ones, while the work process accelerates at the same
time. Technologies are also developed and implemented differently across different
organizations or even parts of a single organization, leading to a constant reshuffling of
adaptation processes and experiences. It is in the combination of equipment, hardware and
software, the incorporation of these artifacts into one’s everyday workstyle, and the new
ways of doing and organizing work that follows out of these activities that the role of new
technologies in media work becomes apparent. Technology is indeed central to media work,
but its role is neither unproblematic nor inevitable.
Institutions. Although the definition of the media as an industry is a matter of ongoing
academic debate, for the purposes of this paper it is important to note the traditional
emphasis on media production industries as the more or less exclusive domain of firms,
companies and corporations. As noted earlier such exclusive location is highly problematic
in the contemporary context of atypical media work. Such media work can be seen as a
particular (and popular) set of professional values and practices within a wider context of
cultural production, which would include theater, painting, philosophy, architecture, and
other examples of a contemporary culture industry (Steinert 2003). Hesmondhalgh (2002)
advocates a much broader view of media as part of the plural cultural industries, suggesting
how cultural production has become more, rather than less complex, diverse and contested
than one would perhaps expect in the course of the 20  century era of mass media. Part ofth
this complexity and ambivalence of cultural production as it pertains to media industries is
the fact, that much of the work is done by individuals, or by teams and groups of people that
generally only temporarily bundle their talents and skills for a specific project – such as a
film, a video game, or one season of a television show. 
Since the late 1990s policymakers, industry observers and scholars from around the
world have sought to reconcile the emergence of increasingly individual and small-scale,
project-based or collaborative notions of cultural production – be it for commercial or other
purposes – with traditional notions of media work as it takes place within the cultural
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industries. This process culminated in the concept of creative industries, introduced by the
Creative Industries Task Force (CITF) of the British Department of Culture, Media and
Sport in 1998. The CITF defines creative industries as “those industries which have their
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job
creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property. This includes
advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film
and video, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and
computer games, television and radio.”  3
The creative industries concept has been taken up as a new way to look at media
production, focusing on the combination or coming together of creativity and commerce in
cultural work. The creative process in this context not only refers to the development and
production of goods and services – it also refers to the ways in which consumers make their
choices for certain products and increasingly become part of the production process. An
intellectual as well as practical shift towards creative industries affects traditional notions
about the status, security, and function of jobs, as the creative work that takes place both
within and outside of the cultural industries becomes even more contingent on global market
conditions and producer-consumer relationships. The concept thus presumes that any and
all people involved in creative work see themselves and their talent, skills, and ideas in
commercial terms too – which can be a hard sell for the self-perception of professionals in
media industries, who tend to cherish creative autonomy and peer review rather than market
appeal or sales statistics as most important indicators of the quality of their work. 
The media as a set of industrial employers is not just home to six or seven huge global
mega corporations (Bagdikian 2000), but also to hundreds of thousands small business
enterprises, varying from organizations as individuals to companies and networks of talent.
A diagrammatic overview of organizations and businesses in the media industries therefore
reveals an “hourglass effect” in the distribution of employment, with people working in
either a relatively small number of large companies, or in the growing multitude of small
firms – with few employed at the few medium-sized businesses in-between (Hackett et al.
2000). Histories of media firms and their operations shows how both types of media work
need each other – the one perhaps for the outsourcing of specialized activities, the other at
times for acting as powerful sponsors or clients. The field of mass media operating on a
global scale clearly privileges the international conglomerate. On the other hand, vertical
integration (such as the AOL/Time Warner merger of 2000) and media deconcentration (as
for example the dismantling of Vivendi Universal in 2003) go hand in hand, indicating the
dynamic, disruptive and at times chaotic nature of the creative process in the context of large
and small companies alike.
As social theories about the network society suggest, the networked form of enterprise
is quite typical for media work – especially considering the ongoing outsourcing, off shoring
and subcontracting of (specialized and flexible) parts of the creative pipeline across the
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planet. Media production across professions (and especially in film, television, and
videogame development, but increasingly in advertising and journalism as well) takes place
within global production networks (GPN) that combine concentrated dispersion with
systemic integration. This means that work and employment in the media is both organized
through the production networks of transnational corporations, as well as in specific local
or regional territories, potentially stimulating – and also: exploiting - global and local value
creation and development at the same time (Coe et al. 2004). The analysis of work and
employment in media production cannot do justice to its object without taking into
consideration how these global production networks (GPN) are played out on an everyday
basis. Furthermore, the work of GPN scholars in fields such as motion pictures (Coe &
Johns 2004) and digital games (Johns 2006) shows how these translocal processes do not
just play into the hand of powerful global corporations, but at specific times and instances
– which are exploited by media workers and cultural policymakers alike - in fact favors the
talented individual, the free agent, or the smaller (and often more agile) enterprise.
Organizations. As the production of culture becomes contingent on a strategically
coupled global network of (large and small) companies and talent, the responsibility for
preparing, finding, and keeping employment not only shifts the individual, she also is
integrated in a new international division of predominantly flexible, contingent cultural
labor (Miller & Leger 2001). The media have a tendency to cluster in specific (urban) areas,
within which regions an ongoing exchange of labor, talent and skills takes place between
people and organizations (Scott 2000). Newcomers, recent graduates, and other hopefuls
flock to these areas, further contributing to an at times rollercoaster atmosphere. However,
the migration patterns of international division of cultural labor tend to be mostly regional
or virtual, rather than global. People tend to remain firmly in place as their talent migrates
to fulfill part of the production pipeline: a location for a film shoot, a particular asset of a
digital game, the marketing and customer relationship management services of a news
organization. Locational agglomeration and the global networked form of enterprise can thus
be seen to reinforce each other, adding to the contingency of media work, while the
professionals in these industries are more connected and at the same time in direct
competition than ever before.
In the context of the new international division of cultural labor and the outsourcing-
driven character of GPN the increased precariousness and contingency of work in the
creative industries is certainly cause for concern. Yet, as the work of Blair (2003) for
example shows, media workers and their organizations develop all kinds of tactics and
strategies to counter the precarity embedded in their work styles, especially by informally
self-organizing into groups or teams that tend to move from project to project together for
a certain period of time. These so-called semi-permanent work groups (SPWG) benefit both
employer and employee, as the first can outsource the hiring and firing of team members to
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those in charge of specific aspects of the production process (such as team leads in game
development, magazine editors, or assistant directors in film and television), whereas
employees can secure future employment through their (largely informal) personal networks.
These SPWGs are not without power, as the creative talent of their – again: often informal
– leaders can be an essential element in the production process, which allows them to make
certain demands. SPWGs are not just teams of individuals; its definition must be extended
to include local or global networks of firms and companies, as well as temporary lineups of
the interests of consumers and producers in specific user-producer communities (such as in
the case of citizen journalism projects) or contexts (as in discussion forums related to
television shows or computer games).
The management and organization of media work moves in generally unpredictable and
often chaotic cycles, where according to Grabher (2002 and 2004) teams move back and
forth between heterarchical and standardized work forms, streamlined and flexible
production processes, as well as between bureaucratic and dynamic modes of organization.
The main paradox and key source of tension in the organization of media work lies between
on the one hand quite rigidly structured hierarchical firms - as common job titles such as
“editor-in-chief” (journalism), “team lead” (game development) or “art director”
(advertising) indicate – and on the other hand a rather chaotic, conflict-ridden, deliberately
emotional creative process (Ehrlich 1995; Nixon 2006). The work in media organizations
thus tends to be rather formally structured yet informally arranged, where especially
newcomers generally are expected to adapt themselves to largely unwritten rules, as well as
to what Douglas Coupland famously defined as organizational power mist: “[t]he tendency
of hierarchies in office environments to be diffuse and preclude crisp articulation” (1991,
p.25). Not only does this process take place both within and between different firms and
individuals at times located in different regions or countries all over the world, but also the
roles these various players have in the production of culture are extremely diverse and
complex. Some are permanently employed, others only parachute in for a couple of weeks
to work on a certain aspect of the project; several people move in an out of projects all the
time, others get hired away by aggressive competitors looking for a particular skill or talent,
and many if not most media workers swim in a pool of underutilized talent (Hesmondhalgh
2002). The project-based nature of media work thus functions primarily on a heterarchical
basis, where people constantly adapt to changing (yet semi-permanent) work teams, clients
and sponsors. All these actors together form what can best be described as symbiotic,
mutually reinforcing and recombinant ecologies.
Media work tends to take place in the offices and on the work floors of specific
institutions: production houses, development studios, and corporate structures. However,
much of this work is contingent, freelance, and temporary. In an April 2006 survey on the
changing nature of work in the media in 38 countries, the International Labour Organization
for example signaled the rapid rise of such so-called “atypical” work relations.  People are4
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constantly moving in and out of large and small media institutions, continuously
reconstituting the team dynamic and (thus) the creative process. Furthermore, under
conditions of convergence culture, people across and within different institutions as well as
media producers as professionals or amateurs are increasingly (expected to be) working
together, collaborating and co-creating. This process, amplified by new media technologies,
only accelerates the flow of people, processes and ideas through these organizations. In this
emerging context media firms can perhaps best be understood as what Hallett and Ventresca
(2006) call “inhabited” institutions. Regardless of industry or discipline, media institutions
“are not inert containers of meaning; rather they are ‘inhabited’ by people and their doings”
(ibid p.215). What determines the outcomes of media work in inhabited institutions, then,
are everyday interaction rituals and formal organizational structures coupled with the
ongoing construction and negotiating of meaning by the individuals (and groups) involved.
Culture. Within a context of ongoing global conglomeration in the media industries and
a parallel emergence of an increasingly participatory media culture, Jenkins (2006)
articulates a “convergence culture” as the default contemporary setting for media work.
From a top-down perspective in media firms, culture creation increasingly begets convergent
properties, as professionals are expected to market or repurpose their content across
different media (cross media), or to stretch their messages in non-linear ways using distinct
platforms – thus encouraging consumers to move from medium to medium and compile their
own version of the story (transmedia). Convergence culture works bottom-up through
intensifying producer-consumer relationships, interactive storytelling and a shift towards
connectivity (next to content). Media organizations thus brace themselves for inter- and
interinstitutional collaborations and cross-media production, while cautiously courting the
consumer in her role as co-creator or, as Terranova (2000) suggests: free laborer. In this
context it is interesting to note how many media workers directly involved with two-way
interactivity and a more empowered role for the consumer express reluctance and at times
hostility towards exploring ways to share control over the storytelling experience with
members of the audience. The reason for this, argue Kim and Sawhney (2002), is that
interactive media are catalysts for a power shift away from traditional telecommunications
firms. Media companies are thus given to integrate convergence culture into their
historically familiar (and economically validated) protocols, forcing workers to renegotiate
their professional identity with what Jay Rosen in the case of journalism has aptly termed
“The People Formerly Known As The Audience” (TPFKATA). 5
In the day to day process of media work one’s individual professional identity primarily
gets meaning through what Nixon calls a “cult of creativity” partly bound up with a
narcissism of minor differences (2006, p.91). The key to standing out and cultivating one’s
image and professional identity in media work is not so much being original, nor does it
mean getting known as someone who has unique insight into what will work in today’s
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fragmented media market. As Nixon argues, a significant part of the production process in
the work of media professionals centers on drawing attention of competitor-colleagues upon
completion of the project. In doing so, media work often boils down to emphasizing and
cultivating what are generally only small differences between what one group of
professionals does, and what another team generates. “In important ways, however, the
rubric of creativity represented a way of dramatizing the desires and insecurities generated
by needing to mark out these differences in order to succeed in an intensely competitive
world of work” (ibid p.103). Time again, the analyses of media workers in the different
disciplines shows how their primary concern – for a variety of reasons – tends not to be the
customer, nor the client: it is peer review, reputation and recognition. It turns out that this
individual and group-level tactic is not only a way to take responsibility for one’s own
professional identity, but also serves as both an economic and artistic survival tool in an
otherwise complex and unpredictable rollercoaster industry.
Considering the undeniable importance of informal networks, a crucial question remains
on how aspiring as well as seasoned practitioners manage and give meaning to their
professional identity in the process. On a final note, two key strategies stand out, both
having to do with authenticity. Being authentic, original, talented and unique is an essential
ingredient of media work. Authenticity is a problematic category, however, as there exists
a “dynamic tension between authenticity seen as an individual’s creative voice – that is,
their ability to resolve problems in unique and distinctive ways […] - and claims to
authenticity that are carefully crafted to create a personae of an artist with a view to
attracting the attention of customers, critics, gatekeepers and other artists” (Jones et al.
2005, pp.893-4). Manufacturing authenticity is not necessarily something one can do or
control – it is as much a performance as it can be a claim made by or for someone (Peterson
2005). This underscores the elements of networking, socializing, and often quite powerful
social bonds that determine the work-styles of media professionals in tight-knit, clustered
communities of practice. It is, in other words, not only about being good at something – it
is also about carefully cultivating that image of being good. The management of this image
works in two, not entirely distinct yet vitally important domains: economic and artistic. In
commercial terms, one needs to be perceived to provide investors, directors, editors and
other stakeholders with work that would (contribute to) generating revenue, while the media
worker also benefits from a creative image of being seen among her peers as someone with
an unique or otherwise special talent.
DISCUSSION
Using these elements as the trends, developments and values informing the meaning of
the various factors of influence in the model of media work as proposed here, it is possible
to identify some new or possibly improved nuances to contemporary studies of media
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production. A few concrete recommendations stand out. First, media work-studies should
be careful to use the institution – such as a particular newspaper, game studio, or advertising
agency as the dominant framework of analysis. Using the organization or firm as the single
unit of analysis may obscure the ecological dynamism of production networks and work
groups. Second, contemporary media work is enacted by (professional and amateur)
producers as well as consumers in their symbiotic identities as originators, aggregators,
modders, distributors, and editors of the messages of the media. In a convergence culture,
media work stretches across users and producers, as it also does across media. Thus, thirdly,
media production analyses should actively consider the cross media and transmedia
components of the creative process, as it becomes increasingly difficult to separate out
different trajectories of culture creation within distinct media. Ultimately, a contemporary
media sociology studies must take into account the fact that what generally drives
professional media makers – reputation, peer review, acknowledgement – also seems to
drive the amateurs on websites like YouTube, Ohmynews, and Blogger or Livejournal. Just
as only a few people ever make it to the professional ranks of autonomous, credited, and
successful media storytellers, we see how only a small minority of participants to such
interactive and social online networks can be considered to be active creators of content. Yet
all are participating under what could be called the conditions of fandom: “where creative
production, feedback, and critical reflection are the products and name recognition, attention
and feedback are the currency.” 6
The media logic of work and employment in the media production industries offers two
key advantages when dealing with these issues: first, it enables one to map explanatory
frameworks across rather than within media professions or disciplines, and second, it allows
us to look at the concrete implications of the changing organization of the global cultural
economy which arguably affect its professional practitioners first, and the rest of us later.
The last remaining issue regarding the study, analysis, and understanding of media work
that I would like to address briefly here, relates to the dominant framing of media production
studies in the academic literature. It seems quite common for the foremost authors in the
field – such as Mark Banks, Susan Christopherson, Simon Cottle, Gernot Grabher, David
Hesmondhalgh, Catherine McKercher, Vincent Mosco, Andy Pratt, Andrew Ross, Ned
Rossiter, Allen Scott, and Jeremy Tunstall – to be theoretically located (or to locate
themselves) quite squarely in one of two camps, with generally pragmatic or even relativistic
approaches on the one hand, and critical (neo-)Marxist perspectives dominating the other
half of the coin. Of course, this typology too easy and simplistic. However, it is striking that
authors without an explicit normative perspective often tend to be discarded as people who
describe and map the field of media work without aiming to “expose” the corporate
exploitation of struggling artists. The same crude argument goes the other way, and
generally gets expressed by more or less deliberately ignoring the more critical or cultural
studies informed literature. Indeed, overall there seems to be an unfortunate yet distinct
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1. Cartoon available at URL: http://www.cartoonistgroup.com/store/add.php?iid=13367.
2. I borrowed the term “workstyle” from several professional agencies in the field of management and
human resources, see for example the site of a British professional coaching agency called The Results
Agency (at URL: http://www.theresultsagency.co.uk), Dutch agency Bureau Eveleens (URL:
http://www.workstyle .nl) , German workstyle-management consultancy D@ccord 4u
(http://www.daccord4u.de/dienstleistungen_workstyle.htm), and Australian coaching agency
MerryMentality (URL: http://www.merrymentality.com.au/workstyle.html).
3. See URL: http://www.culture.gov.uk/creative_industries.
4. Report available at URL: http://www.ifj.org/pdfs/ILOReport070606.pdf.
5. Source URL: http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2006/06/27/ppl_frmr.html
(June 27, 2006).
6. Quoting Rochelle Mazar in her October 20, 2007 blog entry “Henry Jenkins and Fan Culture,”
URL: http://www.mazar.ca/2007/10/20/henry-jenkins-and-fan-culture (accessed: July 15, 2008).
divide between a rather self-referential and internally coherent Commonwealth-inspired
literature, a (relatively small) American literature, as well as a dispersed set of works across
disciplines generally quite distanced from the particular theories and methods of media and
communication research – such as organizational anthropology, cultural sociology, and
economic geography. 
I realize that the main point in this piece has been to articulate an at times bewildering
complexity in understanding media work, and to advocate an awareness of the multiple and
often contradictory directions the evidence can take us when studying media work.
Considering the rapid growth of studies in the field and the increasing global prominence
of creative industries and the cultural economy, I would emphasize that such a call for a
more hermeneutic rather than hermetic theorizing in contemporary media sociology is not
only warranted, but essential.
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THE ROUTINE AT THE DAILY ROUTINE:
EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN AN AGE OF
MEDIA TRANSFORMATION
JOHN HATCHER3
This qualitative study of a daily newspaper seeks to understand how the identity of
journalists influences the work they do, and how these individual characteristics
manifest themselves when exposed to the social and institutional forces of the
newsroom. A four-month study of one U.S. newspaper suggests many factors may
inhibit real change in news routines.
The newspaper may be likened to a ship on which the captain sets the course, but
seamen handle the wheel and at any moment may head the vessel several degrees
off course…In the same way, the reporter has some latitude in selecting his
operations, and by so doing may work against the publisher’s policy. (Breed, 1952,
p. 173).
On a long wall in the newsroom of The Daily Routine  are pictures of the men and women1
who work to publish the newspaper each day. They are grouped in neatly ordered rows,
clustered under headlines listing their departments. They are editors, reporters,
photographers, page designers and graphic artists. When the managing editor of The Routine
looks at these pictures, he sees a team, united in its effort to produce a dynamic newspaper.
However, he also sees individuals. What’s more, he wants the individuality of journalists
to influence how they do their jobs. Men and women. Parents with teenagers. Twenty-
somethings fresh from college. Minorities. Upper class. Middle class. Religious and
agnostic. Democrats and Republicans. The differences in the news staff reflect the
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differences in the community, the editor says. Further, a newsroom that looks like its
community will create a newspaper that speaks to its community in a harmonious
relationship between journalists, their work, and the community.
Decades of research have suggested that influences such as news routines, ownership
and broader cultural influences erase differences that individual journalists might bring to
their work (Breed, 1952; Gans, 1972; Tuchman, 1973, 1978; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Dreier,
1983; Entman, 1989; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). This study revisits these questions in an
era when news organizations struggle to find ways to make themselves relevant in a
changing world:
As newspapers struggle to increase readership, they do so competing against alternative
sources of media, such as citizen-driven news products – that appear to be less rigid in
structure and more dynamic in their content (Schaffer, 2005; Rosen, 2006). 
In an increasingly diverse society, some scholars are convinced the only way newsrooms
can be effective is to become equally diverse in both their staffs and the content produced
(Campbell, 1995; Heider, 2000).
It’s never been more important to understand what constrains individuality in news
work. Traditional news organizations are struggling to find ways to remain relevant to their
readers (Ahrens, 2005). Organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors
argue that one way to reach a broader audience is to hire journalists who represent a greater
diversity of backgrounds, interests and orientations (Dedman & Doig, 2004). At the same
time, surveys of working journalists find, first, that journalists feel less autonomy in their
work and, second, that more journalists are largely dissatisfied with their work and thinking
of leaving the industry (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
How much do individual journalists feel they influence the daily routines of one
newspaper? The research questions guiding this inquiry ask:
• How much autonomy do individuals have and what other influences affect the news
gathering process?
• When do journalists feel they have control? When do they not?
• Do individual characteristics influence news content? Does identity matter?
• Do diverse newsrooms create diverse newspapers?
• Does individual difference matter more at certain stages of the newsgathering process
(e.g. reporting, editing, management)?
• Does individual difference matter more in positions of leadership?
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THEORY
This study is informed by a rich body of literature that has long puzzled over the
disparity between the importance industry practitioners give to the individuality of the
working journalist and the factors that have been found to constrain this power. In some
ways, the individual matters in news work. Peiser (2000) finds journalists give priority to
issues that are important to them personally. Women, for example, are more likely to give
importance to social and humanitarian issues. The result, Peiser predicts, should be
differences in the way journalists make news decisions. However, there has been a
significant decline in the autonomy journalists see themselves as having in their work
(Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). Overall, surveys find a decline in their freedom to select stories
and to choose the elements of a news article. Some of the reasons for this decreasing
perception of autonomy include editorial control, time and space limitations and inadequate
staffing. Increasing corporate ownership is also thought to play a role. The sense of
individual autonomy does not appear to be uniform. Liebler (1994) finds male and female
journalists have roughly the same perception of their own power in a newsroom, but
minority journalists perceive themselves as having slightly less autonomy. 
The assumption behind recent industry efforts to increase the diversity of news
organizations in the United States appears to be that the individual can make a difference
in the news product. Organizations like the Maynard Institute, the Poynter Institute for
Media Studies and the Freedom Forum have taken the lead in challenging the newspaper
industry to create newsrooms that resemble the diversity of the communities they cover. To
track and evaluate these efforts, the public can now look at any daily newspaper in the
nation and compare the diversity of its newsroom staff with the diversity of its community
(Dedman & Doig, 2004). Such an inspection finds that the push for diversity has witnessed
some improvement since the 1970s when minority journalists comprised just 5 percent of
the workforce in America’s newsrooms (Weaver, Beam, Brownlee, Voakes & Wilhoit,
2002). Even so, minority journalists comprise just 12 percent of all staffs in U.S.
newsrooms, while accounting for 31 percent of the population (Dedman, 2002). 
Increasing diversity is only part of the solution, and many scholars have found that
newsrooms can be effective in their coverage if these trends are coupled with a desire within
the newsroom to be diverse and inclusive (Pease, Smith & Subervi, 2001). Other studies
have shown that it can be financially profitable for a newspaper to increase its coverage of
diversity (Gross, Curtain & Cameron, 2001).
The ideal image of the media in a democracy is one of an autonomous press that offers
a detailed analysis of important issues that are used by an engaged citizenry to keep
government accountable (Entman, 1989). A newspaper is idealized as a marketplace of ideas
where all sides are heard from and all groups equally represented. By and large, Entman
argues, media produce a product that is satisfying to no one. A journalist may yearn for work
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that attempts to “illuminate the powerful,” (p. 125) but falls short due to a desire to be
objective, accountable and profitable. Entman believes these news practices are highly
resistant to change, primarily because of the limits of audience interest and the journalist’s
close relationship with political elite.
Other research suggests who individuals are may not matter. In their look at the
spectrum of influences on news content, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) outline a range of
factors beyond those of the individual that may stifle the tastes and preferences of the
individual reporter. Shoemaker, Eichholz, and Wrigley (2001) argue that the routinized
forces of the newsgathering process hold greater influence on how news stories are selected
and framed. Further impeding a journalist’s autonomy is the charge to seek out and report
on events that fit under the title of “news.” “The problem for journalists is that although they
usually have a reasonable sense of what is not news, they are less certain what exactly and
invariably news is” (Paletz & Entman, 1981, p. 16). 
Breed (1952) finds news decisions are shaped by societal and community influences,
newsroom routines and the policies set by publishers. Reporters learn to adhere to these
pressures, which limit and define the decisions they make in newsgathering. Breed likens
the power of the individual reporter to the seaman steering a ship at sea. The publisher has
set a course and destination, and a reporter has some freedom to veer slightly from this
course, but only within limits. Too much deviation will be noticed quickly. Breed finds that
the freedom of a reporter varies by the kind of story and at different steps in the reporting
and writing process. Overall, though, he argues that journalists rarely question policies
established by publishers. 
Reporters, Fishman finds, work in a “bureaucratically constructed universe,” (1980, p.
134). This universe defines what is and isn’t news. Fishman sees reporters making decisions
about news that are in keeping with the orientations of the sources they routinely encounter
as part of their beats. They tend to ignore events and voices that are disruptive to the
“agencies’ idealizations of what is going on and what should be going on” (p. 134).
Bureaucracies become “fountains of information” (p. 143) that offer up information that is
verifiable in a “scheduled, predictable way” (p. 143). Journalists are constrained by an
economic set of restrictions: deadlines, story quotas, and reliance on prescheduled and
preformulated events.
For journalists, issues of social identity could affect the way they see the news events
they report on. It is human nature to evaluate, sort and categorize others with respect to ones
own social identity in a process known as self categorization (Turner, 1985). In a non-
conscious manner, Tsui and Gutek (1999) observe, individuals will assume differences in
an individual’s knowledge, skills and perspectives based on these same demographic
characteristics. The result of this phenomenon can be outright prejudice or hatred for an out-
group. However, a more subtle form of discrimination or bias may emerge in which
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“positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy and trust are reserved for the in-group and
withheld from out-groups” (Brewer and Brown, 1998, p. 575). 
On the face of it, the American journalist, and specifically the reporter, holds a great
deal of power (Entman & Paletz, 1981). Reporters choose the stories they write, the sources
that speak in their stories, the things sources are permitted to say, and the amount of
information those stories will include. As such, it would seem, a reporter’s personal
“background, experiences and attitudes, may direct them to stories which their newspapers
are not organized to gather and would not otherwise publish” (p. 14). However, Entman and
Paletz argue that the American journalist is motivated to produce work that is pleasing to
both employers and colleagues. Their backgrounds and attitudes come from a white, male,
middle-class background that tends to reject “extreme ideological positions” (p. 14), and
their desire for career success and acceptance among their peers, tends squelch their desire
to act autonomously.
In summary, each news organization has its own culture. It’s in part influenced by
societal factors already outlined, but it’s also influenced by professional norms and the
tradition of the newsroom routines (Tuchman, 1973; 1978). Many scholars (Gans, 1972;
Tuchman, 1973, 1978; Fishman, 1980) have already observed how the routines of
newsgathering constrain the ability of a journalist to act completely motivated by individual
motivations. News organizations rely largely on government-generated news, sources that
have immediately verifiable information (Tuchman, 1978) and on news events that are
preplanned and predictable (Fishman, 1980). As such, journalists who desire to pursue news
that is drastically removed from these institutionalized formulas may find themselves
deviating from the practices of acceptable newsroom behavior.
METHOD
A qualitative case study approach was taken to ask whether individual differences
manifest themselves in the routine of one daily newspaper. A four-month analysis resulted
in the collection of in-depth interviews, on-site observations, field notes, news stories and
other documents related to the newspaper’s mission and perceived audience. The project
was guided by a series of research questions that explore the freedom the individual has to
operate as they do their jobs as reporters and editors in a newsroom. 
The journalists themselves are not the focus of this project – this is not an evaluation
of the performance of one newspaper. The attempt is to understand how these journalists
interact with coworkers, policymakers, managers and the public in the process of
newsgathering. This approach borrows heavily from a style of research called institutional
ethnography. Institutional ethnography, as defined by the originator of the term, Dorothy
Smith (2002), is “conceived of as arising in people’s activities (what they do, say, write and
so on) in particular local settings at particular times” (p. 21). The research focused on how
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daily activities and routines revealed the structures and meanings created within the
newsroom environment. 
The identities of the newspaper and of the journalists participating in this project have
been kept confidential. The newspaper is a daily newspaper that was chosen because it is,
in many ways, characteristic of urban newspapers across the United States. The newspaper
is group-owned, has a circulation size between 100,000 and 200,000. It is considered by the
American Society of Newspaper Editors rankings of diversity to be part of one of the top
newspaper groups in the nation when it comes to hiring minority journalists.
This style of research is intentionally dynamic and flexible. The inquiry was permitted
to evolve and deviate during the course of research. Informants were chosen as research
evolved; interviews were open-ended (DeVault & McCoy, 2002). As Smith (1999, p. 310)
notes: “Each informant provides a partial view; the work of institutional ethnography is to
put together an integrated view based on these otherwise truncated accounts…” A total of
11 reporters and editors were interviewed using a semi-structured technique; variation was
sought in age, gender, ethnicity and newsroom position. Each interview relied on an
interview guide that focused discussion on the issues of social identity, newsroom
autonomy, newsgathering routines and diversity. Interviews attempted to be conversations
rather than interrogations, as outlined by Kvale (1996). All interviews were recorded and
transcripts were created and analyzed.
In addition to interviews, the researcher visited the newsroom as an observer at different
times. These visits were designed to observe editors and reporters in the daily practice of
their work. Notes were taken while observing and extensive field notes were written after
the visit.
Textual analysis was conducted of a variety of documents collected during this two-
month period. Newspapers produced during this time were analyzed. In-house documents
such as story budgets and notes from newsroom managers were analyzed. Journalists
interviewed were asked to submit stories representing the type of work they feel is
important.
The greatest advantage of case study research is that it allows a variety of data to be
analyzed, increasing the likelihood of results being “convincing and accurate” (Yin, 1994,
p. 92). Analysis took place both during and after data collection. Memos were written
routinely exploring emerging themes; transcripts and documents were also analyzed once
data collection was complete using a variety of techniques including the creation of charts
and visual maps and by way of textual analysis (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Results were
reported in a narrative format with a goal toward producing work that would be of interest
and value to journalists as well as scholars (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).
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FINDINGS
Analysis of The Daily Routine finds unanimity in the view of the importance of
individuality of journalists. Journalists say that, to be effective, the individual must matter.
Journalists must be independent thinkers, free to explore and discover the world. At the
same time, the findings confirm what scholars of newsrooms before have noted: That an
individual’s autonomy competes against myriad obstacles, filters and barriers. The factors
that shape news decisions are complex and, in many ways, appear to go unnoticed. The
findings look first at the results of in-depth interviews and then at observations of newsroom
routines.
In-depth Interviews
The newspaper’s senior managing editor oversees the paper’s daily operations, though
he answers to an executive editor and a publisher. Like many journalists at the Routine, he
isn’t from the community his newspaper serves. For the first 10 years of his journalism
career, he moved from newspaper to newspaper, working his way up the editing ranks until
he came to The Daily Routine 20 years ago. Like all of the top editors at the newspaper, he
is white, though he doesn’t talk about race as one of the ways he identifies himself. 
I grew up on a farm in Nebraska where, you know, you don’t go home until the hay is in the
barn sort of work ethic is important. I grew up on a farm where in many ways we were very
isolated, but that also meant that the arrival of the daily newspaper every day was really an
important event… So that, that helped shape my thinking as well as my own parents’ value
of reading and education and work and all of those things. So those are probably formative
experiences, and in my life whether it’s the value of reading and writing and truth and fact
as well as the value of work and the value of how you treat people and sort of that golden rule
of respect. So I would try to bring that with how I work with the people here as well how I
would want our staff to treat our readership as well.
Most of the journalists interviewed defined themselves in a similar way. Almost all of
them see class as the main way of identifying themselves. Few of them think of race or
ethnicity when asked open-ended questions about how they identify themselves. Many of
them said their families instilled in them a sense of the importance of having a strong work
ethic. Many of them came from rural communities in the Midwest, where they were raised
in homogenous, white communities. None of the journalists interviewed for this project was
originally from the community where The Daily Routine publishes.
Q: Thinking about your parents, when you look at their identity and their background, do
you see issues such as your race or your class or any of those kind of things or even your
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ethnic heritage. Do you think that any of those factor into how either your parents or you
have come to see yourselves?
A: I think class, definitely. My parents have pretty different class backgrounds. For
example, my mother, was I believe the first person in her family to go to college and
graduate. And my father on the other hand is third generation advanced degree. And, you
know, obviously education plays a factor in where you fall in the, I guess, socio-economic
spectrum. So, yeah, that’s definitely… race, not as much… not really as much.
One reporter who grew up in an urban neighborhood in a city very much like the city
where The Daily Routine is based had a different view of her background.
Because I went to a poor urban high school… so I was conscious, always conscious of the
difference between urban and suburban schools so that’s why it was always interesting to me.
And then, the more I found out about education in (this) state and the school district the more
interested I got in it.
Exceptions in how these journalists identify themselves were confined to people who
saw their social class as being different from their peers. 
It’s funny you ask that question because... I think I probably will have a different background
than a lot of people here. I grew up in very, very rural (name of area)… but my father was
actually, my father that raised me, was actually a tenant farmer. So, we moved from location
to location, always pretty much generally in (region of state). We were constantly on the
move. I went to 13 different school districts. So, it was very poor, very rural, um, not a lot
of luxuries at all.
A frustration of this project was that few minority journalists were interviewed. The one
black journalist interviewed is originally from Africa. Her perspective about issues of race
as they related to her identity and her job were apparent. Of all of the journalists
interviewed, she was the one who volunteered information about how issues of race played
out both in the newsroom and in the communities the newspaper covered. She was also
aware that this perspective made her quite different from her peers. 
When asked about race and diversity issues, several mentioned that in the past, the
newspaper had brought in experts to do diversity training. No one spoke highly of these
events, suggesting they consisted of psychologists who tried to get everyone to admit that
they secretly held racist tendencies and hidden biases.
Journalists saw other aspects of their identity influencing their jobs. Because one
reporter came from a lower-income setting, he said, he was aware that he sometimes looked
at people with money in a negative light. He wondered if part of this came from his time in
college when he had to work to pay tuition while others didn’t worry so much about
finances.
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It was always frustrating to me, OK, why do these people have everything and these people
have nothing? And how does this come to be? What process is it? That was, I guess, the basic
and I guess I realize that more now that I’ve gotten older. I realize that was motivating me
in a lot of ways. But I had a prejudice against rich people that I had to get over.
Another reporter whose family was poor growing up said she tried not to let this
perspective get in the way of her knowing what was news.
Q: Do you see kind of your roots, your background whatever you want to call it, playing
a part in how you see the world and how you make decisions about what’s news and what
isn’t.
A: You mean like sympathizing with the underdog? 
Q: I don’t know. Do you see that as part of it?
A: I think that. I like to think I can make a distinction between sympathizing with the
underdog and what’s actually news for the underdog…
Both of these reporters spoke to an awareness that their perspectives may be different
from the majority opinion. When this reporter talked talks about evaluating news she said
she knew she should not align herself with people who shared her background. Another
reporter said he had to keep his own perspective in check. Neither said these motivations
were the result of pressure from anyone above them. In fact, one story he wrote that exposed
the grandiose lifestyle of local elite was supported and encouraged by the newspaper.
How journalists perceive their role. The reporter whose primary duty is to cover the
police and public safety said she lives for the front-page story. She starts her day at the city’s
police station looking for items hiding inside the routine police reports. She calls them
“quirky stories.” They are the items that may not be big news stories, but will capture the
attention of editors at the newspaper, who she knows delight in the “off beat” stories. She’s
also proud of the contacts she has on police departments around town that will mean she
gets a call when something big happens.
The newspaper’s education reporter, in contrast, sometimes feels like she’s part public
servant and part journalist. Her job involves covering the school district that serves the city’s
poorest communities. As a child, she attended urban schools herself, so she feels a
connection to them and to cities.
Well, I love cities and I’m really interested in the whole urban, urban… I don’t know…
quandary. How do you educate kids with really high needs in a system that’s set up for failure
from the get go, you know? Funding-wise and every other way. It’s just like an impossible,
impossible equation. And it’s real interesting… I said this a lot of times to myself and
probably to people. I consider myself almost like a civil servant only I don’t work for the
government. I’m just like a, almost like a cop or a social worker.
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These contrasting perceptions suggest great variation in what motivates journalists to
do their work. One is motivated by the excitement of finding a news story first and having
the front-page scoop. Journalists who talked about these kind of motivations also spoke of
a sense of importance they feel when they are working on news stories that involve
interacting with famous and important people. They also have a keen awareness of the kinds
of stories their editors favor, and the kinds of stories that will have a good chance of
appearing on the front page of the paper. 
The romance of it. The idea of being on the cutting edge of history, being in the middle of
the mix. You’re not a decision maker and I don’t know that I ever have any particular desire
to be a decision maker, but I always wanted to be involved in it in some way… It was just
a thrill. And the idea that I would play a role. I always had the idea that what I, what
newspapers, what journalists do is important… that people make decisions based on that
information. 
On the other end of this scale are motivations expressed by a desire to make a
difference. Journalists who gravitate toward this end of the spectrum often talked of wanting
to look for larger issues facing ordinary people. They, too, seemed motivated by their stories
running in a prominent place in the newspaper. Here is one reporter talking about a story she
wrote that fit this description.
I think because of the feedback that we got from parents and from kids. That it mattered and
that they read and saved (the story) because they thought it might help them at some point
or because it would help them at that point in time. And I mean, that’s really what you’re
striving for in some ways…to create a reaction that. Not create a reaction. That’s not the right
word, but just to um, to do something that somehow helps people. Or that gets people to look
at something in a different way.
And I mean I guess that was something unexpected with journalism but that I grew to
really hope for and like. Like if somebody said to me, “What you wrote, I never really
thought of it that way” or “I wouldn’t have put it that way that’s interesting” or “That’s bad”
or, you know, just getting that kind of feedback.
Each end of this scale has curious characteristics. Journalists motivated by competitive,
news-oriented motivations do not talk about a connection or orientation toward the
community at large or the readers of the newspaper. Their conversations tend to gravitate
toward thinking about the thrill of discovering something new and interesting. This contrasts
with journalists motivated toward public service.
Journalists measure their autonomy. One editor said that he earned his autonomy by
proving he could produce what the editors wanted with little oversight. He began working
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at the paper at an outlying bureau and said he proved himself capable of doing the job with
little need for oversight or guidance by editors…
… because I would deliver. I would... I always had stories. I always was working on
something. And they knew that if they just set me free, that they could always count on a
good enterprise story for Sunday at least one, two, three stories a day for the daily paper.
They just didn’t have to worry about it.
He thinks that’s why he had so much freedom as a reporter. Other journalists, he said,
didn’t enjoy the same kind of freedom. They were the ones editors would have to give
assignments to; they were the ones editors would have to make sure were making the right
decisions.
Most reporters at The Daily Routine said they felt their jobs give them autonomy, though
there’s a mixed perception of where and how it’s enjoyed. Many rate autonomy by what
freedom they don’t have. Several reporters who value their skill as writers, not just
reporters, echoed these words: “Not a lot (of autonomy). It’s hard to quantify. I felt more
stifled than I felt creative.” Most rated autonomy as one of the most coveted aspects of their
job, and were frustrated when they didn’t feel it was great enough.
…and to have that freedom and putting yourself in (the reporting). There is definitely a
frustration, a frustration of letting personality show through. And I think this is newspapers,
I think, one of their big problems. It’s very anonymous.
Reporters appeared keenly aware of the limits of their autonomy. One reporter says he
feels the greatest sense of freedom in that he knows his beat more intimately than his editors,
and, he also knows what stories his editors would like him to write. 
Well, the best, real power that I have is I know all the 10 million things that go on my beat
and the initial sorting of what they even know about is by me. So, there are certainly things
going on that I keep to myself because I know that... I just think there are better ways to
spend my time.
A senior managing editor said a sense of independence encourages journalists to draw
on their individual perspectives to explore the issues in a community that can’t been seen
by the editors who work primarily in the newsroom…
… it would be a sad newspaper — and not very interesting — if everybody was in lock step
with me and my way of thinking. We want people who think diverse in diverse ways.
From the top editor to the newest reporter, there is a sense that the news reporter should
feel empowered and independent. But the boundaries of this freedom – its limits – cannot
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be truly understood without looking at how all of these individuals interact in the pursuit of
news.
Observing Routines
Reporters at The Daily Routine arrive at their downtown office by passing under an
automated arm at the entrance to their attended parking lot. It is the first of many barriers
they’ll go through on their way to their desks. They enter their massive office building on
the edge of the city’s bustling business district through a rear entrance marked for
employees only. They wear photo identification cards around their necks, and hold them up
for guards at the security checkpoint before they head upstairs to the newsroom. Visitors to
the newspaper can expect to confront even more security. They must check in at a front
security desk where they will present a photo identification. Their personal information will
be recorded in a log. They’ll be issued a nametag and won’t be allowed to enter until their
escort arrives.
Once in the newsroom, a reporter sits down at her desk to begin a routine that has been
practiced at this newspaper since it began publishing more than 100 years ago. At least one
issue for every day of every month of every year. And while many things have changed —
one journalist remarked that the newsroom looks like an accounting firm as much as a
newsroom these days with its uniformed cubicles and row upon row of employees sitting
at their computer screens — the practices of the newsroom seem to follow the routines
scholars have noticed for decades (Breed, 1952; Tuchman, 1973; Fishman, 1980). 
A reporter’s job is defined by a beat. A beat assignment can mean covering a particular
government entity — such as city hall or the police — or the beat can be a particular
community. When journalists at The Daily Routine talk about the typical routines of their
work, they describe a strategy of talking to a small group of sources they know and interact
with on a regular basis. From the sports writer to the school reporter, journalists seem to
stick to communicating with a small, familiar group of people.
When journalists do go out of the office, it is usually with purpose. A former education
reporter, covering several schools in the outlying suburbs, said she planned her days around
the meetings and other events her schools had planned for the week. These events would
dictate both her schedule.
Time wise, it was a very strange job because I had a lot of evening responsibilities. But in
order to reach any of my sources I needed to be around during the day. So, I would
sometimes work a lot of split shifts where I’d go in at 10 or whatever and make calls and try
to get some interviews done and try to get some writing done and take a break — go home
do something else for a couple of hours —  and then go back out to cover a school board
meeting or some sort of event.
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One reporter who used to work at The Daily Routine knew that the best way to find
interesting stories was to get out into the community. But as he talked about doing this, he
also expressed a sense of anxiety about doing it, saying he would have to sometimes “force
himself” to get up from his desk and go out and talk to people.
One editor who covered the urban communities as a reporter said she would make it part
of her routine to visit key spots around the community. At these places, she would talk with
community leaders she had built relationships with and look over bulletin boards to see what
events the paper should pay attention to. She said an urban neighborhood had to be covered
differently because the residents don’t have the resources to send out press releases and do
the other things to get the attention of the media.
Transient work histories. Many of the journalists at The Daily Routine have been with
the newspaper for more than 20 years. Yet, for the most part, their careers have never been
stationary. They describe jumping from beat to beat in no predictable fashion. Some would
become editors for a time, only to return back to work as a reporter again. At times these
moves seemed prompted by requests from newsroom managers who often shuffled the staff
around experimenting with new initiatives; other times the moves seemed brought on by the
journalists’ desire for variety.
In general, this constant movement allows for no real attachment or connection to a
particular issue or cause, nor a connection to a particular community. Of all the journalists
interviewed, only one seems resistant to this transient pattern: The urban school reporter has
been on the same beat for 10 years and said she has no intention of leaving it.
This reporter was unique in those interviewed in this newsroom for several reasons.
One, she sees herself serving a public service kind of a role. Two, there is a strong
relationship between her own personal identity and background and the beat she covers.
Three, she expresses contentment with her current beat that is not found in her fellow
journalists. This is not to say that the other journalists are unhappy – rather, that part of what
keeps them content is the constant variety.
Gauging performance. Most reporters seem keenly aware of what the editors they work
for — both directly and indirectly — expect from them. Most of this knowledge comes not
from a set of rules or directives or from direct communication, but from the way news
stories are treated. Rarely do reporters communicate with editors above their direct
supervisor, but they often have stories returned to them with questions from editors above
their supervisor. After a while they begin to learn the preferences of different editors based
on these interactions.
A challenge for reporters is anticipating what the latest initiative is from the paper. Most
reporters say the newspaper goes through cycles in which it is looking for one particular
kind of news story. Often these initiatives are not explicitly published or communicated, but
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inferred by the way news stories travel through the process of reporting, editing and
publishing.
A measure for reporters of how close their reporting is to meeting the latest desires of
the newsroom is how quickly it moves through this process. If a story moves quickly
through the layers of editors and onto the front page of the newspaper, the reporter assumes
she has correctly anticipated the kind of story editors are looking for, the kinds of sources
editors want to hear from, and the kind of information editors want from those sources.
When stories are held up, or returned with questions or even not published, it’s a cue to
reporters that their work is not in congruence with their newspaper.
Send it to (the editor) and so, you know, never heard anything back. He sounded encouraging
when I told him about it. But I never heard back. And that’s the type of thing. Now I should
go shake his limbs or whatever. That has happened a couple of times and that, I find the most
frustrating thing where I think a newspaper should lend itself to voices from every part of the
newsroom.
An editors’ routine. Everyone knows the routine at the long conference table. The senior
editor gives a brief opening statement and then editors in the room take their turns
presenting the news stories they have available for the next day’s newspaper. Some editors
sit at the main conference table; others sit in the chairs lining the outside wall. It is a group
comprised mostly of men, most wearing ties and dress shirts. There are no minorities in the
group. There is little discussion as they go through the list of stories, finalizing ideas that
began taking shape hours earlier. 
Each editor has a copy of the story budget for the day. It lists all the stories available in
a long menu-like fashion. Each story is represented by a brief two or three word description,
a sentence summarizing the story, an estimated length of the story in inches and whether or
not the story includes any photographs or graphics. Some stories have “A1 pitch” next to
them, meaning they have been identified as stories that could run on the front page of the
next day’s paper. On this day, some of those stories include a ceremony for a high school
student killed a car crash, a story about campaign spending in a local political race, a story
about a regional developer who may be selling off some of his shopping malls, along with
national stories including coverage of the World Series.
The entire ritual takes almost exactly 30 minutes. When it is done, the senior editor
speaks: “Here are the stories I like. Tell me what you think.” For the most part, there is little
debate or discussion. The senior editor has suggested an interest in the mall developer story.
One editor asks how relevant that issue is to people’s lives. The senior editor begins to list
all of the ways this developer has been involved in projects, including the chamber of
commerce. “His fingers are in the community in so many ways,” the senior editor says.
Reporters at The Daily Routine measure their days and weeks by the events that drive
their search for news. Editors at the newspaper, likewise, measure their own work routines
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by moving from one meeting to the next over the course of a day. From the moment they
walk in the door, editors are evaluating and assessing the available news of the day, in
preparation for the meetings and ongoing dialogue during which they seem to come to a
consensus about the most important stories of the day. At 10 a.m., there is the first meeting
of the day to take inventory of what news event seems to hold the most promise, and to
revisit the decisions made the day before. At noon they hold a “standup meeting” in the
middle of the newsroom in which they make some early decisions about what stories may
hold the most promise. The 4 p.m. meeting is more formal. Editors review the decisions
made earlier in the day and finalize details. Often, there is one last meeting around 6 p.m.
to review the news one last time.
So much of what these editors do revolves around dialogue. They talk in their meetings,
and then when the meetings are over, they talk about other story ideas. Often, in these
conversations, they draw on their own lives and experiences. One editor has noticed that the
leaves are still on the trees and wonders if it is late in the year to have fall foliage. Another
editor talks about what the weather is going to be like for Halloween, prompting one editor
to recall a great news story that ran last year, which had an excellent opening sentence.
Summary of results
In summary, the challenge for journalists at The Daily Routine appears formidable. It
requires a balance between being a dynamic, surprising newspaper that values individual
creativity and the need to produce a commodity — the newspaper. To survive a relentless,
unending demand, a newspaper cannot be completely dynamic. Instead, it is formatted,
compartmentalized, and planned. News events become stories on a budget that have a value
based on criteria known by the news staff. They become items that are measured, evaluated
and packaged as a combination of headlines, text and photographs that complete the already
formatted, ordered and compartmentalized newspaper.
CONCLUSION
Editors and reporters at The Daily Routine believe journalists must be independent and
free from restraints as they do their jobs, but social and organizational routines continue to
constrain what happens in a newsroom. At a time when newspapers are in the throws of
upheaval and transition, this study of one daily newspaper suggests that larger, social
situations and the stated and unstated routines of the news organization create boundaries
that narrow the ways individuals may bring their identities to their work. The Daily Routine
was found to operate under a set of norms, understandings – agreements – on what is valued
in the news selection process. This agreement comes through an ongoing dialogue that is
built based on traditions, institutional knowledge, individual identity (especially of those in
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charge), and an understanding of how competing media and national media value similar
news events. Included in creating this meaning can be strong relationships with sources –
particularly public officials and key sources with whom journalists have close relationships.
The following factors seem to be most important in understanding how the individual
freedom of journalists is constrained:
“Getting it.” There is no rulebook or manual that dictates so many of the decisions
made in the newsroom. But there appears to be an understanding regarding what is expected
of journalists at every step in the newsgathering process. These rules are passed along
through discussion about potential news events, through decisions about which events
journalists will cover and how those events will be interpreted. Journalists seem to have a
strong sense of whether their fellow reporters “get it” when referring to the decisions that
are in keeping with the view of the news organization. They say some reporters tend to
“miss” stories that should have written, while others will “overplay” some stories the
newspaper will not see as being of value. 
Expressing identity. Journalists who sense their identity and background have a strong,
shared congruence with their peers and newsroom managers appear comfortable using this
identity as an inspiration for their work. Those who see their identity as being different seem
to keep this identity in check and are cautious not to let it influence their work. This
situation shows the huge challenge facing diversity initiatives constructed on the assumption
that a newsroom with variation in background, class, ethnicity and other measures of
difference will result in variations in news content. Of course, if some of these groups feel
they must stifle their difference, then diversity could result in little difference in content. 
Orientation of journalists. Analysis suggests there are many motivations for doing
journalism even in one newsroom. Some seem motivated by a competitive vision of success
that is satisfied by front-page news stories and feeling that both coworkers and sources are
pleased with their work. Others seem more motivated by a desire to serve larger public good
that appears to be more motivated toward the larger community or citizenry.
Demand for news. Surviving the daily pressures of putting a paper together, there is,
curiously, little room for “surprises,” in a business built on surprises. There must be a kind
of standard by which news is judged that is congruent from reporter to editor. This is
constantly being revised and redefined through discussion and dialogue, and the result seems
to be the “typification” of news observed by Tuchman (1973).
Limiting the sources of news. Surviving the daily struggle to decide what is news and
what isn’t news, journalists create a shared understanding of what stories should be written
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1. The name of this newspaper and the journalists involved in this project are confidential, based on
an agreement with the newspaper. Pseudonyms are used for both.
about. This, by default, allows them to stop looking in other places for news as confirmed
in previous findings by Fishman (1980). Journalists must cover certain meetings, traditions
and newsworthy events often defined by beats. These events consume their work routines,
leaving little room to consider sources of news that are not part of the beat structure.
While this project is limited in that it explores one daily newspaper for a short time, its
validity is supported in that it confirms and updates some of the classic studies in the field
of media sociology including the work of Breed (1952) and Tuchman (1973; 1978). This
confirmation seems to be the importance of the study. The Internet, citizen media and a
general reshaping of the news industry have all sounded the alarm that news organizations
are going to have to make drastic transformations if they are to remain relevant and
profitable. In spite of this recognition, these findings suggest, little has changed in the
practices and routines of U.S. newsrooms over half a century of research. As Reese and
Ballinger (2001) note: “The questions asked in the early newsmaking research of the 1950s
are just as important today as they were then: How does it work—and in whose interest?”
(p. 654). Social structure and organizational routines remain daunting barriers to the kind
of dramatic reinventing that will need to take place to effect real change. While journalists
appear keenly aware of – and even open to – the idea of transformation, they also seem
unaware of how long-established organizational and social situations inhibit this change. 
Future research could delve more deeply into understanding the relationship between
the social identities and organizational roles of journalists and how they influence the news
decisions journalists make. Survey work exploring these findings on a broader and, perhaps,
cross-cultural scale could further understanding of whether institutional norms observed in
this study are being challenged in any way by the changing climate of media.
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TAKING IT TO THE STREETS: 
U.S. NEWSPAPER DISCOURSES
ON IRAQ WAR PROTESTS
AMANI ISMAIL, MERVAT YOUSSEF AND DAN BERKOWITZ4
During times of war, the media sphere quickly and regularly draws attention to a
socially constructed vision of public opinion. News media influence public opinion
but also support government positions during wartime through a so-called “rally
effect.” Rarely do the media actually contest the legitimacy of war waged by
government so that news frames tend to portray war protests as anti-patriotic
threats to the social order, standing as marginal to national consensus. This study
investigates how three U.S. newspapers’ news and opinion pages – sites where
public opinion and ideology are negotiated – reflected rallies and protests about
the Iraq War. News, editorials, and letters to the editor were examined through a
qualitative textual analysis from the top newspapers in Seattle, Minneapolis, and
Atlanta. Above all, this study points out the role of community character in
constructing a media discourse that negotiates between public opinion and
localized ideology. This role appears to be a particularly critical one during times
of crisis, with public opinion surrounding the Iraq War serving as a prime example
for studying this phenomenon.
Keywords: Iraq War, news, opinion, protest, community
During times of war, the media sphere quickly and regularly draws attention to a socially
constructed vision of public opinion. News media influence public opinion (Mutz & Soss,
1997) but also support government positions during wartime through a so-called “rally
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effect” (McLeod et al., 1994). Rarely do the media actually contest the legitimacy of war
waged by government (Eilders & Luter, 2000), so that news frames tend to portray war
protests as anti-patriotic threats to the social order, standing as marginal to national
consensus (Reese & Buckalew, 1995).
Ideally, news media serve as a vital forum for a multitude of voices within society,
whether from the mainstream or from dissident ideology. In “the idealized democratic
society,” the media should serve “as a watchdog on elected officials to make sure they are
doing their job” (Boaz, 2005, p. 349). Media are meant to be “tools for citizens both to
debate with one another and to express discontent to the ruling elite” (Boaz, 2005, p. 349).
The emergence of pro- and anti-war sentiments follows from the controversial nature
of war, with the current Iraq War standing out as a particularly controversial campaign. The
war’s U.S. death toll has already surpassed 4,000 (Cable News Network, 2008). Media
representation of wartime public opinion becomes pertinent to maintenance of the social
order by presenting certain perspectives as “universal, natural and coterminous with ‘reality’
itself” (Hall, 1982, p. 65) while simultaneously marginalizing others. In the Iraq War’s case,
arguably “the media might have had a direct impact on [people’s] support for the war”
(Willnat et al., 2006, p. 547, emphasis added). 
This study investigates how three U.S. newspapers’ news and opinion pages – sites
where public opinion and ideology are negotiated – reflected rallies and protests about the
Iraq War. News, editorials, and letters to the editor were examined through a qualitative
textual analysis from the top newspapers in Seattle, Minneapolis, and Atlanta. 
The study begins with a discussion of how newswork interfaces with news of protest
during wartime, how the nature of community shapes the nature of that news coverage, and
how local newspapers serve as mediators of community conflict. From that foundation, we
present a textual analysis of news and opinion pages about public protests and rallies for the
Iraq War, framing the outcome as a negotiation between local newspapers, public opinion
and community ideology.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROTEST NEWS
To understand and analyze the nature of protest news, we draw on four areas of
literature. First, we consider the sociology of news, which considers how news comes to be.
Next, we address the ideological nature of news, which leads to the concepts of “protest
paradigm” and “rally paradigm.” Finally, we consider how the news media act as mediators
of community conflict. Taken together, we suggest that protest news aids a community in
understanding itself during times when its power structure is challenged, but at the same
time, protest news serves to reinforce the very power structure that is being challenged.
News workers manufacture news as a product of the cultural system in which they
operate. They consult with a “reservoir of stored cultural meanings and patterns of
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discourse” (Schudson, 1995, p. 14). Reporters, as actors in their societies, structure and
produce stories that the communities and cultures in which they operate could understand
(Berkowitz & TurKeurst, 1999). In reporting conflict, news media often not only relay
events but, further, represent core values of the culture in which they are produced
(Berkowitz & Eko, 2007). 
Reporters work under a number of deadline and economic constraints; as a result news
organizations adopt certain work routines that help facilitate doing the work and meeting
deadlines (Tuchman, 1973). Reporters gather and assemble parts that are important for the
production of a story and meeting a deadline. As a cultural product, news facilitates cultural
ceremony. It ritualizes the reporting of breaches in social order into a set of “phases”
bringing the breach to a closure and an arrival at social stability as it acts as a mediator in
community conflicts. News media maintain cultures in time (Ettema, 1990; Fishman, 1982).
The media play a role in the maintenance of the social fabric.
During times of national conflict when a society feels threatened from the outside, the
media normally tend to take a more critical approach in covering elite conflict, supporting
the status quo when faced with challenges from outside the power structure (McLeod &
Detenber, 1999). The employment of this “protest paradigm” to report on protest groups
demonstrates how news workers routinize and ritualize the social drama (protests) to
maintain social control and order. 
Journalists follow certain routines in news production as a way to accomplish their task
efficiently on time, whether they cover an expected or an unexpected event. When faced
with a non-routine event, they tend to adopt the same strategy. Reporters routinize the
unexpected to fit a “story type” that they already know how to report. And because
journalists belong to the same community that shares meanings, they rely on a compiled
“mental catalogue” to typify the event at hand (Berkowitz, 1992, p. 363). They pull out story
themes and know how the events would unfold and how the story should go.
The protest paradigm is an excellent example of how reporters use their mental
catalogues to tell a story about a breach in society and report the restoration of normalcy.
Stories that report protests usually use a narrative structure, rely on official sources, use
official definitions, and/or invoke public opinion (McLeod & Detenber, 1999). The use of
this narrative structure facilitates the typification of the story: it becomes a story about
deviants challenging social order, disturbing the peace, and breaking the law. Stories favor
the police and officials in the amount and the nature of coverage and assure the audience
that the system will ultimately restore normalcy (Vincent et al., 1989).
 Journalists use a little of both story-telling and chronicling, as myth provides a familiar
story plot, a frame, to explaining events (Lule, 2001). Protesters are deviants who challenge
and threaten social order and peace. Chronicling, on the other hand, fills in the gaps, assures
the audience of the restoration of normalcy, and at the same time, sets the standards for this
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normalcy (Bird & Dardenne, 1988). News tends to function as an agency, which allows
ideological manipulation and domination (Vincent et al., 1989).
Within the protest paradigm, stories tend to focus on the performance of the protesters
and on violence rather than the issues they protest to bring attention to. This also gives room
for the narrative structure and saves reporters both effort and time, as they can quote an
official rather than pursuing a more in-depth approach to discussing the issues. Furthermore,
stories depict protesters as a deviant minority (McLeod and Detenber, 1999), “isolated from
the ‘general public’” (McLeod & Hertog, 1992, p. 273). Thus, the protest paradigm does a
double duty: it provides journalists with the parts necessary to produce a story, and at the
same time it supports the mainstream ideology and the status quo by marginalizing and
delegitimizing the ideologically deviant and reporting the restoration of normalcy. And
although the protest paradigm produces culturally correct stories, it also produces skewed
stories containing minimal critical information. 
This outcome occurs partly because journalists do not simply reflect reality in the
society in which they report. Rather, they reflect the constructed reality (Hackett, 1984;
Molotch & Lester, 1974). News informs us about what we do not experience firsthand. It
renders what we would consider remote happenings observable and meaningful (Molotch
& Lester, 1974). Indeed, the culture of the society produces the news in an “active labor of
making things mean” (Hall, 1982, p. 64). The protest paradigm helps journalists reflect the
constructed reality in society and helps the reader make sense of protest news.
As a cultural product that reifies cultural values, news constructs and reconstructs the
ideology of the dominant power base. As social institutions, the news media facilitate an
ongoing social dialogue, maintaining the social status quo (Berkowitz, 1997). The mass
media act as distributors of ideology (Gitlin, 1980), which Foss (1996) defines as “a pattern
or set of ideas, assumptions, beliefs, values, or interpretations of the world by which a
culture or group operates” (p. 291). She explains that interpretations may reflect the set of
values any one culture embraces. While constructing a symbolic world that signifies
priorities and certifies legitimacy and importance (Schudson, 1995), the news media also
influence public opinion (Mutz & Soss, 1997). They give “guidance” to the public on how
to think about an issue and how to react to it using ritual to mediate social drama, and
editorials sometimes reject the action taken and suggest the appropriate action (Ettema,
1990, p. 475). 
In times of war – major external conflict – public opinion tends to gravitate toward
cohesion and to mobilize support behind the objectives set by the powerful in the system
(McLeod et al., 1994). Public opinion tends to rally around the flag. Even in wars where the
public did not eventually support the war (the Korean and Vietnam wars), literature
indicates that these wars initially caused the public to rally around the flag but the support
decreased as war casualties increased. As crisis catalyzes public opinion, it also highlights
the role the media play as a mediator for information that feeds the rally effect (McLeod et
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al., 1994). Media have been known to marginalize groups that lie outside the political
mainstream (e.g. Zandberg & Neiger, 2005).
Thinking of the protest paradigm in light of the media role as “guard dog” (Donohue et
al., 1995) helps further understand the nature of news reporting protests and demonstrations.
The guard dog role of the media guarantees that the media do not scrutinize the power
structure; rather, they scrutinize individuals within the power structure. The guard dog
sleeps in case of consensus in the community. But when groups become well-organized and
lobby behind a proposal or when a split happens within the powerful group, they become
a threat to the power structure and end the state of consensus and hence receive the attention
of the guard dog. Still, the media will not scrutinize the established power structure. They
will report deviance on the individual level; they resort to the protest paradigm as a means
to guard the house against the threat. 
In times of national conflict, the guard dog media will present the conflict from the
perspective of the government. But they will also provide a stage for the conception of
public opinion on the micro-descriptive level and on the macro-conceptual level. On the
micro level, news characterizes public opinion using 1) statements about it, 2) description
of violations of social norms, 3) community laws, and 4) bystanders as a metaphor for public
opinion (McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Reporters use general statements to describe protesters
(an isolated minority) from the perspective of the “public” (dominant majority) and quote
bystanders as a way to confirm the idea that they reflect what the public thinks.
On the macro-level, and looking at public opinion as social consensus, “representation
of public opinion may be seen as mechanisms of social control” (McLeod & Hertog, 1992,
p. 262). News about public opinion reinforces what the society accepts and what it does not
accept (McLeod & Hertog, 1992); it sets social boundaries. It has been suggested that “U.S.
press coverage in the days leading up to [the Iraq] war portrayed protest as unpatriotic and
the arguments against war as irrelevant, when it spoke of these phenomena at all” (Boaz,
2005, p. 349). 
Although the literature about protest news often refers to a rally-around-the-flag effect
that responds to protests during high threat times, we suggest that this effect might be more
effectively positioned as a counter-paradigm: the rally paradigm that treats supporters of
government decisions gently and positively, even though it still focuses on protesters’
actions rather than their ideas. Thus we might consider looking at a rally paradigm, where
certain characteristics shape the reporting of news about groups who support the actions of
the government in times of conflict. Like the protest paradigm and because of the same news
work processes that create the protest paradigm, the rally paradigm also supports a society’s
status quo, as it adopts the same mechanisms to facilitate sense-making out of apparent
chaos. 
To this point, we have suggested that news workers rely on routinized work processes
when covering protest news, much as they do for their everyday news reporting. By doing
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so, the emphasis shifts to actions over messages. Coverage of rallies produces much the
same outcome. In either case, the media’s role in guiding and mediating a community’s
conflicts falls short of real meaning-making. This discussion leads to four research questions
in our study of protest news from three major U.S. cities (Atlanta, Minneapolis, and Seattle):
RQ1: What were the general contours of the news and opinion pages’ coverage of pro-and
anti-war discourse in the three newspapers? 
RQ2: How did the rally and protest paradigms appear within this discourse?
RQ3: In what ways was ideology embedded in this protest news?
RQ4: How does the specific nature of a community mediate the effect of rally and protest
paradigms?
METHOD
We chose to examine the Seattle Times, the Atlanta Journal, and the Minneapolis Star
Tribune because we expected that their protest discourse would exhibit varying ideological
positions in correspondence with the varying political nature of their respective
communities. One would expect Seattle of the West Coast, for instance, to adopt a more
liberal stance than its midwestern (Minneapolis) and southern (Atlanta) counterparts.
Additionally, the geographic diversity of our selection was deliberate to avoid a possible
overlap in coverage that could result if the communities were too proximate to one another.
We used the Lexis-Nexis database to search for items on protests related to the 2003
Iraq War. For each newspaper, we searched the “full text” for: “protest” or “rally”
w/sentence “war.” That said, we acknowledge that our choice of search terms is only one
of several possible constructions to retrieve data that would serve our study’s purposes.
However, we arrived at this particular set of terms after various attempts to construct a
search that would best fulfill our objectives. We found it to yield items of utility and
relevance more than any other search we tried. 
Our time frame was composed of about two weeks before the war started (March 20)
and two weeks after, i.e. March 4, 2003 through April 4, 2003. We deemed this to be a
sufficient period for investigating protest discourse because war-related sentiment and
activity would predictably be highly intense in the days most closely surrounding the war,
thus yielding plenty of relevant data. The total number of news and opinion items we
examined for each newspaper is given in the analysis section.  
Since we are interested in protest discourse across news and opinion pages, news, letters
to the editor, and editorials constituted the types of items for analysis. Of all the results that
our searches yielded, we only examined those items that (a) both directly related to the war
and related stances and (b) involved, explicitly or implicitly, members of the newspaper
community. So, for example, a pro-war rally in Tennessee in which Seattle residents
participated would be relevant, whereas an article depicting worldwide anti-war protests
with no mention of any of our three communities would be discarded. 
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In conducting our textual analysis, we drew on an ethnographic approach to studying
media texts, including “extended immersion in the research setting, interaction among
members of the research team throughout the project, emergent research design based on
theory, and inductive ways of developing findings and conclusions” (Berkowitz & Nossek,
2001, p. 45). In other words, we consulted as a team on our individual findings on a regular
basis to contextualize each team member’s analysis both as a separate entity and as
juxtaposed against the other members’ analyses, too. Ultimately, this interactive feedback
procedure helped us visualize individual findings in light of the bigger picture, which proved
useful in carving out conclusions about the study as a whole. 
ANALYSIS: THE PROTEST AND RALLY PARADIGMS IN ACTION
This section presents a city-by-city discussion of the news items, letters, and editorials
that were analyzed. The discussion for each city is organized according to our four research
questions, with an integration of these findings provided at the end of this section. We have
chosen to introduce the two cities with the greatest contrasts first – Seattle and Atlanta – and
then turn to a discussion of the newspaper texts from Minneapolis, a city with contrasts to
the other two.
Protest in Seattle: A Genteel Local Hobby
Seattle has long held a reputation as a progressive, liberal city. Well known for high-
tech industries and coffee houses, this city of approximately 500,000 people is part of a
metropolitan area of more than 3 million. Its adjoining communities house the aviation and
the military, creating a community of multi-faceted identities. Seattle also is known across
the U.S. and beyond as the city where protests against the World Trade Organization turned
unruly in 1999 (Barone & Cohen, 2004).
The first research question asked about the general contours of pro- and anti-war
discourse. Four editorials, 104 letters, and 27 news items were examined from The Seattle
Times, a daily newspaper with circulation of approximately 225,000 copies. These items cast
Seattle as almost completely “pro-peace,” a term differing from anti-war. Seattle residents
often were self-congratulatory on their acceptance of this pro-peace stance, portraying
themselves as friendly, peaceful, and mature in their protests. One news article explained
that “…only in Seattle can you have a march where people even wait at the crosswalks”
(Sorensen, 2003b). Published letters were nearly all pro-peace, even anti-Bush, in the days
leading up to the start of the war. Although some coverage discussed actions of protesters,
much of the content focused on issues and attitudes. Letters to the editor were especially
strong in their discussion of issue positions. Students from the public schools were quietly
applauded for their participation in walk-outs and rallies, as well as information tables in the
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schools countering the work of military recruiters: “‘Find out why the military is hazardous
to your health,’ a handmade sign at their table promises as students stream by…” (Eskenazi,
2003).
As the war loomed closer, discourse began to shift. The favorable stories and letters
about the pro-peace movement shifted their sentiments. Before the war, rallies were the
terrain not of rally-‘round-the-flag, pro-war advocates, but of the pro-peace movement. As
the war began, turf changed and the voice of pro-Bush, pro-troops residents temporarily
began to dominate letters to the editor as well as news content, a transition that was noted
explicitly: “Demonstrators waving American flags and pumping placards that say ‘No
Saddam/Let’s Roll’ recently took to streets just half a mile away from where anti-war
protesters have gathered for the past three months” (Thompson, 2003b). This reversal was
short-lived, save repeated clashes in readers’ letters that cast protesters as “anti-troops,”
while the group recently assuming the label “anti-war” explained that they still supported
the troops, but not the president’s actions.
Ironically, as coverage shifted, pro-peace activists regained their positive identity, such
as in a news item about a family that enjoyed protesting together: “As a family, they’ve
demonstrated, waved placards on the sidewalk, formed peace groups at school” (Ramirez,
2003). Police became the villains instead, “where growing phalanxes of police on foot,
bicycles and horseback boxed them [the protesters] in and refused to let them leave”
(Sorensen & Perry, 2003). Although some of the news coverage focused on actions – albeit
of the police – letters during this time focused on issues, especially on the nature of
patriotism and protest. Surprisingly, an editorial appeared in the newspaper explaining how
letters were selected, a process some readers claimed was biased, but which the editorial
page editor attributed to “A population base weighted in predominantly liberal Seattle”
(Vesely, 2003):
The issue for us has been whether we seek an artificial balance in letters printed or run them
in proportion to the numbers received. We’ve always chosen to run them in a rough
proportion, recognizing that the community is rarely in balance on any issue, let alone one
that reaches so directly into our hearts and lives as war.
Unlike most cities, protesting was portrayed as a local hobby, a theme that was
developed by items such as a feature story on “a little old lady in an orange vest” (Sorensen,
2003a) who helped protests remain peaceful because she was “not to be messed with.” As
for “Silly Hall” – as a columnist dubbed the seat of local government (Balter, 2003) – the
city council’s wisdom was questioned about how far it would go to be politically correct
during protests, doing “everything short of reading bedtime stories and tucking them in at
night.”
In all, the contours of newspaper content followed a general course of supporting pro-
peace/anti-war activities, with a few brief disruptions as the war began. Protesters were
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generally discussed in positive ways by the paper’s writers, and as thoughtful, well-reasoned
individuals (as compared to Bush supporters) in their letters and interview comments.
The second research question asked how the protest and rally paradigms appeared in this
discourse. The simplest answer is, not in conventional ways. If the protest paradigm is
supposed to label protesters as social deviants, that was not done here. Although actions of
protesters were visible throughout news coverage, their thoughts and ideas appeared even
more prominently. They were, for the most part, bastions of reason in the community,
people who expressed their views about the war in a thoughtful way. Their actions were
exemplary. As for the rally paradigm, its appearance was convoluted. Rather than being
portrayed as stalwarts of the community, ralliers ended up as the outsiders, much as
protesters have been in past wartime situations.
The third research question asked about ideology embedded in protest news. This is a
challenging question, because Seattle ideology did not appear to be the same as national
ideology. Nor was it simply oppositional to the status quo, because the community’s
activists tended to go beyond that point and reflect other perspectives on the war than might
have been expected. Nonetheless, one way that ideology appeared in news stories was
through the choice of news sources. Veterans played a key role in rally news, especially
those of the more “popular” wars such as Korea and the Gulf War. Vietnam veterans, in
contrast, were used to symbolize the fallacy of the war, much as their own war had been
portrayed that way. Another kind of ideological source use was drawing on international
students to reflect a global perspective, placing their roles as outside observers who likely
subscribed to a different worldview. Criticism of police actions was another ideological
device, albeit one that would be counter-ideological in the bigger picture of dominant
ideology. This would not be the norm in many other communities, but in liberal Seattle,
these enforcers of the establishment and the status quo were ideologically deviant through
the ways that they mistreated protesters. Another expression of localized ideology appeared
from depicting protesters as religious, family-oriented, thoughtful, and peaceful, or even
keepers of the dominant ideology turning sides, such as a positive news item written about
a war protest by area lawyers (Thompson, 2003a). In some cases, comparison of Seattle with
other West Coast cities helped to exemplify this unusual status, as a columnist illustrated:
San Francisco: 3,013 people arrested, 46 intersections shut down, numerous police-car
windows smashed, a vomit-in to demonstrate that war makes people sick. Portland: bridges
closed, 165 arrested. Seattle: a few streets blocked, 44 arrested, feathers ruffled. (Balter,
2003)
In all, the ideological dimensions of this content brought the newspaper into the role of
community mediator. In news items, stories were cast to negotiate varying sentiments yet
normalize protest as valid activity. In columns, despite the satirical nature, protesters and
government leaders alike appeared as positive exemplars. In letters, where the real face-to-
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face debate took place, the Seattle Times provided a forum for residents on both sides of the
war issue to have their voices be heard. At the same time, by striving toward a balance in
the proportions of the letters received (and possibly by its selection decisions), the
newspaper was able to highlight the zone in which community sentiments lay. This
observation also addresses the fourth research question, about how the specific nature of a
community mediates the news of rally and protest news. Throughout all the content that was
reviewed, the character of Seattle came through, presenting protest in a unique light,
relatively far from that expected by either paradigm of protest news coverage.
Atlanta: Back to the Traditional Protest Paradigm
Considered the “center of the South,” Atlanta is a Republican city (Barone & Cohen,
2004, p. 449) of about 400,000 people (U.S. Census, 2000). With businesses growing
bigger, Atlantans tend to support Republicans but might also support conservative
Democrats (Barone & Cohen, 2004).
 Six editorials, 68 letters, and 26 news items were examined from The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, a daily newspaper with a circulation of 450,000 Monday through Saturday and
650,000 on Sunday (Thomson Dialog, 2003). A main general contour defining the Atlanta
Journal’s construction of the pro- and anti-war news discourse is the diversity of community
facets that voiced their stances on the war. Members of colleges and schools, religious
institutions, businesses, and troops in Iraq were featured. One article covered students of the
same high school holding a sit-in to protest the war and others wearing “Bomb Saddam” and
“Send the Hippies” T-shirts to school in support of war (Wagstaff, 2003). Another reported
that the leader of the National Council of Churches said he would launch a hunger strike to
protest the war (Blake & White, 2003), while a third described efforts by families and
churches to reach out for troops’ families, such as starting support groups and making
“patriotic pins” with photos of President Bush surrounded by red, white, and blue ribbons
in solidarity with troops (Ellis & Brunks, 2003). 
Although pro-war rallies made the news, they were not as prominent as anti-war
demonstrations and protests, which shed light on protestors’ activities that deviate from
social norms or expressions that carry an inherent element of drama and sensationalism.
This played out across both news and opinion pages, although more pronounced in news
discourse. One story reporting a Washington, D.C. march in which Georgia college students
participated reported that D.C. police said “20 or more protesters rushed the guarded
entrance of the World Bank headquarters and made it inside, where six were arrested for
unlawful entry and others escaped by smashing a window” (Jones, 2003). The same story
likened protestors to Vietnam’s anti-war activists of the 1960s, describing their clothing as
“a bit outside of the mainstream.” Further, “Some wore ripped corduroy pants and faded T-
shirts. Girls in checkered-print skirts and tank tops twirled in the crowd.” Another story
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reported on yet another college student-led anti-war demonstration, described as the “largest
protest of the day,” as follows: 
They held signs, waved flags and urged passers-by to honk their horns in support. Each toot
of the horn was met by huge cheers. The boisterous crowd banged drums and buckets,
providing a marching-band beat to chants of “no blood for oil” and “no war, no way, No
Fascist U.S.A.” (Tofig & Seymour, 2003) 
One letter even expressed disapproval of a restaurant staff dumping French wine in a
local river in protest, saying this “not only sends a very bad message to the public, but it is
also illegal without a state permit” (Bethea, 2003), while another called protestors’ displays
“disgusting” (Waterfill, 2003).
Even when protest spectacles were absent, the normalcy of the event or people involved
was highlighted, underlining defiance of the typical protest scenario. One story described
a veteran married couple who wear “glasses and sensible shoes” to the rallies as “not your
typical war protesters” (Brett, 2003a), while another called most marches that day “orderly”
(Jones, 2003). Conversely, reporting pro-war rallies generally reflected a more mellow
manifestation of sentiment than anti-war counterparts. A rally at the Centennial Olympic
Park cast participants in a patriotic light: “Thousands of flag-waving, Bush-backing, troop-
loving patriots came from all around metro Atlanta on Saturday to cheer for their country
at Centennial Olympic Park” (Brett, 2003b). Contrarily, the local “peace movement” was
said to employ “screaming slogans like ‘Support Our Troops, Bring Them Home’”
(Seymour, 2003). 
Interestingly, both letters to the editor and editorials – more so than news – acted as a
forum for debating issues that go beyond the drama of protesting either way. Some letters
voiced concern that protests could be distracting security forces from defending the country
against terrorists (e.g. Nidy, 2003), while others urged support and “utmost respect” for
troops regardless of the moral judgment on war (Koshkin, 2003). The anti-war camp, on the
other hand, often refuted allegations of anti-patriotism, saying that opposing the war does
not necessarily equate with anti-patriotism: “Do you not believe that one can be pro-
America and be against a war? I am one of the most patriotic people you will meet. I flew
my flag long before it was fashionable” (Braunschweig, 2003). Another drew parallels with
the Spanish-American war that was “fueled by a jingoistic press” and “established America
as an imperialist power,” arguing that the war on Iraq is conducive to breeding more bin
Laden-like people (Sartor, 2003). 
Each camp was keen on not only pointing fingers at the opposite camp, but the Journal
itself occasionally came under fire for its own coverage of war and related sentiment. For
instance, one letter expressed that the paper’s headline, “Baghdad Burns,” distorts the
precision of U.S. military targets and questioned, “Why not change the name of the paper
to the Al-Jazeera-Constitution?” (Strange, 2003). In the anti-war realm, some letters argued
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that the paper prioritized pro-war rallies over anti-war demonstrations, even claiming that
“the media in this country (including the AJC) have given President Bush and company free
rein without a hint of criticism. This is an outrage and an evasion of journalistic
responsibility” (Hurt, 2003). Some editorials adopted an upfront pro-war stance, expressing
that U.N. support is not needed because its interests are not identical to those of the U.S.
(Wooten, 2003) or arguing that protests further embolden the enemy and that freedom of
expression comes with responsibility (Garlock, 2003). Others, however, expressed
frustration with how the war was pressuring dissenters to remain silent (Head, 2003) or
documented the harassment of protesters nationwide, calling the pro-war stance illustrative
of a “wave of hardline pseudo-patriotism” (Tucker, 2003). 
Generally speaking, war-related protests in the Journal were communicated such that
the concept and act of disagreeing with the war emerged as contrary to social orthodoxy.
This was a pattern evident both before and after the war started, and enhanced by the
relative normalcy with which pro-war stances were delivered.  
To answer the second research question, it becomes evident that the protest and rally
paradigms were manifest in a largely typical manner, despite the contrast being more salient
in news discourse. Indeed, there was a clear emphasis in news stories on the material aspects
of the protest scene, with appearance, physical activity, and symbols of their dissident
ideology as outstanding components of the relevant protest rhetoric. Even opinion pages,
which ultimately provided a more opportune venue for discussing issues behind the visual
drama, carried themes of anti-patriotism and national security as forces of demonizing
protest acts. Conversely, the relatively minimal pro-war rally coverage coupled with its
“softer” treatment by the Journal worked to depict pro-war sentiment as natural and
expected, usually defended under the banner of patriotism and/or an absolutistic approach
to align oneself with the homeland. Having opinion pages adopt a more even-handed
approach to handling both sides of the spectrum may speak to the paper’s attempt at “toning
down” the features from which the protest/rally dichotomy emerges. It does not underscore,
though, its presence in the newspaper’s primary facet – news. 
The third research question inquired about how ideology was embedded in protest news.
In large measure, the Journal embodied various takes on the war yet tended to do so in a
fashion amiable enough to the war-waging power structure so as not to explicitly defy the
traditional protest and rally paradigms. In fact, one article specifically mentioned the “rally
effect” to explain the increased public approval for President Bush’s performance after the
war started:
Bush’s job approval rating was 71 percent, representing a jump of 13 percent from the
previous weekend, according to Gallup. This is an expected “rally effect” increase that
usually accompanies U.S. involvement in war or a situation in which Americans are in harm’s
way on foreign shores, Gallup adds. (Bessonette, 2003) 
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Our fourth research question asked how the specific nature of a community mediates the
effect on the news of the rally and protest paradigms. The generally conservative nature of
Atlanta might help explain how and why these anti-war protests stood out as deviant.
Conversely, the mainstream, pro-war preferences of the Atlantan community were mirrored
in a normalized, naturalized manner in their mainstream newspaper.
Protest in Minneapolis: Somewhere in Between
Minneapolis, with a population of 382, 618 (US Census, 2000) is the largest city in
Minnesota, which is the center of the three-party politics and is considered a swing state.
While George W. Bush lost Minnesota by 48%-46% in 2000, Republicans won
governorship in 2002. As part of a metropolitan area of 2,642,053 people, Minneapolis is
considered the finance and transportation center of the Upper Midwest (City of Minneapolis,
2002).
The first question addressed the contours of protest coverage. Thirty-four news items,
57 letters to the editor, and one editorial were examined from the Minneapolis Star Tribune,
one of the top 20 largest newspapers in the nation with a daily circulation of 405,459 and
a Sunday circulation of 669,290 (About Star Tribune, 2003). The Tribune mostly favored
the pro-peace movement to the point that a pro-war reader accused it of criticizing those
who “support the efforts to liberate Iraq” (Capello, 2003). It mainly referred to protesters
as “pro-peace” or “peace people” (Grow, 2003b) and went further to call protests “war for
peace” (Grow, 2003c). Coverage depicted protesters of this war, unlike previous wars, as
mature people coming from various walks of life. Protest emerged as a family activity where
protesters brought their toddlers along. It also distinguished first-time form old-time or
regular protesters, conveying that protests engaged a wide range of people including war
veterans (Furst, 2003a). 
News coverage did not focus on pro- and anti-war camps arguments as much as the way
the community negotiated these different viewpoints. This became evident in stories that
reported junior high students’ planned walk-outs and in the one editorial examined. The
walk-outs catalyzed debate in the school community about how to negotiate students’ desire
for political participation by protesting against the war. The Tribune mainly depicted the
change in junior high and commended it, reporting how they took turns in speaking and
demonstrated in-depth knowledge about the issues surrounding the war. “Unlike most older
protesters, they kept their remarks brief… They’re [the kids] informed. What happened to
junior high?” (Grow, 2003a). The editorial, on the other hand, reflected the alienation that
the generation that protested the Vietnam War feels as “liberal has become a dirty word”
and questioning the war entails the risk of “being branded unpatriotic, un-American, a
pessimist, a crybaby” (Berg, 2003).
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The negotiation was also reflected in readers’ letters as they discussed issues through
an exchange about the meaning of patriotism especially before the war started. Pro-war
people seemed to prefer voicing their opinion through letters rather than actual rallying.
While news reported pro-peace demonstrations, letters from pro-war readers mainly cast
their disapproval through defining patriotism in terms of supporting the government:
“‘Standing up for my government means standing up for my country’” (Perterson, 2003) and
trusting the president: “Bush can see with crystal clarity that sometimes honest men must
deal with a monster when others are unwilling…Thank goodness for George W. Bush’”
(Moses, 2003). They also viewed pro-peace protesters as “anti-American” and argued for
war as a preemptive action to prevent another 9/11. In fact, one letter explained: “Sometimes
patriotism means leaving one’s personal feelings at the door for the good of our country”
(Salchow, 2003). Conversely, pro-peace readers tried to explain that protesting is a vital part
of practicing democracy and does not conflict with patriotism: “The American experience
is defined by the freedom to express differing points of view” (Gronquist, 2003). Some
people tried to occupy an in-between position, neither supporting nor opposing the war, but
ended up supporting it since it seemed like the patriotic thing to do: “No clear-thinking
person would deny the value of a vigorous debate on matters as important as war and its
implications. In the end…we are ‘Washington’ and it’s time to get behind the people who
are about to do our heavy lifting” (Wolfe, 2003).
When the war started, the coverage slightly shifted toward reporting the actions of the
pro-peace demonstrators and the issues of the pro-war camp, which became visible as it
organized rallies. Yet in Minneapolis, police and protesters still maintained a “cordial”
(Furst, 2003c) relationship characterized by cooperation. They engaged in an almost scripted
ritual in which each has a distinct role. For instance, one protester decided to “go ahead and
get arrested anyway” (Furst, 2003c) and another thanked the police “‘for their
professionalism and the gentle way they handled us [the protesters].’” A police officer
explained: “‘We both kind of respect each other and we’ve never had problems’” (Furst,
2003d).
The second question addressed the appearance of the protest and rally paradigms in the
paper. Perhaps because the relationship between the police and the protesters was not
confrontational the protest and the rally paradigms did not appear distinctively until the war
began. When the war started and protesters blocked entrances to the courthouse in
downtown Minneapolis, the protest paradigm emerged slightly and briefly as the story
started by describing the actions of “civil disobedience,” reporting the number of people
arrested and how the police dealt with the protesters and restored normalcy. 
The protest paradigm was also manifested in reports that gave voice to the protesters,
yet hinted that they have time to protest since they are either unemployed or have non-
demanding jobs. Yet another brief appearance of the rally paradigm came through the
comments of military families who “have nothing but contempt for those who were noisily
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protesting the war....” (von Sternberg, 2003a), and through pro-war ralliers who waved signs
denouncing anti-war protesters: “You shut the hell up – we will protect America” and called
protesters “‘the enemy because they’re not anti-war – they’re anti Bush’” (von Sternberg,
2003b).The Tribune engaged in the rally paradigm as it reported counter demonstrations
after the war started and invited readers to send the paper information about support groups
for military families (von Sternberg & Walsh, 2003) After the war began, the protest and
rally paradigms seemed to engage in a dialogue that reflected the ongoing debate in the
community about the camp one should support..
The third question addressed the ways in which ideology was embedded in protest news.
This community featured many pro-peace protests although polls showed that the majority
of Minnesotans supported the war. This could explain why news mediated both stances on
the war and tried to make sense of the ongoing debate between the two camps especially that
the pro-war supporters became more confrontational after the war had begun and engaged
in counter rallies, while war veterans were visible in both pro- and anti-war camps. The
Tribune conducted and published an opinion poll that showed that a 58 percent majority
supports the war. It also carried the comment of a political scientist who explained that
public opinion “is following a pattern familiar from past wars” (Black, 2003). Furthermore,
the Tribune ran a story that reported that many Americans “are torn by competing emotions
about the war with Iraq, especially now that U.S. troops are in the line of fire” (Lerner,
2003). 
Another ideological facet emerged through giving voice to bystanders who thought that
pro-peace protesters who advocated supporting the troops by bringing them home “‘are
being unpatriotic.’” They worried that the “‘troops will see this [the march] and they’ll think
it’s terrible’” (Furst, 2003b). They constructed their support of the war in a patriotic frame
that excluded members of the anti-war camp and deemed them unpatriotic.
Community ideology was reflected in reactions to the governor’s proposal that
protesters should pay restitution. While letters from readers reflected the debate that took
place in the community, the paper took a clear rejecting stance: “Charging for arrest? Good
luck, governor.” The story sarcastically described the proposal as “outside-the-box and
likely outside-the-constitution” and a “pay-per-arrest plan.” While the story reported the
proposal’s illegality, it also reminded the governor and readers of the marginality of the
protesters. It transcribed a phone call of a “career protester” with his mother who orders him
not to use curse words when talking to her about why he does not have a job. The “career
protester” exclaims: “‘What word? Job?’” The story concludes: “Sometimes, our governor
doesn’t seem to see the complexities” (Grow, 2003c). The Tribune performed the guard dog
role and barked at the governor because his proposal threatened the valued freedom of
speech.
This leads to the fourth research question, which addresses the nature of community as
mediator of the protest and rally paradigms. The Tribune functioned as a community
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mediator. Like the interfaith vigils and prayers, which served as a middle ground for the
undecided and those who negotiate conflicting feelings, the paper acted as a venue for
negotiating the ideas of both camps. Yet, unlike with candlelight vigils, it stepped in when
it felt that the governor’s proposal would threaten the unanimous right of free speech in the
community. 
Integrating Findings from the Three Analyses
These three analyses of news and opinion pieces from Seattle, Atlanta and Minneapolis
have each shown a different flavor, yet they also point toward larger integrated findings that
inform our research questions. The first research question asked about the general contours
of this discourse. Overall, the protest and rally paradigms did not surface in their usual
forms before the war began. Before the war, news texts focused mostly on issues and letters
remained in the background. After the war started, though, the rally paradigm emerged
briefly. Letters grew around the start of the war as well, with much of the heated debate
taking place there instead of news items.
The second research question asked more specifically about the nature of the protest and
rally paradigms. Ideally, the protest paradigm should focus on the negative actions of
protesters, while the rally paradigm should focus on the positive attributes of ralliers. The
actual newspaper discourse, however, was not that clear-cut, with community character
shaping the tone and emphasis. Both of these paradigms appeared most closely to their
expected shapes during the time closest to the start of the war.
The third research question asked how ideology was embedded in the discourse.
Generally, localized ideology was reflected rather than a single national ideology. One
journalistic characteristic was the choice of news sources who expressed specific views.
Veterans of the Gulf War and other recent veterans provided rally-flavored comment, while
Vietnam veterans and non-veterans appeared with a more protest-oriented tone. Police held
somewhat ideologically ambiguous positions, sometimes as guard dogs of local ideology,
but other times as the “bad guys” of the story.
The fourth question asked how the community and the newspaper mediated the
discourse. Clearly, the character of the community shaped coverage as well as the letters that
were published. By publishing these items, the three newspapers served as community
mediators to keep the story on course. This community character is something different than
the structural pluralism that has sometimes been used to understand the community-
newspaper interface, and based in a relatively homogeneous locale. This role of local
mediator catalyzed the papers to shift slightly between the rally and protest paradigms as the
war started.
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CONCLUSIONS
Expressing public opinion through voices of various ages, professions, and ideological
stances speaks to how the newspapers we studied embraced the notion of community
representation in media discourse. Across all three newspapers, a vast array of news sources
was evident. That the protest and rally paradigms appeared differently across time and
across communities highlights the media’s role as a cross-community mediator. 
It is especially interesting that the protest paradigm appeared in its traditional form in
the more-conservative Atlanta, while becoming convoluted in the liberal city of Seattle. This
finding highlights how anti-war protest represents a kind of deviance whose acceptability
varies with the political leanings of a given community. For the cases of Seattle and
Minneapolis, telling the news (and publishing the letters) of protest and rally in a relatively
unorthodox manner became sufficiently sensational and attractive to community residents,
creating a media discourse with which the audience could resonate ideologically. Likewise,
the rally paradigm thrived more within the Atlanta community’s conservatism. In that case,
it made more ideological sense for that newspaper to align with the official sphere regarding
the war. Thus, the Atlanta media discourse was both a product and feature of its community,
normalizing the pro-war position while simultaneously questioning – even criticizing – the
anti-war counterpart. 
Although hard news is conventionally expected to carry richer, more informative
substance on the day’s issues, this study found letters to the editor to be the main news
discourse element to fulfill this function. This finding raises questions about how an
emotionally charged event or issue corresponds with its manifestation in news and opinion
pages. Other aspects of community and public opinion could also be at work, with the guard
dog role of a newspaper mediating and sorting out contrasts with a community’s preferred
meanings. 
Above all, this study points out the role of community character in constructing a media
discourse that negotiates between public opinion and localized ideology. This role appears
to be a particularly critical one during times of crisis, with public opinion surrounding the
Iraq War serving as a prime example for studying this phenomenon. If protest discourse
bears a correlation to community character, then traditional press functions such as those
of government watchdog and public informant would also likely vary across communities.
Viewed this way, the impact of community in mediating pivotal discourse becomes
particularly consequential. Future studies could explore these ideas further by developing
the media-community interface into a grander and more systematic scheme. The qualitative
approach we took here was valuable for sensing the role of community character that might
not emerge so effectively from a quantitative structural analysis. Quantitative work,
however, might become useful for developing a set of community character indicators for
a broader study of media discourse about war protest. 
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Considering the implications of the present study raises concerns about how news media
are performing their long-prescribed roles of informing their readers. This study has
demonstrated the constructed reality of a local community, but ironically, the community
itself becomes one such tool in constructing this reality.
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UNTANGLING SPIRALS OF SILENCE
IN A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
LEO W. JEFFRES, KIMBERLY NEUENDORF, 
CHERYL CAMPANELLA BRACKEN AND DAVID J. ATKIN5
Noelle-Neumann’s theory about the “spiral of silence” renewed interest in public
opinion research when it was introduced in Germany more than 30 years ago.
According to the theory—which has enjoyed mixed support — people use the media
and personal experience to perceive those opinions that are gaining and those that
are losing ground. When people believe that their opinions are in the majority or
becoming more popular, they express their convictions openly, outside of their
family and circle of friends. If they think their opinions are in the minority, or
losing favor, they feel less certain of their position and are less likely to discuss
their opinion except with friends. This study builds on the notion that there are
multiple spirals of silence, examining potential spirals based on partisanship and
gender in a presidential election. In particular, the researchers apply the spiral of
silence in an election context, where there is ample media coverage about the topics
and issues that are the subject of strong opinions and where there is a greater
likelihood that people would encounter their expression in public settings. Results
from a regional probability sample indicate that those showing the greatest interest
in issues and those closest to their candidates are most likely to express opinions
to those with whom they are most likely to disagree, i.e., confrontation rather than
silence. One might explain these findings in the context of “multiple spirals of
confrontation” rather than “multiple spirals of silence.” Implications of study
findings are discussed.
Keywords: spiral of silence, opinions, presidential election, 
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Noelle-Neumann’s theory about the “spiral of silence” renewed interest in public opinion
research when it was introduced in Germany more than 30 years ago. According to the
theory, people use the media and personal experience to perceive those opinions that are
gaining and those that are losing ground. When people believe that their opinions are in the
majority or becoming more popular, they express their convictions openly, outside of their
family and circle of friends. If they think their opinions are in the minority, or losing favor,
they feel less certain of their position and are less likely to discuss their opinion except with
friends (see Noelle-Neumann, 1974, 1977, 1984, 1989, 1991; Lang, 1986).  Evidence in1
support of the theory has been mixed,  however, varying with the context and topic of2
opinion under study. 
For instance, looking at how people expressed their opinions about the verdict of the
O.J. Simpson trial, Jeffres, Neuendorf and Atkin (1999) found evidence of racial differences
and suggested that there is not one but many potential spirals of silence, based on such
identifying attributes as group membership. But more research is needed about people’s
assessments of the climate of opinion and what it is about the context that inhibits the
expression of unpopular opinions. This study builds on the notion that there are multiple
spirals of silence, examining potential spirals based on partisanship and gender in a
presidential election. In particular, the researchers apply the spiral of silence in an election
context, where there is ample media coverage about the topics and issues that are the subject
of strong opinions and where there is a greater likelihood that people would encounter their
expression in public settings.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The spiral of silence has been studied in a variety of contexts and countries, using
diverse issues and topics of public opinion.  Scholars also have tested major assumptions3
operating as part of the theory (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997; Noelle-Neumann, 1974;
Scheufele & Moy, 2000; Stevenson & Gonzenbach, 1990)  and discussed its significance4
for democratic processes (Entman, 2004; Moscovici, 1991; Sparrow & de Chernatony, 1995;
also see Simpson, 1996). Since public opinion evolves through interpersonal communication
and activities that occur in public settings, it’s important to examine that context. 
The pressure to conform, or one’s willingness to speak out, is central to the spiral of
silence (Scherer, 1991; Tichenor, 1988). Noelle-Neumann (1984) defines public opinion as
“views one can safely express in public.” The conformity hypothesis and the theory in
general are dependent upon conditions under which people will speak about controversial
issues.  Salmon and Kline (1984) note that people in the real world almost always have5
some support for their position, which would reduce the pressures to conform (also see
Gonzenbach, 1992).  Price and Allen (1990, p. 373) conclude from their examination of the6
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literature that “research findings from recent American studies do not seem to support the
claim that a widespread fear of isolation contributes to the silencing of minorities.”  7
When people find themselves in a public setting where opinions are expressed, the spiral
of silence theory seems to assume that the “other” initiates the discussion and first expresses
one’s opinion, placing “self” in the position of responding with an opinion of his or her own.
That often is the case, but certainly not always. Sometimes a topic is raised but positions are
not clearly stated at the outset. In this situation, one either must generalize from media
reports and personal experience that the “other” person holds the majority or minority
opinion.  The accuracy of one’s estimate of the general “climate of opinion” also has been8
questioned.  Communication research suggests that people use cues to identify another’s9
positions on various issues and the likelihood that they will agree or disagree. Among the
most important cues would be those associated with unambiguous ascriptive factors (e.g.,
race, gender), cues associated with achievement (e.g., income and education, which may be
ascertained from dress or speech), or affiliation with some group (e.g., membership in a
political party or organization, or affiliation with some religion); the last of these three may
require verbal cues more than the others. Rather than study the spiral of silence by asking
our subjects and respondents to declare whether they would express themselves to an
“undifferentiated” other, the present study focuses on multiple contexts. 
Researchers studying the third person effect have looked at the relationship between
“self” and “other,” finding that people who are more dissimilar or socially distant are
believed to be affected by the media more than we are; in a parallel fashion, some research
has found the spiral of silence to operate when the “other” person is more distant, suggesting
that people assume those like us hold the same opinions while those different from us
probably hold contrary opinions. Thus, we would expect people to gauge the “climate of
opinion” not on the basis of some generalized media reports but on the basis of group cues
or individual characteristics that one believes are associated with the opinion issue likely to
be expressed. In this scenario, one would find an individual’s behavior manifesting multiple
spirals of silence, which vary across different situations. 
Involvement has been found to be a significant factor when the spiral of silence
operates. In Salmon and Neuwirth’s (1990) test of an elaborated version of Noelle-
Neumann’s model of the spiral of silence, involvement and knowledge directly influenced
expression of opinions. Similarly, Shamir (1997) found perceptions of the climate of opinion
were related to overt expression of opinion in Israel, but the impact was not consistent and
political involvement was most important. Clearly, people who hold a mild or no interest in
a particular issue are less likely to bother expressing an opinion in a conversation, one way
or the other. There is little at stake. However, if someone is intensely interested or highly
involved with the issue, we would expect that to act as a motivating force. The importance
of involvement may not have a “linear” relationship with enactment of the spiral of silence.
At a moderate level of involvement and interest, we might expect sufficient motivation for
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involvement but sufficient inhibition of expression because of the social cues stemming
from the situation. At a high level, involvement and interest may motivate the individual to
overcome such inhibitions and express contrary views despite social sanctions. 
Although the spiral of silence has generally been applied to the expression of opinions
about public issues in general, election campaigns also have been provided an important
context for examining the theory. Glynn and McLeod (1984) found support for the
hypothesis that those who see their position as gaining support will be more likely to discuss
that position than those who see their position as losing support in a study of the 1980
presidential elections. There also was partial support for individuals seeing support for a
candidate more likely expressing a preference for that candidate. In an experiment,
Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1994) found that revealing information about poll results led
voters to develop more positive views of a candidate but did not affect voting intention.
Turner and Sparrow (1997) discuss the significance of the spiral of silence for political
parties interpreting pollsters’ predictions in British elections. 
HYPOTHESES
To examine multiple spirals of silence where individuals would use group cues, we
chose gender and partisan affiliation. For the former, the controversial issue of abortion was
chosen for examining the spiral of silence. Although men and women are not far apart in
their opinions about abortion,  we might expect differences in the perceived “right” of the10
opposite gender to express or hold views on this touchy issue. For party affiliation, four
issues being examined in the ongoing presidential campaign were selected—cutting taxes,
social security and medicare policies, environmental policies, and education policies.  Since11
people may not agree with “their” gender or political party on an issue, we would expect the
spiral of silence to operate only when they agreed. Thus, the following expectations are
hypothesized based on the spiral of silence perspective:
H1a. Men who believe they agree with other men on abortion will be less likely to express
their opinion in a context where they encounter a woman favoring strong pro-choice views.
H1b. Women who believe they agree with other women on abortion will be less likely to
express their opinion in a context where they encounter a man expressing strong anti-choice
views. 
H2a. Democrats who believe they agree with other Democrats on each of the issues (cutting
taxes, social security and Medicare policies, environmental policies, education policies) will
be less likely to express their opinion in a context where they encounter a Republican
expressing Republican policies. 
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H2b. Republicans who believe they agree with other Republicans on each of the issues
(cutting taxes, social security and Medicare policies, environmental policies, education
policies) will be less likely to express their opinion in a context where they encounter a
Democrat expressing Democrat policies. 
Since involvement and interest are believed to be motivating factors for expressing
one’s opinion, we hypothesize the following. In addition to the importance of an issue, the
strength of one’s partisan affiliation should operate in a similar fashion since the issues are
tied to party identification:
H3. The greater the perceived importance of an issue, the stronger the spiral of silence
expressed in Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
H4. The stronger one’s partisan identification, the stronger the spiral of silence expressed in
Hypotheses 2a and 2 b.
The discussion above suggests that involvement at the highest levels might be a
motivating agent, contrary to the spiral of silence; thus, it’s useful to examine the
relationship to see whether it occurs at moderate levels of involvement, but not at the highest
levels.
METHODS
Two surveys were conducted in the two and a half weeks leading up to the 2000
presidential election. One survey was conducted in a metropolitan area of the Midwest, with
interviews of 505 adults using a computer-aided telephone-interviewing (CATI) system. The
second was a national survey of 2,172 respondents conducted over the Internet by a
commercial research firm that sends requests to a diverse set of potential respondents, who
logged onto the survey site to participate. The interview schedule for the telephone survey
and the Internet instrument followed parallel forms, with no differences in wording other
than those created by the unique nature of the formats. Thus, the Internet interview included
some matrices to display items that were administered serially in the telephone survey. 
Importance of Issues was operationalized with the following instructions: “Now, I’m
going to list several items and I’d like you to tell me how important each one is in helping
you decide for whom to vote in the presidential race, using a 0-10 scale, where 0 is totally
unimportant, 10 is extremely important and 5 is neutral. You may give any number between
0 and 10.” Respondents were asked about the importance of cutting taxes first, followed by
items tapping the importance of environmental policies, educational policies of the
candidates, social security and medicare policies of the candidates, the candidates’ stand on
abortion, and the candidates’ stand on gun control. 
Jeffres et al. Untangling Spirals of Silence in a Presidential Election
86  Journal of Media Sociology, Vol. 1, Nos. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2009)
Partisan Affiliation was operationalized with the following: “Which of the following
categories best describes your partisan affiliation? Strong Democrat, lean towards
Democrats, Independent, lean towards Republicans, strong Republican.” On the list of
responses not read but also coded was “other party.” 
Partisan Agreement on Issues was operationalized with a series of statements similar to
the following: “How much would you say you agree with other [Democrats/Republicans]
on the issue of cutting taxes? Using a 0 to 10 scale where 10 means you totally agree with
other [Democrats/Republicans] and 0 means you totally disagree, how much would you say
you agree with [Democrats/Republicans] on this issue?” Items obtained agreement on each
of the following four issues: cutting taxes, environmental policies, educational policies of
the candidates, social security and medicare policies of the candidates. Since these items
were tailored for Democrats and for Republicans, independents and those affiliated with
other parties or no party skipped this section. 
Gender Agreement on Issue was operationalized in a similar fashion, beginning with the
following statement: “As you may have heard, there appear to be differences in how the
majority of men and women view some issues today. As a [man/woman] how much do you
agree on the issues? First, how much would you say you agree with other [men/women] on
abortion? Using a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means you totally disagree with most other
[men/women] and 10 means you totally agree with most other [men/women], how much
would you say you agree with other [men/women] on this issue?” 
Expressing Partisan Opinions in Public Settings was operationalized with the following
introduction: “People often strike up a conversation with someone while sitting in a waiting
room or some other public setting. Suppose you were in such a situation and knew that the
other person was a die-hard [Republican/Democrat]. If that person started talking strongly
about how much he supported [Bush’s tax cut and economic policies/Gore’s tax cut and
economic policies], how willing would you be to enter the conversation and express your
views? Not willing at all, slightly willing, very willing, willing and eager to express my
views.” Next, respondents were asked “What if the same person started talking about the
candidates’ environmental policies. How willing would you be to express your views on that
topic?” Third, respondents were asked “How willing would you be to express your views
about social security and medicare if the [die-hard Republican/die-hard Democrat] started
giving his views on that subject?” Fourth, respondents were asked, “How willing would you
be to give your views about education in this situation?” Although no information about
partisan agreement on issues was obtained for respondents who were independents or had
other party affiliations, they were asked a set of four items in which they were to encounter
another person who was a “die-hard Republican or Democrat.”
Expressing Gender Opinions in Public Settings was operationalized in a similar fashion
with the following statement: “Suppose you were in a waiting room and a [woman/man with
strong pro/anti- choice views] struck up a conversation. How likely would you be to join the
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conversation and express your views? not willing at all, slightly willing, very willing,
willing and eager to express my views.” 
In addition to the operationalization of concepts in the spiral of silence, the study
measured a host of other variables for other purposes. These variables also were used in a
secondary search for predictors of people’s likelihood they would speak out and express
their opinions in public settings: 
Social Categories — These included gender (coded male=1, female=2), the number of
people in a respondent’s household, age, household income (ranging from 1=$10,000 or less
to 8=more than $100,000), level of education (from 1=completed grade school or less to
6=advanced college degree), ethnicity (“What is your ethnic or racial background?”), and
marital status (“What is your marital status? Are you married, divorced, widowed, separated,
or never been married?”).
Political Factors — These included a measure that asked respondents the following:
“do you belong to any neighborhood or community organizations, including block clubs,
social groups, religious groups, business groups or ethnic groups?” If they said yes, they
were asked “What are they?” The raw number was coded as a measure of community
organizational ties. Political philosophy was measured by asking respondents which of
several categories “best describes your political philosophy” (1=strong conservative, lean
towards conservative, 3=middle of the road, lean towards liberal, 5=strong liberal). Political
knowledge was based on an index reflecting the number of correct answers to five items (1)
Can you tell me where Kosovo is located?; 2) Which of the presidential or vice presidential
candidates is the son of a former U.S. Senator?; 3) The Nobel Peace Prize this year was won
by a political leader from which of the following countries — Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Australia or Chile?; 4) Who is running for the U.S. Senate in New York
against Hillary Clinton — Rudolph Giuliani, George E. Pataki, Rick Lazio, Fiorello
LaGuardia or John Faso?; 5) Which of the presidential candidates supports school
vouchers?). Closeness to candidates on each of the issues was tapped using a scale where
“0 means you’re closest to Bush, 10 means you’re closest to Gore and 5 means you’re
neutral or equally close to each candidate. You may give any number between 0 and 10.”
An index across the four major issues (cutting taxes, the environment, Social Security and
Medicare, and education) also was computed.
Media Exposure — The traditional measures of media exposure were included using the
following: “How many hours of television did you watch yesterday?” “How often do you
usually watch the news on television?” “How many hours did you listen to the radio
yesterday?” “How many days last week did you read a newspaper?” “How many different
magazines do you read regularly?” “In the past six months, how many books have you
read?” “In the past month, how many borrowed or rented videos have you watched?” “In the
past month, how many times have you gone out to see a movie in a theater?” In addition,
respondents were asked if they had ever gone on the Internet and, if so, how often they did
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so at work (0=never to 7=several times a day) or at home (same scale); the two scales were
combined for a measure of Internet use. Those who had never gone on the Internet were
coded as 0. In addition, respondents were asked how often they “visit media websites, such
as one of the TV networks, a newspaper or radio site.” Respondents also were asked how
often they visit chat rooms (0=never before to 6=every day). 
Political Communication — Several measures of political communication were used,
including both interpersonal and mass communication. Respondents were asked “how
closely would you say you follow the campaign in the media — very closely, somewhat
closely, not too closely, not at all?” Respondents were told, “As you probably have noticed,
there are more political commercials on television as we get closer to the election. Using a
0 to 10 scale, where 0 means you’ve seen almost no political ads on TV and 10 means
you’ve seen many political commercials what number tells how much you’ve been exposed
to political commercials? You may give any number between 0 and 10.” Respondents were
asked if they had watched each of the debates on television and the number was summed up
for a measure of debates exposure. Respondents also were asked if they had visited any of
the websites covering politics of the candidates during the presidential campaign. Three
items tapped the strength of one’s interpersonal political communication network;
respondents were asked how often they “talk about politics and current events” in their
family, with their closest friends, and with people at work — almost never, seldom, very
frequently or all the time. Responses were summed across the three for a 3-12 scale.
Respondents were asked to use a 0-10 scale where 0 means one completely disagrees, 5 is
neutral and 10 means one completely agrees to tell how much they agreed with the following
statements: “I enjoy talking about the campaign with family and friends” and “Most of my
friends have the same political views as I do.”
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The first hypothesis said that men who believe they agree with other men on abortion
will be less likely to express their opinion in a context where they encounter a woman
favoring strong pro-choice views. A companion hypothesis predicted the same thing for
women. Because such significant numbers of men and women said they were neutral by
selecting 5 on a 0-10 scale, we coded that as separate from the responses indicating
disagreement (0-4) or agreement (6-10) with other men or women on the issue. As Table 1
shows, in both the metropolitan and Internet surveys, men who said they agree with other
men on abortion were more likely to express their views to a woman with strong pro-choice
views compared to those who were either neutral, or thought they disagreed with other men.
A slightly different pattern is found for women, where those who said they agreed and
disagreed with other women were more likely to say they would express their view to a man
with strong anti-choice views on abortion, compared to those who were neutral. Again, the
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same results are found in both surveys. Both patterns are contrary to the spiral of silence
dynamic outlined in Hypothesis 1. The correlation between agreement with one’s gender on
abortion and talking with the opposite gender is statistically significant for men (metro
survey r=.23, p<.001; national survey r=.08, p<.05) but not for women (metro survey r=.07,
n.s.; national survey r=.02, n.s.).
The second set of hypotheses predicted that Democrats who believe they agree with
other Democrats on each of the issues (cutting taxes, social security and Medicare policies,
environmental policies, education policies) would be less likely to express their opinion in
a context where they encounter a Republican expressing Republican policies. A similar set
of hypotheses predicted the same for Republicans. Because there was much consensus
among partisans on the issues, neutrals (5) were coded with numbers indicating
disagreement (0-4). Results are found in Table 2, where we see an almost perfect pattern
contradicting the spiral of silence outlined in Hypothesis 2 in both the metropolitan and
national Internet surveys. Democrats who believe they agree with their partisans on issues
are more likely to express their views when they encounter a Republican displaying his or
her party’s views on the issue. The same results obtain for Republicans, where those in
agreement with their fellow GOP partisans are more likely to express their views when they
encounter a Democrat holding the opposite views. In the case of abortion, there is room for
ambiguity, i.e., men and women may not see much consensus on the issue within gender,
but in the election media coverage articulated party positions on the issues selected for the
study, so such an interpretation is less tenable. It would appear that agreement acts as a
motivating factor, stimulating partisans to argue their party’s positions when given the
chance. 
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Further comparisons were undertaken between Republicans and Democrats with
independents and those naming other party affiliations on expression of opinions when
encountering other partisans. In the case of independents and others, the situation was
described so that respondents encountered a die-hard Republican or Democrat supporting
policies of Gore or Bush. As Table 3 shows, independents are the least likely to express
their opinions, with Democrats second most likely and Republicans most likely of all to
express their views in a potentially-conflicting situation. With one exception, the pattern is
consistent across both surveys. The exception is found for the environment, where
Republicans were more vocal in the metro survey, while Democrats were more vocal in the
national Internet survey. 
Tables 4 through 10 include regression analyses reflecting a search for predictors of
respondents’ likelihood they would speak out, or express opinions to others. 
Tables 4a and 4b  outline how Democrats who share their party’s views and have12
stronger community ties are more likely to speak out across the four issues. Community ties
is a predictor in six of eight regressions and at least one of the two measures of agreement
with fellow partisans is a predictor in five of eight regressions. The significance of social
category measures varies, although education and gender are significant in the metro survey
and gender and white ethnicity are predictors twice in the Internet survey. For the former,
women and the more highly educated are more likely to speak out; for the Internet survey,
minorities are more likely to speak out. Media exposure variables drop out in the Metro
survey but several figure prominently in the Internet survey, where the larger sample size
allows us to detect smaller relationships. For the Internet survey, watching TV news, visiting
media websites and visiting chatrooms are positive predictors of expressing opinions on all
four issues, and going out to see movies is a predictor for three issues (taxes, environment
and education but not Social Security). For both the Metro and Internet surveys, the political
communication variables are the most powerful. Thus, mere media exposure does not
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stimulate expression but watching the debates and following the campaign in the media do.
Even more powerful, as expected, is being  involved in a  strong  political  communication
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network. Thus, those who often talk about politics with family, friends and coworkers also
are more likely to express their opinions when they encounter a stranger from another party.
Tables 5a and 5b  present the same regressions for Republicans in the two surveys.13
Because the Metro survey is predominantly Democratic, the sample size here lacks
sufficient power for detecting relationships. Results indicate that men are more likely to
express their opinions in six of the eight regressions, and strong community organizational
ties is a positive predictor for all four topics in the Internet survey. A pattern detected for
Democrats also is found here — agreement with fellow partisans is a positive predictor in
five of the eight instances. In the Internet survey, several of the same media exposure
variables that were significant predictors of Democrats expressing opinions emerge as
significant predictors here — watching TV news, visiting chat rooms, and going out to see
movies. And, again, political communication variables explain the most variance.
Republicans in stronger interpersonal political communication networks also are more likely
to express their opinions, as are those who follow the campaign in the media. 
Regressions for independents and those belonging to minor parties are outlined in
Tables 6a and 6b,  where we find that men are more likely to speak out on taxes and the14
environment. In general, media exposure is less important and the model produces a unique
set of predictors. Book reading is a positive predictor for all of the four topics in the Internet
sample, and visiting chat rooms is a predictor three times. The strength of political
communication variables is confirmed a third time. Thus, being in a strong interpersonal
political communication network is a positive predictor across all topics in both surveys. In
addition, following the campaign in the media and visiting political websites are predictors
of expressing opinions about one or more topics.
Measures of expression across the four issues (cutting taxes, the environment, Social
Security, and education) were combined for an average tendency to speak out for each
respondent. Tables 7a and 7b  give results for each of the three groups. Results indicate that15
gender is a consistent predictor in both the Metro and Internet survey for Republicans (men
are more likely to speak out) but the other measures of social categories appear as significant
predictors in only one regression. Involvement in community organizations is a positive
predictor for Democrats, Republicans and independents/others in the Internet survey and for
Democrats in the Metro survey. The pattern of significant predictors among political factors
(agreement with one’s party), media exposure, and political communication repeats the
earlier analyses. Media exposure does not appear to predict expression in the metro survey
but watching TV news and going out to see movies “stimulates” Democrats and Republicans
to expression opinions in the Internet survey. Visiting chat rooms is a significant predictor
for all three groups in the Internet survey. Involvement in a strong interpersonal political
communication network is a significant predictor for all three groups in both the Metro and
Internet survey, and following the campaign in the media is a significant predictor for all
three — Republicans, Democrats, and Independents/Others — in the Internet survey.
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All respondents — Democrats, Republicans and Independents/Others — were included
in overall regressions shown in Table 8  and Table 9.  The dependent variable is likelihood16 17
one would express an opinion to others (the same dependent variable as in Tables 7a and
7b), but the entire sample is included. In addition, for one set of regressions only those
measures correlated with the dependent variables were included; for the other regressions,
all predictors were included. Results from testing the model suggest that education is a
positive predictor for expressing one’s opinion in the Metro survey, while gender is a
predictor in the Internet survey (men speak out more than women on the four issues/topics).
Those in larger households are more likely to express their views in the Internet survey, and
minorities are more likely to express their views in both surveys. Respondents who share
their party’s views and those closest to their candidates are more likely to speak out. The
more important the issues, the more likely respondents are to express their views in the
Internet survey. Media exposure drops out as a predictor in the Metro survey but both
measures of TV viewing, reading books, watching movies, visiting media websites, and
visiting chat rooms are positive predictors of opinion expression in the Internet survey.
Again political communication variables are the strongest predictors in both surveys. A
strong interpersonal political communication network is a predictor in both studies, while
watching the debates is a positive predictor in the metro survey and visiting political
websites a negative predictor in the Internet survey. 
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Table 10 presents regressions predicting expression of opinions about abortion to the
opposite gender for the Metro and Internet surveys.  Results from both surveys suggest that18
women who see the issue as most important are most likely to speak out. The same result
is found for men in the Internet survey, but not the metro survey. Again, the strongest
predictor variable is involvement in a strong interpersonal political communication network.
 The third hypothesis predicted that the perceived importance of an issue would affect
the predicted spiral of silence expected in the first two hypotheses. However, as reported
above, results disconfirmed those hypotheses and were in the opposite direction for men,
while women who both agreed and disagreed with other women were more likely to express
their views on abortion to men. Nonetheless, we examined the potential influence of
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perceived importance of an issue to see if it has an impact on the relationships between
perceived gender agreement on abortion and expressing views to the opposite gender but
saw no significant changes. In the metro survey, for men, importance of abortion was not
correlated with whether men agreed with other men on the issue (metro survey r=.07, n.s)
or likelihood one would express views to women (metro survey r=.08, n.s.); thus, the partial
correlation controlling for importance had no impact on the relationship between like gender
agreement and expressing views with opposite gender. For women, the importance of
abortion was correlated with both perceived gender agreement (metro survey r=.14, p<.03)
and expressing views with opposite gender (metro survey r=.20, p<.001); controlling for
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abortion issue importance did not alter the bivariate correlation beyond its insignificant
level. In the national Internet survey, the importance of the abortion issue was correlated
with perceived gender agreement and expressing views with the opposite gender for both
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men and women; controlling for issue significance reduced the correlation between
perceived gender agreement and expressing views to opposite gender for men (national
sample r=.08, p<.04; partial r=.06, n.s.), but the same control had no impact on the
insignificant finding for women (national sample r=.02, partial r=-.02). Thus, the third
hypothesis is rejected. 
The fourth hypothesis predicted that strength of partisan identification would affect the
predicted spiral of silence expected in the first two hypotheses. In the metro survey, strength
of party identification was correlated with average perceived party agreement across four
issues for both Republicans (r=.48, p<.001) and for Democrats (r=.27, p<.001). This
provides some support for Hypothesis 4. When strength of party identification was held
constant, the relationship dropped below significance for the Republicans (partial r=.15,
n.s., n=111), but it remained significant for Democrats (partial r=.27, p<.001, n=224).
Strength of party identification also failed to have an impact in the national survey, but
perceived agreement with fellow partisans was correlated with expressing views to the
opposite partisans for both Democrats (r=.17, p<.001) and Republicans (r=.23, p<.001). 
DISCUSSION
The present study applies Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) spiral of silence theory in an
election context, working from the assumption that individuals use social cues to locate
other people’s opinion on issues. In the studies reported here, those cues were assigned
rather than left to chance, following earlier work (see, e.g., Jeffres, Neuendorf & Atkin,
1999; Lin & Salwen, 1997). In actual public contexts, people rely not only on visual factors
such as race, age and gender, but also comments about the pertinent topic that give clues
about where the other person stands on issues. News media almost always report results of
polls in terms of social categories. 
Amidst the confluence of these mass and interpersonal communication sources, it’s
useful to focus on the different motivations for speaking out or keeping quiet, and the social
contexts in which people live. This study addressed one such important context, a
presidential election. Results showed that those showing the greatest interest in issues and
those closest to their candidates are most likely to express opinions to those with whom they
are most likely to disagree, i.e., confrontation rather than silence. One might explain these
findings in the context of “multiple spirals of confrontation” rather than “multiple spirals
of silence.” In particular, the election under study was very close and neither Republicans
nor Democrats thought their “side” was losing; in other words, the climate of opinion may
have been seen as a “draw” rather than a winning or losing situation. In this case, the spiral
of silence would not operate. 
This anomalous finding might also be a function of cultural factors which differ from
those in classical European contexts (e.g., Fuchs et al., 1982). Noelle-Neumann’s pioneering
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work on “the spiral of silence” identified fear of social disapproval as the key motivator for
expressing personal opinions in public. Although subsequent research has produced only
scattered support across different societies and contexts, her theory identified key variables
and stimulated long overdue investigation of this phenomenon in multi-cultural societies
such as the U.S. 
American society may be considered multicultural in both macro and micro senses. That
is, many ethnic/racial/religious groups share the same space but individuals are likely to
hold multiple cultural and social identities. Research shows that ethnics vary by context in
expressing their ethnic identity and heritage (Eschback & Gomez, 1998; Lysne & Levy,
1997). Subervi-Velez (1984) calls this notion of a fluid identity “situational ethnicity.” One
could argue that everyone’s a minority in the U.S. today. Thus, each individual is privy to
the nuances of in-group and out-group dynamics, having experienced both powerless and
powerful positions (even if it’s only the “power of victimization”). Every individual is
capable of filling the role of spokesperson for a minority viewpoint, and face both rewards
and punishments as potential outcomes of their actions. Rewards often might be intrinsic,
such as feeling good for “sticking up” for others, or being praised by a group for one’s brave
actions. Rewards might be more extrinsic, such as appearing on the evening news or the
“Ricki Lake Show.” Punishments might include social ostracism, or a barrier to career
movement.
The U.S. “climate for expressing opinions” today contains few, if any, taboos (e.g.,
Entman, 2004). Almost every topic is grist for conversation and mass media “let it all hang
out.” One might argue that media, particularly television, encourage or sanction expression
of the most extreme, or outrageous opinions. It is the extremists who often garner the most
attention, or a spot on afternoon talk shows (e.g., Patterson & Donsbach, 1996). Although
American society is devoid of communication taboos, an exception might be found in
contexts where there is intense public interest, when media attention is maximized, when
there is intense interpersonal communication about the topic, and when publics are
polarized; an example of this would be a “politically-correct” topic with deep differences
(see Jeffres et al., 1999; Salwen et al., 1994).
The variable most strongly related to speaking out on any individual issue or collectively
is the strength of one’s political communication network. Thus, those who talk about politics
at home, with friends and at work are more likely to express their opinion to strangers in a
public context. This also is common sense — those who don’t talk about political issues
with friends are less likely to also express their opinions to strangers. Essentially, we may
have both trait and state influences on people’s willingness to express opinions in public.
On balance, study results reinforce the utility of “spirals” of communication as an
explanatory framework that can unify the largely disparate domains of mass and
interpersonal communication research. Scholars are discovering that the type of spiral
originally identified is only one of several. The process of spiraling thus represents a
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1. The conformity hypothesis is based on the work of Asch (1953), who found that subjects confronted
with a unanimous majority expressing incorrect evaluations about the length of three lines in an
experiment conformed about one third of the time to the incorrect majority judgment. Asch and others
(Allen, 1965, 1975) found that anything less than a unanimous majority opinion significantly reduced
conformity and increased one’s willingness to dissent. 
2. For example, in Hong Kong, Willnat (1995) found respondents in two surveys more willing to voice
their political opinions publicly when they perceived the majority opinion to be on their side or when
they perceived a trend in support of their own viewpoint concerning Hong Kong’s political future
before 1997. However, while Matera and Salwen (1989) found some support for the spiral of silence
— respondents who favored Radio Marti in Miami and also perceived it was the majority opinion were
more willing to express their opinions publicly—other evidence was contrary — those who did not
favor Radio Marti and thought the public agreed were least willing to express their opinions publicly.
Gonzenbach, King and Jablonski (1999) also found contrary evidence —  in certain situations
individuals who feel their position is beginning to lose public support may feel compelled to voice
their opinions in a study focusing on whether homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the U.S.
military.
3. These include the Persian Gulf W ar (Eveland, McLeod & Signorielli, 1995; Gonzenbach, 1992;
Entman, 2004), public issues in Germany (Fuchs, Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1992), American opinions
about homosexuals in the military (Gonzenbach, King & Jablonski, 1999), opinions about whether the
U.S. should declare English as the official language (Lin & Salwen, 1997), opinions about the
president (Katz & Baldassare, 1994), development of the French Revolution (Wilke, 1989), and other
situations where people make choices to express themselves (Granovetter & Soong, 1988; Pan &
McLeod, 1991; Park, 1998; Taylor, 1982; Allen, O’Loughlin, Jasperson & Sullivan , 1994).
4. Noelle-Neumann (1974) found some support for hypotheses based on the theory in surveys
conducted in 1972 and 1974 in West Germany. Subsequently, the theory has generated research
around the world to test her propositions. Perry and Gonzenbach (2000) found some evidence that
perceived opinion can silence “public display expression.” Stevenson and Gonzenbach (1990) found
support for the spiral of silence hypothesis in a study on AIDS; those who view their position as
gaining strength were more willing to speak out about children with AIDS attending public school.
promising avenue for later work; that is what factors lead to “spiraling up” (a spiral of
confrontation) and what factors lead to “spiraling down” (the spiral of silence)? Future
research into “upward spirals” might consider the individual’s interest in the issue,
perceived cohesiveness of the group holding similar views, group size, perceived efficacy
of the individual’s expression of opinion (e.g., individual and group goals such as
influencing someone’s voting decision), and perceived rewards derived from expressing
one’s opinion. Later studies should vary the conditions under which opinions are expressed,
in order to tease out the relative influence of these and other factors.
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5. Noelle-Neumann suggests that the source of conformity is fear of isolation, but some others suggest
that positive social attraction may have more influence on opinions and speaking out than fear of
isolation (Glynn & McLeod, 1984; Salmon & Kline, 1984). Also, informational forces also may drive
conformity (Gonzenbach, 1992; Price & Allen, 1990). Allen (1991, pp. 246-247) criticizes Noelle-
Neumann’s location of the fear of isolation in the nature of human beings (needing to be popular,
respected) and says that, for de Tocqueville, “a necessary condition for social isolation is a political
order in which political isolation is considerable.”
6. Gonzenbach conducted an experiment using a real, emotional issue about which there is “no
objectively correct answer” (President George Bush’s involvement in the Iran Contra affair) and about
which subjects knew there was no unanimity. Subjects watched a segment from a network news
broadcast about a TV confrontation between George Bush and Dan Rather, followed by one of three
versions of the actual interview. Subjects were asked to indicate how supportive they were of the
information presented in the news report and interview, with results indicated on the monitor showing
the interview. Results were manipulated to indicate support for Bush or Rather, and subjects were told
they would be randomly called on to stand before the group to defend their opinion of Bush and
Rather’s positions, with their individual evaluation displayed on the monitor for the others to see,
producing a threat of impending scrutiny, which the spiral of silence says is necessary to trigger
conformity. Results provided partial support for the hypothesis that a person would conform to the
majority opinion congruent with the news report. However, perceptions of opinion did not affect
opinion when the majority opinion was incongruent with the news report. Thus, subjects did not
conform when the perceived majority opinion was incongruent with the news report. Social categories
and individual psychological traits also were related to conformity.
7. Glynn and McLeod (1985) argue that it is an error to assume that fear of isolation is a motivating
force and we should measure and empirically test its role. Results of research are hard to explain by
reference to fear of isolation by a minority. Those holding minority opinions often seem more willing
to express their opinions; see Glynn and McLeod (1985), Salmon and Neuwirth (1990), and Salmon
and Rucinski (1988). Baldassare and Katz (1996) argue that attitude strength, indicated by greater
political interests, extreme political views and more attention to elections, is significant in predicting
whether people will express their political views. Arguing that one’s interest in politics and level of
self-efficacy affect one’s willingness to speak out, Lasorsa’s (1991) survey results found there are
conditions under which people “buck the spiral” to express opinions. Other recent evidence suggests
that people’s social and demographic characteristics, the nature of the issue, the issue’s salience to
individuals, and the positive attraction to social groups are more important determinants of willingness
to express an opinion than a general fear of social isolation; see Lin and Salwen (1997), Price and
Allen (1990), Salmon and Kline (1985), Salmon and Neuwirth (1990), and Salmon and Rucinski
(1988).
8. The mass media play a crucial role in creating the information environment. Noelle-Neumann’s
model also requires examining how people monitor the information environment and search for
evidence that their personal opinion is shared by a majority of citizens. Rimmer and Howard (1990)
hypothesized that the level of media use would predict one’s perceptions of the climate of opinion and
congruency behaviors, i.e., high levels of communication would be correlated with more accurate
estimates of the climate of opinion. Their survey in southern Indiana focused on PCBs as an
environmental hazard, finding no relationship between media use and the ability to accurately estimate
the real majority position on the PCB issue. They also found no support for the hypothesis that higher
media use would lead to more correct perceptions that one was in the majority or minority on the issue.
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They found support for the hypothesis that greater media use and higher issue salience would be
positively related to opinion expression compared to those with lower media use. In a path model
supporting the spiral of silence perspective, Neuwirth (2000) found that media exposure and attention
were associated with knowledge during a changeover of presidents in Mexico.
9. How accurate are people’s perceptions of the climate of opinion? Price and Allen (1990, p. 375)
note that people’s estimates are quite good in the case of elections because of extensive news coverage
and poll data (Glynn & McLeod, 1984), but this is not necessarily true for other issues (Tichenor &
Wackman, 1973). Noelle-Neumann contended that the media present a consonant portrayal of the
climate of opinion, a prevailing attitude, but this has been challenged when applied to the U.S., e.g.,
Glynn and McLeod (1985) found little support for the contention that the media presented a consistent
bias in any direction on estimating outcomes of the 1980 U.S. presidential race. Kennamer (1990)
notes that Noelle-Neumann’s theory is largely silent on the degree to which people are accurate in their
opinion sampling and estimates of others’ opinions. “Unless there is considerable evidence to the
contrary, one’s assessments of the climate of opinion may not provide strong disconfirmation of one’s
own position and, therefore, may not threaten one into the fearful silence Noelle-Neumann
hypothesizes. Even if one does perceive that in some larger universe opinion is hostile, the knowledge
that others in one’s immediate surroundings or reference groups are supportive may provide the
psychological strength to continue expressing one’s opinions” (Kennamer, 1990, p. 396). 
10. According to a national poll reported by ABC News, 58% of men and 52% of women say abortion
should be illegal to end an unwanted pregnancy. Some 58% of men and 61% of women support legal
abortion in all or most cases. The poll is reported on the network’s website: www.abcnews.com 
11. These issues were among those mentioned as the most important ones for deciding presidential
votes in a survey conducted in July, 2000, by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation and
Harvard University. They also were identified as “extremely” or “very important” in Gallup polls
conducted in July or August of 2000; education was cited as extremely or very important by 91% in
August, 2000; taxes, 77% in July; environment, 71% in July; Social Security, 82% in July; and
abortion, 56% in August. The data are available at the polling organization’s website:
www.gallup.com/Election2000/issues,.
12. The following variables were entered in stepwise regression for the Metro Survey in Tables 4a and
4b: 1) Social categories — education level, gender (1=male, 2=female), number in household; 2)
Political factors, community ties — no. of community orgs. belong to, political philosophy
(high=liberal), political knowledge, importance of issue (0-10),agree with Democrats on issue (0-
10),closer to candidates on issue (0-10,0=Bush,10=Gore), importance of candidates’ experience and
background (0-10); 3) Media use — hours watched TV yesterday, frequency watch TV news, number
of magazines read regularly, frequency visit media websites, Internet use (home+work); 4) Political
communication — friends share political views(0-10),political communication network, follow
campaign in media(0-10), watched debates(across all 4 debates),enjoy talking about politics(0-10).
The following variables were entered in stepwise regression for the Internet Survey in Tables 4a and
4b: 1) Social categories — gender, no. in household, white ethnicity (white =1; others= 0); 2) Political
factors, community ties — no. of community orgs. belong to, political philosophy (high=liberal), level
of political knowledge, agree with Democrats on education(0-10),closer to candidates on education
(0-10,0=Bush,10=Gore), importance of education(0-10); 3) Media use—no. hours watched TV
yesterday, frequency watch TV news, frequency read newspaper, no. magazines read regularly, no.
books read in past 6 months, no. videos watched in past month, no. movies seen in past month,
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frequency visit chat rooms, frequency visit media websites; 4) Political communication — enjoy
talking about politics, friends share political views, exposure to political advertising, frequency visit
political websites for campaign, exposure to debates, follow campaign in media, political
communication network.
13. The following variables were entered in stepwise regression for the Metro survey in Tables 5a and
5b: 1) Social categories — gender (high=female), white ethnicity (white=1; others=0); 2) Political
factors, community ties — political philosophy (high=liberal), level of political knowledge,
importance of issue, importance of candidates’ experience and background, agree with Republicans
on issue, close to candidate on issue (0-10,0=Bush,10=Gore); 3) Media use — no. magazines read
regularly, frequency watch TV news, 4) Political Communication — exposure to TV political
advertising (0-10),political communication network, watched debates, enjoy talking about politics (0-
10), followed campaign in media (0-10). The following variables were entered in stepwise regression
for the Internet survey in Tables 5a and 5b: 1) Social categories — gender, number in household, age;
2) Political factors, community ties — number of community organizations belong to, political
philosophy, political knowledge, agree with Republicans on taxes, closer to candidate on taxes (0-10,
0=Bush,10=Gore), importance of taxes, importance of character and values; 3) Media use—hours
watched TV yesterday, frequency watch news on TV, number of days read newspaper last week,
number of magazines read regularly, number of books read in past six months, number of videos
watched in past month, number of movies seen in theater in past month, number of hours listened to
radio yesterday, level of Internet use, frequency visit chat rooms, frequency visit media websites,; 4)
Political Communication — enjoy talking about politics (0-10), perceived exposure to political TV
commercials, frequency visit political websites, friends share political views, watched debates (0-4),
political communication network, follow campaign (0-10).
14. The following variables were entered in stepwise regressions for the Metro survey in Tables 6a
and 6b: 1) Social categories—age, gender; 2) Political factors—importance of issue, closer to
candidate on issue (0-10, 0=Bush,10=Gore); 3) Media use—no. magazines read regularly, Internet use
(home+work), frequency visit chatrooms; 4) Political Communication—enjoy talking about politics,
follow campaign in media, watched debates, political communication network. The following variables
were entered in stepwise regressions for the Internet survey in Tables 6a and 6b: 1) Social
categories—age, gender, number in household, white ethnicity (white=1, others=0); 2) Political
factors, community ties—political philosophy, no. of community organizations belong to, importance
of issue, importance of character and values, closer to candidate on issue (0-10, 0=Bush,10=Gore);
3) Media use— frequency watch TV news, number of magazines read regularly, number of books read
in past six months, number of videos watched in past month, number of hours listened to radio
yesterday, frequency visit chat rooms, frequency visit media web sites; 4) Political
Communication—enjoy talking about politics, frequency visit political websites, number debates
watched, follow campaign (0-10), political communication network.
15. The following variables were entered in stepwise regressions for the Metro survey in Tables 7a
and 7b: Democrats—1) Social Categories — education; 2) Political factors, community ties —
political philosophy (low=conservative,high=liberal), number of community organizations belong to,
average importance of four issues (taxes, environment, social security, education), average closeness
to candidates across four issues, average agreement with Democrats on four issues ; 3) Media Use —
frequency watch TV news, frequency visit media websites; 4) Political Communication — enjoy
talking about politics (0-10), follow campaign in media, number of debates watched, friends have same
politics, political communication network; Republicans—1) Social Categories — gender (1=male,
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2=female); 2) Political factors, community ties — average importance of four issues, average
closeness to candidates on the four issues, average agreement with Republicans on the four issues ;
3) Media Use — no variables entered; 4) Political Communication — enjoy talking about politics,
political communication network; Independents—1) Social Categories — gender, black ethnicity
(black=1, others=0); 2) Political factors, community ties — average importance of four issues, average
closeness to candidates on four issues ; 3) Media Use — no variables entered; 4) Political
Communication — enjoy talking about politics, follow campaign in media, number of debates
watched, political communication network. The following variables were entered in stepwise
regressions for the Internet survey in Tables 7a and 7b: Democrats—1) Social Categories—gender
(1=male, 2=female), number in household, white ethnicity (white=1, others=0), ; 2) Political factors,
community ties—number of community organizations to which belong, political philosophy
(low=conservative, high=liberal), average closeness to candidates across the four issues (low=closest
to Bush, high=closest to Gore), average importance of issues across 4 issues (taxes, environment,
social security, education), average agreement with own party across the 4 issues, political knowledge
scale (number correct) ; 3) Media Use—number of hours watched TV yesterday, frequency watch TV
news, number of magazines read regularly, number of books read in past six months, number of videos
watched in past month, number of movies seen in past month, number of days read newspaper last
week, frequency visit chat rooms, frequency visit media websites, level of Internet use at home and
work; 4) Political Communication—enjoy talking about politics, frequency visit political websites,
follow campaign in media, number of debates watched, political communication network (frequency
talk about politics with family, friends, coworkers); Republicans—1) Social Categories—gender
(1=male, 2=female), number in household, age; 2) Political factors, community ties—number of
community organizations to which belong, political philosophy (low=conservative, high=liberal),
average closeness to candidates across the four issues (low=closest to Bush, high=closest to Gore),
average importance of the four issues, average agreement with own party across the 4 issues, political
knowledge scale (number correct) ; 3) Media Use—number of hours watched TV yesterday, frequency
watch TV news, number of magazines read regularly, number of books read in past six months,
number of videos watched in past month, number of days read paper last week, number of movies seen
in past month, hours listened to radio yesterday, frequency visit chat rooms, frequency visit media
websites, level of Internet use at home and work; 4) Political Communication—enjoy talking about
politics, frequency visit political websites, number of debates watched, follow campaign in media,
level of exposure to political commercials on TV, friends share politics, political communication
network (frequency talk about politics with family, friends, coworkers); Independents—1) Social
Categories—gender (1=male, 2=female), number in household, age, white ethnicity (1=white,
0=others); 2) Political factors, community ties—number of community organizations to which belong,
political philosophy (low=conservative, high=liberal), average closeness to candidates across the four
issues (low=closest to Bush, high=closest to Gore), average importance of the four issues ; 3) Media
Use—frequency watch TV news, number of magazines read regularly, number of books read in past
six months, number of videos watched in past month, number of hours listened to radio yesterday,
frequency visit chat rooms, frequency visit media websites; 4) Political Communication—enjoy talking
about politics, frequency visit political websites, number of debates watched, follow campaign in
media, political communication network (frequency talk about politics with family, friends,
coworkers).
16. The following variables were correlated with the dependent measure and included in the first
regression for the Metro survey in Table 8: 1) Social Categories — education level, black ethnicity
(black=1, others=0); 2) Political factors, community ties — political knowledge scale, average
closeness to candidates on the four issues (0-40, with lower scores closest to Bush, high scores closest
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to Gore), average agreement with one’s party on the four issues (0-40, higher scores=greater
agreement) ; 3) Media Use — frequency watch TV news, number of magazines read regularly, Internet
use at home and work, frequency visit media websites ; 4) Political Communication — enjoy talking
about politics, friends share political views, exposure to political ads on TV, follow campaign in the
media, number of debates watched, visited political websites for campaign, political communication
network. The following variables were correlated with the dependent measure and included in the first
regression for the Internet survey in Table 8: 1) Social Categories — gender (1=male, 2=female),
number in household, white ethnicity (white=1, others=0); 2) Political factors, community ties — no.
of community organizations belong to, level of political knowledge (0-5), average importance of the
four issues (0-40), average agreement with own party across the four issues (0-40); 3) Media Use —
hours watched TV yesterday, frequency watch TV news, hours listened to the radio yesterday, no. of
days read newspaper last week, no. of magazines read regularly, no. of books read in past six months,
no. of videos watched in past month, no. of movies seen in a theater in past month, frequency use
Internet at home and work, frequency visit media websites, frequency visit chat rooms; 4) Political
Communication — enjoy talking about politics, friends share political views, follow campaign in
media, exposure to political ads on TV, frequency visit political websites, no. of debates watched,
political communication network.
17. Independents and those belonging to other parties were not asked this question; they were assigned
a 0. Thus, Democrats and Republicans who disagreed with their party to the maximum would have the
same score as independents and those belonging to minor parties. Note: All of the predictor variables
were included in the Metro and Internet survey for the second equation in Table 9: 1) Social
Categories — gender (1=male, 2=female), age, no. in household, household income, level of
education, white ethnicity (white=1, others=0); 2) Political factors, community ties — no. of
community groups belong to, political philosophy (low=conservative, independent=midpoint,
high=liberal), political knowledge (0-5), average importance of four issues — cutting taxes,
environment, Social Security, education (0-40), average closeness to candidates on the four issues (0-
40, with lower scores closest to Bush, high scores closest to Gore), average agreement with own party
(0-40); 3) Media Use — hours watched TV yesterday, frequency watch TV news, hours listened to
radio yesterday, no. of days read a newspaper last week, no. of magazines read regularly, no. of books
read in past 6 months, no. of videos watched in past month, no. of movies seen in a theater in past
month, frequency use Internet at home and work, frequency visit media websites, frequency visit chat
rooms; 4) Political Communication — enjoy talking about politics, friends share political views,
follow campaign in media, perceived exposure to political ads on TV, frequency visit political
websites, no. of debates watched, political communication network (3-12, frequency talk about politics
across three contexts — in family, with closest friends, with people at work).
18. The following variables were entered in stepwise regression for the Metro survey in Table 10: 1)
Social Categories — education, household income, white ethnicity (white=1; others=0), black ethnicity
(black=1; others=0); 2) Political factors, community ties — importance of abortion (0-10), closer to
candidate on abortion issue (0-10, 0=Bush,10=Gore), agree with gender on issue (0-10), party
identification (low=Democrat, high=Republican), strength of partisanship (indep.=0, weak Dem. or
Rep.=1, strong Dem. or Rep.=2); 3) Media Use — frequency read newspaper, time spent listening to
radio yesterday, time spent watching TV yesterday; 4) Political Communication — enjoy talking about
politics (0-10) and political communication network. The following variables were entered in stepwise
regression for the Internet survey in Table 10: 1) Social Categories — age; 2) Political factors,
community ties — number of community organizations belong to, importance of abortion issue, closer
to candidate on abortion issue (0=closest to Bush, 10=closest to Gore), party identification
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(low=Democrat, high=Republican), strength of partisanship (0=indep. and other; 1= lean towards
Republican or Democrat, 2=strong Republican or Democrat), political philosophy (low=conservative,
high=liberal), agree with gender on abortion issue (0-10); 3) Media Use — frequency watch TV news,
no. of videos watched in past month, Internet use, frequency visit media websites, frequency visit chat
rooms; 4) Political Communication — enjoy talking about politics (0-10), perceived exposure to
political TV commercials (0-10), frequency visit political websites for campaign, watched debates (0-
4), friends share political views (0-10), follow campaign in media (low=closely, high=not at all),
political communication network (how often talk about politics in family, with close friends, at work).
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TELEVISION OMNIVORES? SNOB AND SLOB
TASTE FOR TELEVISION PROGRAMS
IN THE NETHERLANDS IN 2000
RUBEN P. KONIG, HANS C. REBERS, AND HENK WESTERIK6
In the seventies, Bourdieu argued that people demarcate societal boundaries
through a lifestyle that exhibits their cultural taste. Elites consume highbrow
cultural products and the lower social strata consume lowbrow cultural products.
In the nineties, Bourdieu’s theory was amended by the introduction of the concepts
of cultural omnivores and univores. Omnivores consume a wide variety of highbrow
and lowbrow cultural products, whereas the lower social strata only consume
lowbrow cultural products. Our research extends the application of these ideas to
the field of television program taste, using data from a survey among a stratified
probability sample of the adult Dutch population (n=825). Through correspondence
analysis and hierarchical regression analysis, we showed that people from higher
status groups and with larger amounts of cultural capital watch less lowbrow
television genres than implied by the theory on cultural omnivores. Our findings
support Bourdieu’s original theory on the distinctive force of taste expressions. As
a consequence, we deem that the widely used typologies of gratifications sought and
obtained that are used in communication science may be extended with the concept
of ‘distinction’.
Keywords: lifestyle, taste, distinction, cultural omnivores, television, education,
occupational status
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According to Bourdieu (1979/1984), status groups in society can be discerned by their
taste; “taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier” (p. 6). High status groups display
‘legitimate taste’; they listen to classical music, appreciate the fine arts, go to the
Guggenheim museum, and watch films by foreign movie directors. They consume complex
works of art that require a high amount of cultural knowledge and intellectual prowess to
be understood and appreciated. In contrast, low status groups display ‘popular taste’; they
attend to popular music and popularized art forms. They hardly ever set foot in a museum,
dance to the bass drums of today’s popular artists, and go to see Hollywood movies. They
consume much less complex works of art. In between, middle status groups display
‘middlebrow taste’.
In other words, different status groups exhibit different lifestyles, which convey the
social boundaries in society. According to Bourdieu (1979/1984), these differences in
lifestyle are acquired through socialization by the family and at school. Here, people acquire
cultural capital, that is, the codes and conventions that are required to understand and
appreciate more complex works of art; “a beholder who lacks the specific code feels lost in
a chaos of sounds and rhythms, colours and lines, without rhyme or reason” (p. 2). Thus, as
people acquire more cultural capital they become increasingly able to display a refined taste.
So, according to Bourdieu (1979/1984) members of elite groups usually acquire much
cultural capital through their socialization, thereby becoming able to display a refined
highbrow taste. Further, during the course of their life, they mingle with other members of
elite groups. In such situations they actually display an elitist refined taste to show their
status group affiliation. Thus, they are not only able to display a refined highbrow taste, but
are also willing to do so. The result is a distinct relationship between social status and
cultural capital on the one hand, and the cultural lifestyle people exhibit on the other.
Lowbrow taste is found among people with low social status and little cultural capital,
whereas highbrow taste is found among the elites with much cultural capital.
However, Peterson and Simkus (1992; Peterson, 1992) have shown that, in the United
States at the end of the twentieth century, Bourdieu’s (1979/1984) notions had to be
differentiated with respect to tastes for music. According to their research, low status groups
did indeed listen to a limited set of lowbrow musical genres, but high status groups did not
confine themselves to highbrow musical genres. They consumed a wide variety of musical
genres, ranging from lowbrow to highbrow music. They appeared to be cultural omnivores
who derived their status from their ability to display the appropriate taste for every social
situation they found themselves in, whereas members of low status groups displayed an
unvarying taste in every situation. The latter appeared to be cultural univores. Thus,
Peterson and Simkus amended Bourdieu’s (1979/1984) theory on how social status groups
distinguish themselves from each other. Simplified, Bourdieu’s reasoning boils down to
distinction according to the quality of the genres attended to, whereas Peterson and Simkus’
amendment suggests distinction by the quantity of genres attended to. In essence though,
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omnivorousness is just another form of distinction; a very interesting and relatively new one,
that is.
Since Peterson and Simkus’ (1992; Peterson, 1992) research, cultural omnivores have
been found in other cultures as well. López Sintas and García Álvares (2002; using data
from 1994) have shown the existence of cultural omnivores in Spain, and Van Eijck (2001;
using data from 1987) has shown their existence in The Netherlands. In both countries,
however, the ‘legitimate’ taste of the high status groups did not disappear altogether. Part
of the elites still exhibited a highbrow taste, whereas another part of the elites showed
themselves to be cultural omnivores. This corroborates with Peterson and Kern’s (1996)
conclusion that the shift from “snobbish exclusion to omnivorous appropriation” (p. 900)
was still in progress in the Unites States in 1992, as it probably is today.
Research on cultural omnivorousness and univorousness mainly focuses on tastes in
music (Bryson, 1996, 1997; Peterson, 1992; Peterson & Kern, 1996; Peterson & Simkus,
1992; Van Eijck, 2001), and to a lesser extent on other cultural activities such as reading
(Van Eijck & Van Rees, 2000; Van Rees, Vermunt & Verboord, 1999), media use (Van
Rees & Van Eijck, 2003), and outdoor cultural activities (López Sintas & García Álvares,
2002). Since television is a strong contestant for people’s free time (Huysmans, De Haan
& Van den Broek, 2004; Van Rees & Van Eijck, 2003), we deemed it relevant to extend the
knowledge about the field of snobs and slobs, or omnivores and univores, to television
viewing behavior. In their publications, students of cultural omnivorousness suggest —
mostly implicitly — that omnivorousness is not confined to musical tastes, but should be
found with respect to all vehicles of culture. Television can be considered such a vehicle,
and people’s taste for television programs is as much part of their cultural lifestyle as is their
taste for music. Peterson and Simkus’ (1992) amendment to Bourdieu’s (1979/1984) theory
on the distinctive force of people’s lifestyles with respect to expressions of musical taste
should also apply to other expressions of taste, including their watching or avoiding certain
television program genres.
Our attempt to find taste patterns in television viewing, however, is not just another
description of people’s lifestyles, now concerning television; albeit a useful challenge to
existing research on omnivorousness. Television is an interesting case in point. Dutch
people spend far more time on watching television than on going out to participate in
cultural activities or reading books, even though cultural participation is on the rise for the
more popular art forms like rock and pop concerts and musicals (cf. Huysmans et al., 2004;
Huysmans, Van den Broek & De Haan, 2005). So, going to the opera may be an important
aspect of one’s lifestyle, but it is not more than an occasional token of ones cultural prowess
in comparison to the lived through cultural participation of watching television every night
and talking about the programs during the day; another token one’s cultural life style. And
what is more, because of television and other media, people do not have to leave their homes
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to participate in cultural activities. The Dutch public broadcasting system is compelled to
broadcast cultural programs for at least 25% of the time (Huysmans et al., 2005).
In the past, researchers have hardly paid attention to omnivorousness regarding
television program types. One of the few exceptions is a study carried out by Van Eijck and
Van Rees (2000). They were able to discern omnivores from univores with respect to the
opposition between entertainment and information programs. And indeed, the omnivores
were highly educated. In their study, however, they studied omnivorous (and univorous)
readers’ tastes in television genres using fairly crude categories of television program types,
and they did not study television genre omnivorousness in itself. They studied the
relationship of television genre preferences with reading omnivorousness. In the present
study, we attempted to assess the difference, or absence of difference in television
omnivorousness between different status groups more directly. We wanted to investigate
whether or not the higher social strata consumed a wider range of television program types
for their television use than the lower social strata. In case the higher social strata proved
not to be omnivores, we also wanted to find out whether or not the higher social strata watch
more complex, highbrow genres than the lower strata. In short, we made Peterson and
Simkus compete with Bourdieu.
METHOD
Data
For our study we used data from a national Dutch survey on Media use in the
Netherlands 2000 (Konig et al., 2005). In the winter and early spring of 2000, a stratified
probability sample of the Dutch population aged between 18 and 75 years old (n = 825;
cooperation rate 43.2%) was interviewed face-to-face, using a computer assisted
standardized questionnaire (CAPI). Comparisons with census data (Centraal Bureau voor
de Statistiek, 2000) revealed that our sample is representative of the Dutch population
regarding gender. Married and middle-aged people were somewhat over-represented given
their proportions in the population, but since we are investigating relationships and will not
try to estimate population frequencies, we deem this deviation from representativeness
unproblematic. For more details on sample, questionnaire, and other aspects of the survey
please see Konig et al. (2005).
Measures
To be able to distinguish people who consumed a wide variety of television program
types from people who consumed a less wide variety of genres, we measured how often
respondents watched thirteen different genres. Respondents were asked how often they
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watched sports programs; quiz and game shows; soap operas and other daily serials; current
affairs programs; political programs; talk shows about everyday problems; talk shows about
societal problems; health and medical programs; cultural programs, such as arts and cabaret
programs; music programs; movies; news; and documentaries. If respondents indicated they
did not know what certain program types entailed, they were supplied with a standard list
of examples of that program type. We asked respondents to choose between the following
answers: never, sometimes, regularly, often, and almost always. Since the difference
between omnivorousness and univorousness boils down to how many programs people
avoid when watching television (cf. Bryson, 1996; Van Eijck, 2001), we dichotomized these
answers into never, and sometimes to almost always.
To be able to let Peterson and Simkus compete with Bourdieu we also had to be able to
judge the complexity of the television program types in our analysis. Therefore, independent
from our survey data, we assessed the complexity of the above-mentioned genres using a
panel of twelve experts from the Department of Communication at the Radboud University
Nijmegen. These experts were provided with the following definition of complexity; the
cultural knowledge and intellectual powers that are needed to understand and appreciate a
television program genre. Thereupon, the experts were asked to rank the program types
according to their complexity, with the most complex program type at rank 1 and the least
complex at rank 13. The mean Spearman rank correlation between the rankings of the
experts was .75, the intraclass correlation coefficient was .97, and the corresponding
Cronbach’s alpha was .97, all of which indicates a pretty strong agreement among the
experts.  Results are presented in Table 1.1
In our survey, social status was measured as the status of respondent’s present or former
occupation. An open-ended question was used to establish the respondent’s present
occupation, and if they did not have a job at that moment, they were asked what their former
occupation had been. The answers of the respondents were coded using Ganzeboom’s et al.
(1992) International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (ISEI), which scores
occupations according to their social prestige. We recoded these scores into four categories:
low status (ISEI < 40), lower middle status (40 - 49), upper middle status (50-61), and high
status (> 61).
Cultural capital was measured as the highest formal education (completed or attending
at that moment). The categories were: elementary school or less, lower vocational school,
lower secondary school, secondary vocational school, O levels, A levels, college, and
university.
ANALYSIS
We used correspondence analysis (Gifi, 1990; Greenacre, 2007; Israëls, 1987) to assess
what television programs were watched or avoided by people with different levels of
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occupational status and education. With this type of research problem two analytical
strategies are appropriate; composite correspondence analysis with no supplementary
variables, or multiple correspondence analysis of occupational status and education with the
television programs as supplementary variables (Greenacre & Pardo, 2006, p. 199). We
chose the first strategy, because using composite correspondence analysis, one can create
an overview of many bivariate cross tables in one graphical representation.
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We created a composite table using occupational status and education as column
variables, and with television program types as row variables. Due to list wise deletion of
missing data, this composite table contained the data of 734 (89%) respondents. A
correspondence analysis solution was computed using the procedure ANACOR (SPSS,
1990). Canonical normalization – option A3 as discussed by Israëls (1987, pp. 72-75) – was
used to compute the scores of the row and column categories on the dimensions.
To determine the number of informative dimensions, we plotted the proportion of
explained inertia by each dimension against the number of that dimension in a screen plot.
This resulted in Figure 1, which shows a clear bend in the line between the second and third
dimension. Therefore, we chose to use two dimensions. These two dimensions reproduce
83.7 per cent of the total inertia.
Figure 1. Proportions of Explained Inertia by Ten Dimensions
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Figure 2. Correspondence Analysis of Television Program Genre Preferences 
of People with Different Levels of Education and Occupational Status (N = 734)
Konig et al. Television Omnivores?
124  Journal of Media Sociology, Vol. 1, Nos. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2009)
The two-dimensional solution of our correspondence analysis is depicted in Figure 2.
In this figure, television programs types are depicted as small diamonds. Watching a
television program type is indicated with a plus-sign (+), and avoiding a program type is
indicated using a minus-sign (-). Categories of occupational status and education are
depicted as relatively large squares. The labels of all categories are explained in the legend
that accompanies the figure.
There are no statistics in correspondence analysis that can indicate statistical
significance of results. Therefore, we performed ÷  contingency tests (p # 0.05) to test2
whether or not occupational status and education are statistically independent of watching
some television program types. This appeared to be the case for program types that have
light gray labels in Figure 2 (sports and music programs, news, and talk shows about societal
problems). Programs with dark gray labels (movies and documentaries) are only statistically
independent of occupational status, and not of education.
Angles are the key to the interpretation of Figure 2. To find out if respondents in a
category of occupational status or education are either over- or under-represented in the
audience of a specific television program category, or vice versa, one must imagine a line
from both categories to the origin (depicted as a gray cross). If these lines constitute an acute
angle, the respondents are over-represented in the combination of the two categories. More
acute angles are depictions of stronger over-representations. If lines constitute an obtuse
angle, respondents are under-represented in the combination of the two categories. More
obtuse angles are depictions of stronger under-representations. Right angles indicate absence
of over- and under-representations.
The lengths of lines from the origin to the categories also indicate the strength of the
over- and under-representations; longer lines represent stronger over- and under-
representations. Therefore, categories close to the origin are much less interesting than
categories further away. Exceptions to this rule are program types with strongly skewed
frequency distributions. Categories with relatively low cell counts tend to be located
relatively close to the perimeter of the figure. With strongly skewed distributions, however,
this does not necessarily imply a strong relationship. For example, there are only 6 people
in our sample who avoid news. Their over-representation among lower and lower middle
status groups and among people with lower secondary school, secondary vocational school,
and O levels, however, is not significant. The possible existence of such exceptions is the
reason why we performed the ÷  contingency tests discussed above.2
To facilitate discussion about over- and under-representations of respondents in
combinations of categories, we drew areas in the shape of rounded wedges. Since the
program types in these wedges are plotted roughly in the same direction from the origin, we
will simultaneously discuss their relationships with respondents’ occupational class and education.
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After correspondence analysis, we also used hierarchical regression analysis to
determine if the number of television program genres that people watch is related to their
education and occupational status. We included age in the analysis, because younger
generations in the Netherlands tend to be higher educated than older generations (Vogels,
2005). Including age prevents us from finding an age effect, masked as an effect of
education. For similar reasons we included the average time a person watches television;
people with a higher education tend to watch less television (Huysmans et al., 2004). The
results are presented in Table 2.
RESULTS
The first thing that catches the eye in Figure 2, is that the categories of both
occupational status and education are located in a typical horse shoe formation. People with
low status and lower middle status are at the left end of the status horse shoe, while the
upper middle status group is in the middle of the horse shoe, and the high status people are
at the other end. A similar pattern can be observed for education. People with elementary
school or less and lower vocational school are at the left end of the education horse shoe.
Conversely, people who have completed lower secondary school, secondary vocational
school, and O levels are at the middle of the horse shoe, and on the right end, A level,
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college, and university can be found. The education horse shoe is somewhat wider than the
status horse shoe. This indicates that, on average, the relationship between education and
what people watch and avoid is somewhat stronger than the relationship of occupational
status with their television lifestyle.
The second conspicuous aspect of Figure 2 is that there are a number of program genres
that are watched by such a varied audience that these genres do not distinguish the status and
educational strata from each other (gray labels). Watching talk shows about societal
problems, music, sports, and news programs appears not to be over-, nor under-represented
in any of the social categories under scrutiny. For example, everybody reports watching
news and two thirds of all social categories watch sports. Watching movies and
documentaries is only related to educational achievement and not to occupational status.
Below we will first discuss what different status groups watch and avoid on television.
After that, we will turn to television lifestyles of different educational levels.
Television programs in the upper left and lower left rounded wedges in Figure 2 are at
acute angles with low and lower middle status. This means that people with a low or lower
middle occupational status tend to avoid current affairs programs, cultural programs, and
political programs. It also indicates that they tend to watch talk shows about everyday
problems, soap operas and other daily serials, quiz and game shows, as well as health and
medical programs.
Upper middle status people are inclined to watch political and cultural programs (lower
right wedge) and not to avoid current affairs programs (obtuse angle with upper left wedge).
They tend, however, to avoid talk shows about everyday problems (lower half of upper right
wedge).
People with a high status are likely to avoid health and medical programs, quiz and
game shows, soap operas and other daily serials, and talk shows about everyday problems
(upper right wedge). They are somewhat inclined to watch political and cultural programs
(lower right wedge).
Regarding education, people with elementary school or less (e1), and people with lower
vocational school (e2), are prone to avoid documentaries, current affairs programs, cultural
programs, political programs (upper left wedge), and movies (upper middle wedge). They
are likely to watch talk shows about everyday problems (upper half of lower left wedge).
The people who have completed lower secondary school (e3), secondary vocational
school (e4), or O levels (e5) are apt to watch soap operas and other daily serials, quiz and
game shows, and health and medical programs (lower half of lower left wedge). They are
not disposed to avoid movies (upper middle wedge).
People with A levels (e6), college (e7), or university degrees (e8) are inclined to avoid
health and medical programs, quiz and game shows, soap operas and other daily serials, and
talk shows about everyday problems (upper right wedge). They are given to watch political
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and cultural programs (lower right wedge), and they have a slight tendency not to avoid
current affairs programs and documentaries (upper left wedge).
Finally, when combining results from the estimation of the programs’ complexity (see
Table 1) with the correspondence analysis shown in Figure 2, one can see that people with
a relatively low occupational status or education are prone to avoid programs with relatively
high complexity (political programs to documentaries in Table 1). People with a relatively
high occupational class or education are likely to avoid programs with relatively low
complexity (health and medical programs to music programs in Table 1).
Now that we know who watches or avoids what types of television programs, we
address omnivorousness in itself. Table 2 shows the regression of the number of genres
people view on their education and occupational status, as well as their age and the time
they spend on television. Only age and time spent on television appear to be related to the
number of genres somebody views on television. Thus, neither education, nor occupational
status is related to the number of genres a person watches. Therefore we conclude that, as
to television program genres in relation to education and occupational status, it is impossible
to discern omnivores from univores. The thesis of cultural omnivorousness does not seem
to apply to television viewing in the Netherlands at the turn of the century.
DISCUSSION
We conclude that all status groups as well as all educational layers in Dutch society
watch limited sets of program types – sets that are of roughly comparable size. Thus, they
all show a similar degree of television omnivorousness or – depending on where you draw
the line – television univorousness. Some program types are popular among all, but that does
not make some status groups or educational layers more omnivorous than others. The
difference between lifestyles of the social strata is not a difference in the quantity of
program types they watch, but rather a difference in the quality of the programs that they
watch. Elites are prone to watch more complex program types and lower strata tend to watch
less complex program types. In this respect, elites can still be said to have snob taste, as
opposed to the slob taste of people with lower status and less cultural capital – which is a
conclusion that fits well with Bourdieu’s (1979/1984) original theory.
Thus, with respect to television in the Netherlands, there seems to be no reason yet to
amend Bourdieu’s seminal work on Distinction. Peterson and Simkus’ (1992) amendment
of Bourdieu’s theory does not seem to apply to the Dutch situation concerning television
tastes. Although their amendment may apply to musical and other cultural tastes, it does not
imply cultural omnivorousness in general.
Some might object to our study and its theoretical framework because of the private
character of watching television. Indeed, Western people usually watch television within the
confines of their nuclear family (Lull, 1988). Therefore watching or avoiding particular
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television programs could be regarded as a private activity that does not exhibit one’s
societal status. However, this would also hold true for reading, for which omnivorousness
has been shown by Van Rees et al. (1999). After all, people talk about what they read
(Kraaykamp & Dijkstra, 1999), and people talk about what they saw on television (Lull,
1980). In other words, people make sure that others can infer their status from their reading
and from their television viewing. So, the activity of watching television itself may be
private and hardly visible outside the family home, but through conversation people can get
a fairly accurate idea of what other people watch and avoid.
Closely related is a possible critique that our results might have been influenced by
social desirability. After all, our data stem from face-to-face interviews. However, if
respondents were indeed prone to give answers that they thought were socially desirable,
they would have done exactly what they do on a daily basis when they exhibit their social
status through discussing their lifestyle. Thus, social desirability seems to be no impediment
for research on social distinction.
And, indeed, there are a few reasons for further research on this topic. First, our data are
eight years old, by now. Changes might have occurred since 2000. However, that does not
necessarily render our conclusions invalid. The transition of the elites from snobs to
omnivores as it was describes by Peterson and Simkus (1992; Peterson, 1992; Peterson &
Kern, 1996), López Sintas and García Álvares (2002), and Van Eijck (2001), was described
by these authors with data from the 1980’s and early 1990’s. The process must have started
much earlier, and is probably still in progress (cf. Peterson & Kern, 1992). Thus, the fact
that in 2000 television viewing still is unaffected, makes it probable that it never will be.
Second, the results from Dutch research on omnivorousness (e.g. Van Eijck, 2001), thus
far, are comparable to results from other Western societies such as the United States and
Spain (e.g., Peterson & Simkus, 1992; López Sintas & García Álvares, 2002). Therefore, we
deem it probable that our results apply to more societies than the Netherlands alone. It
would be interesting to investigate through future research whether this is true.
Third, since new media such as the Internet and computer games claim more and more
attention from media users, it would be interesting to investigate the phenomenon of cultural
omnivorousness for these new media too. Do the elites play other games and do they use the
Internet differently, or do they play more different kinds of games and do they have more
diverse usage for the Internet than the lower social strata? Research on questions like that
may deepen our understanding of the phenomenon of cultural omnivorousness, whether with
respect to television viewing, or any other form of cultural lifestyle.
Our present study has at least two different implications for the field of communication.
First, watching certain television programs may function as a token of one’s (aspired) social
position. Thus uses and gratifications scholars might endeavor to find out if distinction may
serve as a gratification sought or obtained with respect to television use. Second, higher
amounts of cultural capital unlatch more complex television genres. In other words, both a
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need to behave in accordance with one’s social status, and deployment of one’s cultural
capital may be considered to be contingent conditions for media attendance.
ENDNOTES
1. After transforming the original scores to normal scores on the basis of their rank, the intraclass
correlation coefficient can be computed as a measure of agreement between the experts (McGraw &
Wong, 1996).
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